Loveland Pass avalanche 4.20.13

[ballackout]

I suppose I should start by saying this: I am young (22) and inexperienced (2nd year in the BC). I have been thinking about this incident a lot especially because if I was with this group I'm not sure I would have questioned the travel plan or method.

That said, I am trying to find the silver lining so I can learn from it. Ignoring the expert v. expert dickwaving here is what I will take away from this tragedy:

1) Persistent weak layers do not persist on every slope, angle, aspect or elevation; BUT,

2) Persistent weak layers form most seasons in CO (where I live) and they are fucking scary.

3) PWLs are hard to trigger, but when they are triggered they will RIP WIDER, RIP DEEPER and RUN LONGER than I would first think. aka my safe zone better be safe and spacing between partners better be larger than I would first think.

3) PWLs are often triggered from the margins. In other words, as CAIC noted many times this season, you could lay many tacks down the gut of a path with no result. But travel around the toe of a path and you bring the whole mountain down. Adjust travel plans to avoid the margins (if you must travel through an area that might have the risk of a PWL.)

4) If you have an avalung or bag available. Make it deploy-able at the trailhead.

As I said before, I am a rookie and I know that in theory these things are easy. I hope that I will remember these lessons every time I leave the trailhead and that I have the courage to actively discuss these things with my partners.

RIP to the victims, I hope their families and friends are surrounded by love.

[Pinner]

^^^be careful of your terminology. Especially re: your #3

Know the difference between persistent weak layers and deep persistent slabs.

Here's a good primer.

[neck beard]

I wonder how many maritime backcountry skiers who practice good travel habits would have made a similar route choice, thinking that a wide enough berth had been provided considering the terrain and primary problem on the day?

I live in an area where "at least half" would not manage a season without serious incident in a continental pack if they transferred what they thought were good habits to that snowpack (they are good habits, just not applied liberally enough?) That statistic may include myself. Actually, a lot of maritime pack skiers that I see have very few good habits developed at all. Many happily kick the dragon in the face on a regular basis and get away with it.

Doing the right thing, and doing it right enough is important when it comes to PWLs and DPSs. Low frequency situations are not good environments for us to learn whether our good habits are good enough... until they are not.

Leaving all that for a moment, I thought this was a tough fact to read. Tougher for the man involved. Be strong dude, your friends will help you through.

The survivor continued to yell for help, but to no avail, as there was no one left unburied to hear him and no other people in the area. The survivor was stranded in this position for approximately 4 hours before rescuers arrived at the scene.

[Canada1]

I wonder how many maritime backcountry skiers who practice good travel habits would have made a similar route choice, thinking that a wide enough berth had been provided considering the terrain and primary problem on the day?

This section is probably the most skied (Backcountry) in Colorado. It is a very high traffic region with very easy road access. It is an unusual up climb because that gully and the face in the trees under the road unfortunately breaks away frequently. It is also an unusual upclimb location because on one side of the gully you are literally climbing from a parking lot to an open paved road. This creates a situation where many clueless individuals would drop in on you as you climb. This could be unintentional because they didn't see you or in ignorance of saftey protocol.

[skiingislife]

This section is probably the most skied (Backcountry) in Colorado.

Not true.

[kailas]

The report said that they had received three feet of snow in the past few days, Vail even opened back up with thirty inches of new. To me, this is a red flag, stay out of the backcountry for a few days and let the snow settle. Certainly don't ski under avalanche terrain to get to your ski destination, stay on the ridges when possible, and be very conservative. I'm sorry, but the AMGA doesn't necessarily produce good guides any more. So sad when these things happen. Who am I, a Colorado skier born and bred with over forty years skiing in the BC, and I'm not even fifty yet.

[rmnpsplitter]

The report said that they had received three feet of snow in the past few days, Vail even opened back up with thirty inches of new. To me, this is a red flag, stay out of the backcountry for a few days and let the snow settle. Certainly don't ski under avalanche terrain to get to your ski destination, stay on the ridges when possible, and be very conservative. I'm sorry, but the AMGA doesn't necessarily produce good guides any more. So sad when these things happen. Who am I, a Colorado skier born and bred with over forty years skiing in the BC, and I'm not even fifty yet.

Did you personally know Rick? Ever tour with him or spend time with him? It's one thing to say that mistakes were made but to call out a person who is no longer with us is pretty fucked. In other words, shut the fuck up.

[LeeLau]

Lou's annotated writeup is really good. http://www.wildsnow.com/9962/caic-sh...#comment-53141

Particularly like this from him

Lou Dawson April 25th, 2013 7:10 am
One other thing to add before I race out of here for a few hours: I’d like to commend all of you for having the obvious experience and knowledge to not focus on airbags, Avalungs, and snowpits. The human factor and decision making were the nut causes of this accident.. Snowpit was not important, airbags would have done nothing, and while perhaps Avalung use would have saved someone that’s a remote factor at this point in time, in terms of discussion. And look at how useless beacons were other than for fulfilling a social contract and helping with a speedy recovery…
So again, thanks for focusing on what is important — the human brain.
Lou

[Bunion 2020]

Did you personally know Rick? Ever tour with him or spend time with him? It's one thing to say that mistakes were made but to call out a person who is no longer with us is pretty fucked. In other words, shut the fuck up.

Hey, a person can be a quality human being, can be the nicest most fun person on the planet and still make a mistake that kills them.

You are hurting right now and I think we can all comprehend your pain even though we are not going through it, but;

"The report said that they had received three feet of snow in the past few days, Vail even opened back up with thirty inches of new. To me, this is a red flag, stay out of the backcountry for a few days and let the snow settle. Certainly don't ski under avalanche terrain to get to your ski destination, stay on the ridges when possible, and be very conservative."

^^^ this isn't calling someone out in order to be a dick, it is pretty much spot on.

[rmnpsplitter]

Hey, a person can be a quality human being, can be the nicest most fun person on the planet and still make a mistake that kills them.

You are hurting right now and I think we can all comprehend your pain even though we are not going through it, but;

"The report said that they had received three feet of snow in the past few days, Vail even opened back up with thirty inches of new. To me, this is a red flag, stay out of the backcountry for a few days and let the snow settle. Certainly don't ski under avalanche terrain to get to your ski destination, stay on the ridges when possible, and be very conservative."

^^^ this isn't calling someone out in order to be a dick, it is pretty much spot on.

I'm sorry, but the AMGA doesn't necessarily produce good guides any more.

This is what bothers me. I realize the mistakes made and the cost its had. Rick knew his shit, he just made a terrible mistake and paid the ultimate price.

[Danno]

Hey, a person can be a quality human being, can be the nicest most fun person on the planet and still make a mistake that kills them.

You are hurting right now and I think we can all comprehend your pain even though we are not going through it, but;

"The report said that they had received three feet of snow in the past few days, Vail even opened back up with thirty inches of new. To me, this is a red flag, stay out of the backcountry for a few days and let the snow settle. Certainly don't ski under avalanche terrain to get to your ski destination, stay on the ridges when possible, and be very conservative."

^^^ this isn't calling someone out in order to be a dick, it is pretty much spot on.

I have a feeling it was this sentence that got the rise out of him, and yes, this is calling someone out:

I'm sorry, but the AMGA doesn't necessarily produce good guides any more.

[ate'em]

good to see the final CAIC report, definitely clarifies some points-

safe zones- this has been a recurring theme in several avy accidents this year. I am thinking of the fatal accident across the road from Silverton Mtn earlier in the winter. It seems like we have a tendency to think that large trees mean 'safe zone'. It is a real false security to select 'safe zones' that may have large trees, but are still exposed to avalanche flows. IIRC, similar story in Haines last winter. Every time we hear how the slab was much larger than anticipated. Or that it was an expectionally large avalanche. I think we are just over-estimating the safety of our safe zones.

To take an analogy from climbing, belay anchors are selected to be completely secure, in fact way more secure than seemingly necessary, not just generally secure enough to get the job done. Our safe zones need to incorporate a huge margin of error, becuase when we need them most, we need them to be completely safe. Sure, its complex, but safe zones shouldn't be front-row seats, they should be well back from the action. We have to assume our decisions are suspect, and leave a large margin to ensure we are on the right side of the line.

[lynchdogger]

Hey, a person can be a quality human being, can be the nicest most fun person on the planet and still make a mistake that kills them.

You are hurting right now and I think we can all comprehend your pain even though we are not going through it, but;

"The report said that they had received three feet of snow in the past few days, Vail even opened back up with thirty inches of new. To me, this is a red flag, stay out of the backcountry for a few days and let the snow settle. Certainly don't ski under avalanche terrain to get to your ski destination, stay on the ridges when possible, and be very conservative."

^^^ this isn't calling someone out in order to be a dick, it is pretty much spot on.

Agreed. Admittedly, I live in a maritime snowpack and where I have done most of my bc skiing - over twenty years. But I used to live in Telluride and Steamboat for a total of 5 years. That snowpack scared the crap out of me then and does now when you have those deep instabilities going on. Regardless of where I live and do most my skiing there is no way in hell I would have been skinning thru or across that drainage. Hell, I would not have been in that parking lot the way it is described with the lot being at treeline and the gully terminating at the lot. Not on that day and not in those conditions.
No way.

Sent from my SCH-I535 using TGR Forums

[lynchdogger]

Lou's annotated writeup is really good. http://www.wildsnow.com/9962/caic-sh...#comment-53141

Particularly like this from him

Lou Dawson April 25th, 2013 7:10 am
One other thing to add before I race out of here for a few hours: I’d like to commend all of you for having the obvious experience and knowledge to not focus on airbags, Avalungs, and snowpits. The human factor and decision making were the nut causes of this accident.. Snowpit was not important, airbags would have done nothing, and while perhaps Avalung use would have saved someone that’s a remote factor at this point in time, in terms of discussion. And look at how useless beacons were other than for fulfilling a social contract and helping with a speedy recovery…
So again, thanks for focusing on what is important — the human brain.
Lou

This! Well said Lou.

Sent from my SCH-I535 using TGR Forums

[simplypow]

"I would not tour with you or around you" is the perfect response to that garbage. Too many people for my taste , bottom up ascent from hard slab area, and other shit to cross off my list of worries.

[bodywhomper]

condolences to family and friends.

I wonder how many maritime backcountry skiers who practice good travel habits would have made a similar route choice, thinking that a wide enough berth had been provided considering the terrain and primary problem on the day?

I live in an area where "at least half" would not manage a season without serious incident in a continental pack if they transferred what they thought were good habits to that snowpack (they are good habits, just not applied liberally enough?) That statistic may include myself. Actually, a lot of maritime pack skiers that I see have very few good habits developed at all. Many happily kick the dragon in the face on a regular basis and get away with it.

Doing the right thing, and doing it right enough is important when it comes to PWLs and DPSs. Low frequency situations are not good environments for us to learn whether our good habits are good enough... until they are not.

As somebody who primarily tours in maritime snow, but received his 'formal' education in an intermountain snow pack, at the time with lots of new snow and a deep pwl that was just quieting down, I would like to think that I would give an overly wide berth to a continental pwl or dps. when there is a pwl locally by me, i play it safe with meadow skipping (big r/r skis are great from that in wet maritime snow) and keep monitor the layer until it's calmed down (and stays calm after more loading).

if i were a true tourist to an area (no familiarity) under the conditions spelled out in the recent caic forecast, i would like to think that i would something else to do other than ski touring. it would be too unnerving to me to be dealing with the combination of the potential for a dps to release (in the midst of a cycle) that could be very large and possibly run further than most slides (i.e. a low recurrence event) coupled with not being familiar enough with the terrain to feel assured that i was not w/in the alpha angle of paths that maybe I can't even see because of forested terrain. I love exploring new areas, but not with a relatively high likelihood of a high consequence and (usually) low recurrence event.

In the caic report, it states that two of the rescuers "arrived at the scene having skinned up Sheep Creek." Having no idea of their actual route, this reads like these two could possibly have been putting themselves (unknowingly) in harms path, skinning up a terrain trap with dps that have the characteristic of being triggered from below.

[Danno]

Lou's annotated writeup is really good. http://www.wildsnow.com/9962/caic-sh...#comment-53141

Particularly like this from him

Lou Dawson April 25th, 2013 7:10 am
One other thing to add before I race out of here for a few hours: I’d like to commend all of you for having the obvious experience and knowledge to not focus on airbags, Avalungs, and snowpits. The human factor and decision making were the nut causes of this accident.. Snowpit was not important, airbags would have done nothing, and while perhaps Avalung use would have saved someone that’s a remote factor at this point in time, in terms of discussion. And look at how useless beacons were other than for fulfilling a social contract and helping with a speedy recovery…
So again, thanks for focusing on what is important — the human brain.
Lou

Interesting, your link took me to the following comment, a bit below Lou's, which I also happen to like a lot:

I agree with Mr. Gladding. I don’t take issue with the decisions that were made. I have done it, any of you who have skiied in the backcountry for 20 plus years has done it. I was horrified to see figure 5 of the caic report. I might have made the same decisions they did, figuring that i could get away with shooting the gap of the runout to the lesser angled tree area. i have been reading these incident reports for many years, and this one had the most effect on me, and I probably learned more from this report than I have ever learned from the review of any other incident. I will probably forever reconsider undercutting [in the runout zone] a large path like this after reading this report, and will always remember this incident when considering the realities of what might really happen if a deep monster slab releases in the area I am touring. This truly sucks. Anyone that attempts to get on a high horse about how the victims made questionable decisions, or how “I would not have been in that situtation” is either full of shit, or hasn’t skiied very many days in the backcountry through the years. I am sure Lou would tell us that he has likely been in similar positions in his lifetime. Nothing is more telling than Lou’s comment at the beginning picture: “Put yourself in the photo, I know I did.” Yeah, that is what I did also, right after I saw the caic pictures and report, and before even coming to this site.

[simple]

condolences to family and friends.



In the caic report, it states that two of the rescuers "arrived at the scene having skinned up Sheep Creek." Having no idea of their actual route, this reads like these two could possibly have been putting themselves (unknowingly) in harms path, skinning up a terrain trap with dps that have the characteristic of being triggered from below.

As one of the two skinners i can assure you we did not skin up a terrain trap. We skinned up a closed ski area run which tops out and then along a summer road which opens to the gully. For reference look at the maps on caic

[simplypow]

Reminds me of incident near south diamond/ cameron pass area 7 years ago, and I mention this because I think many people are discounting the CAIC’s advisories at the risk of diluting them. The series of behemoth avalanche in EVERY surrounding forecast zone for many days, if not more than week beforehand, demonstrated the absolute necessity of taking this type of event into consideration. I regularly need to remind myself when reading CAIC advisories that Dr. Ethen Greene & company do not use words like persistent, likely, and dangerous just because that’s how we talk. Unfortunately, that is how we talk, and consequently people don’t really have the focus or desire to effectively engage each other in these terms all the time. This isn’t an excuse for people to use poor judgement. It just something everyone needs to become fully appraised of when going BC.

[Danno]

Reminds me of incident near south diamond/ cameron pass area 7 years ago, and I mention this because I think many people are discounting the CAIC’s advisories at the risk of diluting them. The series of behemoth avalanche in EVERY surrounding forecast zone for many days, if not more than week beforehand, demonstrated the absolute necessity of taking this type of event into consideration. I regularly need to remind myself when reading CAIC advisories that Dr. Ethen Greene & company do not use words like persistent, likely, and dangerous just because that’s how we talk. Unfortunately, that is how we talk, and consequently people don’t really have the focus or desire to effectively engage each other in these terms all the time. This isn’t an excuse for people to use poor judgement. It just something everyone needs to become fully appraised of when going BC.

I think there's truth to that, the language doesn't have the strength of meaning it should. And I think we all have a real hard time evaluating the risk for the low probability, high consequence event. Because when you take a chance on that type of situation, most of the time you get away with it. And it's hard to know exactly where to draw the line of safety for the high consequence event (short of staying home).

[Lindahl]

Reminds me of incident near south diamond/ cameron pass area 7 years ago, and I mention this because I think many people are discounting the CAIC’s advisories at the risk of diluting them. The series of behemoth avalanche in EVERY surrounding forecast zone for many days, if not more than week beforehand, demonstrated the absolute necessity of taking this type of event into consideration. I regularly need to remind myself when reading CAIC advisories that Dr. Ethen Greene & company do not use words like persistent, likely, and dangerous just because that’s how we talk. Unfortunately, that is how we talk, and consequently people don’t really have the focus or desire to effectively engage each other in these terms all the time. This isn’t an excuse for people to use poor judgement. It just something everyone needs to become fully appraised of when going BC.

Good point - do you mean sort of like complacency in reading the forecast?

[Hugh Conway]

So, one death and pictures of massive naturals on similar aspects aren't enough for you guys to focus on? What exactly do you focus on? I've made plenty of mistakes, and curse myself for forgetting and making them (and fortunately haven't been injured), but I'm genuinely mystified by this stuff. 20 years touring and not thinking of big slide runouts? Is it just most "touring" is turning your mind off and having fun?

[TBS]

Unfortunately, they made the worst mistake possible... they decided to go out at all that day. Powtron and I drove past that area on Friday afternoon (18-20 hours before the slide) and we were able to see half a dozen natural slides before AND after the tunnel on a similar aspect, just from I-70 alone. If we were closer to the faces, I'm sure there would have been more. I'm hardly an expert in the backcountry, but it was more than clear that people shouldn't have messed with anything remotely close to N-facing last weekend.

Another group (who turned out to be the first responders) toured in the same area at the same time without slides, so I really don't think staying indoors was the only answer.

I think that it might be important to teach people how to say no, or how to insist on safe travel techniques, or how to be verbal about following the rules. It sucks "being that guy ( or gal ) who is the 'killjoy' or the 'stickler'", but I think it's a really important skill. It's sad to say, but, like a lot of people, I've seen --so-- much over the years that I really have to conclude some people just don't give a fuck. I know there are times I certainly haven't given a fuck, but I try very hard these days. Anyway, knowing how to tour in the backcountry ( experience ) isn't the same as knowing how to do it properly ( skill ), and that certainly includes always following certain rules, and knowing how to be the 'killjoy' or the 'stickler' or what have you.

Not sure how much of this is a matter of giving a fuck and how much is the difficulty of stepping outside ourselves to look at a situation objectively. I've been fortunate to have touring partners with risk tolerance on the wimpier side of the scale, that listened to each other and were all willing to walk away or re-route if one was sketched. That makes it easy to speak up.

Lou's comments on the CAIC report:
http://www.wildsnow.com/9962/caic-sh...port-annotated

Dawson's and Cookie Monster's comments on training really provoke thought. When I went through an L1 refresher in 2010 there wasn't near the focus on recognizing/mitigating sketchy terrain as there was on snow crystal ID and pit tests. Sure, the latter informs the former, but IMO terrain recognition and management is where all the avy skills/knowledge come together.

Thing is, how do you teach terrain evaluation and human factor issues in two-three field days? We went through a bunch of case studies, but that's a poor substitute for actual field time. It's also hard/impossible to create enough realistic field simulations in three days, especially the human issues. OTOH, if a bunch more field time gets added to the L1 curriculum, the cost increases, fewer people may go through the training and overall avy sense suffers.

Any ideas from the instructors out there?

Regarding safe zones - One guy who survived last year's Tunnel Creek slide did so by grabbing the uphill side of two small trees just before the snow hit. He was standing right next to Elyse Saugstad, who went for a ride. Ever since, I try to stop just above a huggable tree in case I need an anchor. Wonder whether the three who were in the safe zone at Loveland were below the trees or in them...

[tone capone]

I am so sorry this tragedy had to happen, it is with great respect for the survivor of this event and the friends and family of the deceased that I type these words, which I hope will contribute in some small way to the safety of others.

Bottom line for me:

With every person your party grows by, no matter the level of experience or "expertise", there is the potential of complicating descicion making and compromising observation quality to some extent. If a group is relatively inexperienced in observing deep slap cycles, and the group desire to "ski something worthwhile" is high, then the potential for trouble can increase exponentially. This is why we are left scratching our heads. It's no ones fault, it doesn't mean we're ignorant, it just means we're human. Individually, most in the party, if not all, recognized the hazard, but some combination of yet to be determined, or indeterminable human brain/groupthink factors quickly influenced the descision making of that fateful day.

Perhaps only a few true avalanche experts with decades of traveling in avalanche terrain with others are capable of entirely mitigating the human factors of a large group in serious conditions. I know it's a vulnerability for me, and I have been guilty of letting my guard down and or not making the best descisions whithin groups larger than two or three.

It's amazing how fast travel protocol can degrade, how quickly and easily you can end up with multiple people exposed, just to "get from one safe zone to another" especially on the uptrack. Something about group dynamics, maybe it's the basic human instinct of safety in numbers, causes these lapses in judgement to happen more frequently than we would like to admit I believe. It's very difficult to identify and override these instinctual human behaviors in groups, I have found in my experience.

I have been thinking about this alot since the Tunnel Creek event and trying to recognize the potential in myself and others to make mistakes or take unncessessary risk while traveling in groups. Most often I come to the personal conclusion that yes, I have greater potential to make mistakes and take more risk within a group, so it's just not in my best interest to plan trips in the Backcountry with multiple people when there is the potential for large events. So the valuable lesson of these two tragedies for me is: save group plans for times of more mitagable hazard when human factors have less potential to cause big events and big trouble. Sounds simple enough but there is nothing simple about group dynamics and their influence on travel in avalanche terrain. To me it's the most complex variable.

[simplypow]

Good point - do you mean sort of like complacency in reading the forecast?

Assuming you are focused-yes. But I was beaten, tortured, and raped as a child.