Loveland Pass avalanche 4.20.13

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by smmokan

Unfortunately, they made the worst mistake possible... they decided to go out at all that day. Powtron and I drove past that area on Friday afternoon (18-20 hours before the slide) and we were able to see half a dozen natural slides before AND after the tunnel on a similar aspect, just from I-70 alone. If we were closer to the faces, I'm sure there would have been more. I'm hardly an expert in the backcountry, but it was more than clear that people shouldn't have messed with anything remotely close to N-facing last weekend.

---

I'd hate to engage in a "they shouldn't have been out that day" discussion because most of us have done similarly in the past. Otherwise, it would be unfair to those lives lost to put the finger where we (or most of us) may have dodged 10s to 100s of bullets without knowing it.

It's easy to look back and use the Vail Pass avalanche and recent slide activity as omens to back away. Sure, those are red flags and things that would have (and did) keep me inside. But the greater lesson for me personally deals with mitigating risk and travel underneath a death trap more effectively (or no travel at all).

The group may have very well been mere feet away from being alive today. And then what? Just say how terrible a decision it was to be out there? Or take home a deeper meaning that we could all learn from? I'd rather learn from this accident and broaden my backcountry skills than to point blame at being out that day.

Judging from the photos it looks like their safe zone, was really close to be truly safe, but not quite there. Damn.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by cmsummit

Judging from the photos it looks like their safe zone, was really close to be truly safe, but not quite there. Damn.

---

Noticed that too. Like feet away. Sobering.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by PappaG

I'd hate to engage in a "they shouldn't have been out that day" discussion because most of us have done similarly in the past. Otherwise, it would be unfair to those lives lost to put the finger where we (or most of us) may have dodged 10s to 100s of bullets without knowing it.

It's easy to look back and use the Vail Pass avalanche and recent slide activity as omens to back away. Sure, those are red flags and things that would have (and did) keep me inside. But the greater lesson for me personally deals with mitigating risk and travel underneath a death trap more effectively (or no travel at all).

The group may have very well been mere feet away from being alive today. And then what? Just say how terrible a decision it was to be out there? Or take home a deeper meaning that we could all learn from? I'd rather learn from this accident and broaden my backcountry skills than to point blame at being out that day.

---

I think you hit it pretty spot on with this post. My only second guessing at this point is terrain/route selection given the CAIC's report that they had to cross dangerous terrain to get to what they deemed safe terrain. Sounds like all the proper discussions took place and they at least tried to follow proper protocol. As I look at the topo map, I wonder if they would've kept following the alignment tangent to the summer road gaining the more west and even southwest facing terrain, they might've been ok traveling up the small ridge that is on the northeastern flank of the drainage. You could play the what if game the rest of your life I guess and it wont make it any easier. Really makes you think about the subtleties in terrain and how important that is when analyzing routes and safe zones. So sad and a very hard read. Thanks to the survivor and rescuers for telling their tales so we can all learn from this.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by cmsummit

Judging from the photos it looks like their safe zone, was really close to be truly safe, but not quite there. Damn.

---

This is my conclusion too - sounds like they were trying to travel safely, but maybe thought the slope could never possibly rip that big, so their safe zone was safe enough.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by rmnpsplitter

Really makes you think about the subtleties in terrain and how important that is when analyzing routes and safe zones. So sad and a very hard read.

---

This reminds me of the maxim (somewhere in Tremper's book) "It takes a lifetime to learn how to read terrain. Maybe two lifetimes".

And major thanks to Jerome Boulay and the first responders for helping us learn. Really sad situation and I hope the survivors find peace.

What I took from that report, was to put some thought into safe zone selection - which can be complex, especially in new-to-you terrain. I'll probably be overestimating slide path dimensions for a while into the future.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by cmsummit

Judging from the photos it looks like their safe zone, was really close to be truly safe, but not quite there. Damn.

---

It looks like less than 20ft and there would be at least 3 total survivors. That one is eating at me too. Very close to being out of harm's way.

As far as not being out that day? The terrain choice was not a good place to be out in that day.

It's spooky to read that day-of CAIC forecast. Remote triggers and hardslab are terrifying.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by PappaG

I'd hate to engage in a "they shouldn't have been out that day" discussion because most of us have done similarly in the past. Otherwise, it would be unfair to those lives lost to put the finger where we (or most of us) may have dodged 10s to 100s of bullets without knowing it.

---

Agreed. In this case some major red flags were very apparent, but it'd be pretty easy to put oneself in a similar position (crossing below a loaded slope) on a day when the clues are less obvious, but the snowpack is just as dangerous all the same. I'm sure I've been there.

One major takeaway for me will be the run-out angle concept. It's something I paid little attention to up until this spring when I started reading Tremper's book in earnest. Previously my run-out estimates were guesstimates at best. For me this accident reinforces the importance of a true evaluation of that hazard during trip planning and in the field.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by cmsummit

Judging from the photos it looks like their safe zone, was really close to be truly safe, but not quite there. Damn.

---

So close. Terrible.

Another takeaway is if it looks like you are going to get caught - put in your avalung and make sure your airbag is able to be triggered and/or trigger it (don't own an airbag... I'd think I'd undue it at the trailhead when the beacons turned on).

to say that anyone should not have been out on a day like this or that is fucking rediculous. choose terrain wisely and it doesn't matter if whole mountain sides are coming down. just don't be underneath them. there is never a bad day to be out unless you have no viz or the snow sucks. touring on days when shit is hitting the fan is the best way to see avy terrain in all it's wildest glory and to learn by observing using all of your senses. you stay home on high days, good, but you'll have zero perspective on what it's like to be out on those days.

rog

Just trying to further my understanding and have some lingering questions that the report seems to be missing some details:

- In the first group (persons 1-3) how far did they travel in the avalanche? Sounds like they traveled at most 5 ft which if so is pretty disheartening as it doesn't sound like trauma affected them.

- Also sounds like they really didn't get pushed too far considering the size of the avalanche if the furthest person was only 20 ft off of their path. This is surprising to me and I would have thought that they would have been pushed a lot further considering the terrain. Is this normal or is distance traveled too hard to predict?

- In this photo: https://avalanche.state.co.us/media/...c_505_5134.jpg is the obvious small tree stand in the middle/right on the slope the place that they had designated as their safe zone? Not very familiar with that spot and trying to orient myself.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by telebobski

This is my conclusion too - sounds like they were trying to travel safely, but maybe thought the slope could never possibly rip that big, so their safe zone was safe enough.

---

We inspected it from Loveland Valley the following morning and from looking at the avalanche it was obviously big, but it didn't seem out of the ordinary for that terrain. At first we were uncertain if that was the avalanche as at that time there were no details about them crossing the slope and it seemed unexpected that 6 ppl would be riding the slope at that time due to the physical structure of the slope.

Granted this is all hindsight but I will really be evaluating safe-zones going forward as that Sunday I caught myself hanging out in a "Safe-zone" in the Beavers that probably wouldn't be safe if the whole-slope triggered but probably safe if only a portion of the slope triggered.

Good reminder that decisions should be made on worse-case scenarios.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by icelanticskier

to say that anyone should not have been out on a day like this or that is fucking rediculous. choose terrain wisely and it doesn't matter if whole mountain sides are coming down. just don't be underneath them. there is never a bad day to be out unless you have no viz or the snow sucks. touring on days when shit is hitting the fan is the best way to see avy terrain in all it's wildest glory and to learn by observing using all of your senses. you stay home on high days, good, but you'll have zero perspective on what it's like to be out on those days.

---

+1

Learn how to have fun on non-dangerous slopes for the 'bad days'. Aside from biking, staying on under 30 deg slopes has kept me occupied this week. Scary to see so many people pushing it on steep terrain today/yesterday after another 13". Sure, it's not 40", but things still haven't neccessarily settled down yet and 13" more is definitely teasing for more activity. Tomorrow could be bad too with the warming. Disheartening just a bit to see some of the fb activity I've seen.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Vandeezy

Granted this is all hindsight but I will really be evaluating safe-zones going forward

---

Safe zones and only exposing one person at a time. I'm a little confused by the group decision on 50' spacing underneath a slope like that. If one of the group's goal is to minimize exposure underneath a slope by spacing out, 50' is pretty ineffective, even for a small slide on that slope. Ultimately, it may not have mattered one bit in this accident as at least one of the safe zones wasn't safe. We'll never know with the deceased, but I wonder if anyone in the group questioned the 50' spacing in their own minds and said nothing.

Terribly sad.

This event is reminiscent of the 2003 Strathcona-Tweedsmuir avalanche that killed 7 secondary school students. ( For those who aren't familiar with the story: http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/fea.../24/avalanche/ ) It's also reminiscent of the avalanche at La Traviata on Tumbledown Mountain ( also 2003 ) in which Craig Kelly was killed. Major violations of safe travel technique put too many people in harm's way, and a lot of people died as a result.

I haven't posted on my blog much this year because I'm running out of things that I want to say about avalanches, but I'd like to add the following to this discussion.

I think that it might be important to teach people how to say no, or how to insist on safe travel techniques, or how to be verbal about following the rules. It sucks "being that guy ( or gal ) who is the 'killjoy' or the 'stickler'", but I think it's a really important skill. It's sad to say, but, like a lot of people, I've seen --so-- much over the years that I really have to conclude some people just don't give a fuck. I know there are times I certainly haven't given a fuck, but I try very hard these days. Anyway, knowing how to tour in the backcountry ( experience ) isn't the same as knowing how to do it properly ( skill ), and that certainly includes always following certain rules, and knowing how to be the 'killjoy' or the 'stickler' or what have you.

I feel terrible for their families.

I also want to add something else:

For icelanticskier ( AKA "Rog" ):

You come across as a complete and utter moron. You speak about snow science ( stratigraphy in particular ) as if it has nothing to contribute to the sport. You paint with a broad brush when you say that people use snowpits their sole justification for go/no go decisions, when the fact of the matter is that some people do, some people don't, and some people do sometimes. A better understanding of snow science ( and the interaction of weather and terrain ), not a poorer understanding, is what helps people learn NOT to rely on stratigraphic data at the expense of the other datums.

* Weather = Type III information
* Snowpack = Type II information
* Instability ( whumpfing, cracking in the snow cover, avalanches ) = Type I information

Here's why your consistently negative statements about snow science make you sound like a moron: snowpack instability is a continuum between conditional instability and absolute instability. The snowpack is absolutely unstable for what amounts to a very small amount of time during each winter. Most of the time, the snowpack is conditionally unstable, which means that avalanche formation is possible at certain places relative to normal triggering forces. Snowpack tests ( again, Type II information ) can provide invaluable information during times when signs of instability are hard to find otherwise. McClung ( as in Dave McClung, one of the co-authors of The Avalanche Handbook ) suggests in The Avalanche Handbook that certain types of snowpack information, such as shear quality can actually constitute class I information about instability.

You, on the other hand, would apparently prefer to ignore snowpack data entirely, which begs the question: assuming that the snowpack is conditionally unstable ( recent weather has been clear and there are not obvious signs of instability ), where would you suggest we look for data? Despite your pronouncements of being "so experienced" the very fact that you take a position against valuable information makes me think that you are, in fact, not very experienced, and that your mountain travel skills perhaps are not as good as you would like us to believe. It's ESPECIALLY amusing to watch you spout off about "going out when instability is high so you can learn" as if it's difficult to forecast avalanches when instability is high.

I look forward to your response!

Cookie Monster
Don't conflate experienced with knowledgeable. It's a very important distinction. That conflation is partly why people end up not being "that guy" because hey so and so has done tons of tours, they must know what's up. Right?

Been following this pretty close and don't have much to add to the analysis, the CAIC report is both well researched and downright humbling.

Remote trigger, almost-island of safety, not quite enough spacing between members, etc. In my mind they were so close to safely avoiding the dangers they sought to avoid, regardless of how one interprets their risk tolerance that day.

The subjective component is most troubling as all it takes is a miscalculation in one or two details to cause a tragedy.

That piece from DenPo on the victims put the human toll in perspective well, some fine people were in that group. Really a tough week to process, I've had a lot of reevaluation of the risks I take, without much in the way of answers or conclusions..

Very glad to see the $ raised for Lamphere's (sp?) daughter, planning to chip in. Best wishes to those in CO & otherwise affected.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Hugh Conway

Cookie Monster
Don't conflate experienced with knowledgeable. It's a very important distinction. That conflation is partly why people end up not being "that guy" because hey so and so has done tons of tours, they must know what's up. Right?

---

You're definitely right.

I meant teach people how to speak up regardless of expert halo or pecking order, although I realise it's harder to do in practise than in principle.

***

From the published accounts, something about their tour feels hurried and careless. Maybe it should have been one-at-a-time instead of all-at-once ( even with spacing ).

Sent from my Paranoid Android using TGR forums.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by CookieMonster

I look forward to your response!

---

k, here goes....









































































































http://eventmonk.com/misc/rog_sr_12172012.jpg

analyse this^^^^^^^^^^:)

rog

I usually don't pay attention to these threads after awhile but this one just got real interesting and i just made popcorn.

Sent from my SCH-I535 using TGR Forums

The slope in question exemplifies the expression: "hidden in plain sight". It is literally on the side of the road. From most vantage points, it looks like a lot of wind scoured grass. Hidden in the draw however, are a couple of fat wind loads.

Of note in the CAIC final report was the fact that the slide went unreported and perhaps unobserved for a couple hours after it fell. All this on a Saturday at ground zero of Colorado skiing in decent visibility. Eventually, a sharp pair of eyes spotted it & suspected trouble. The rest we know. This gulch holds decent skiing late, 4th of July on a good year. Even last year it had good corn at the end of May.

Hope survivors, family, friends find peace with this.

Just when we feel at home in the backcountry is a good time to remind ourselves that most accidents occur at home.

I was expecting a really stupid dick waving reply from Rog to Cookie.

Not close to that stupid though.

Lou's comments on the CAIC report:
http://www.wildsnow.com/9962/caic-sh...port-annotated

Wondering how many were questioning in their heads about the safe zone, much less knowingly travelling across a very dangerous terrain traps during a time when naturals were going left and right. Expert halo is a really nasty trap and happens all the time, with no real fault.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by CookieMonster

This event is reminiscent of the 2003 Strathcona-Tweedsmuir avalanche that killed 7 secondary school students. ( For those who aren't familiar with the story: http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/fea.../24/avalanche/ ) It's also reminiscent of the avalanche at La Traviata on Tumbledown Mountain ( also 2003 ) in which Craig Kelly was killed. Major violations of safe travel technique put too many people in harm's way, and a lot of people died as a result.

---

I'm not sure how comparable it is to the STS avalanche. In that case, the kids were well spread out and traveling along the opposite side of the valley of the avalanche that hit them. You could argue their group was too big, but everything I've read about it (and I've read a lot) indicates there was nothing wrong with their travel techniques, but that they were blindsided by an abnormally largely avalanche that came down one side of the valley and was big enough to go up the other side and take out the whole group. Afterwards, the biggest questions people asked was why high school kids were brought into that area in the first place. There was little questioning of their travel technique in the reports I read.

Connaught Creek is a good comparison in terms of terrain in that the path of travel goes along the north side of the valley and crosses several avalanche paths, while the south side of the valley is Mt. Cheops, which can let slides go that are big enough to cross the creek and go up the other side. There's a few major slide paths coming down the north side of the valley, so it's important to stay spread out while going through, and sticking as close to the trees on the north side to minimize your exposure to slides coming from across the creek.

When I read the CAIC report on this avalanche, I wondered how I would have proceeded. I don't know if I could honestly say I wouldn't have crossed that slope at all. I think I would have told my group to go one at a time and wait the person in front of you to get all the way across before starting. It also looks like it would have been safest to go slightly up the opposite slope into the trees there and crossing higher up (I'm basing that on picture 5 in the CAIC report, it's hard to tell what's above there based on pictures, so that could be the wrong call). Whether or not I would have made those decisions at the time, I can't say for certain. It's always easier to make a judgment in hindsight. It's definitely something I will keep in my head next time I go out. As well, this and Tunnel Creek definitely makes you re-think what is a safe zone.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Lindahl

Lou's comments on the CAIC report:
http://www.wildsnow.com/9962/caic-sh...port-annotated

---

Sorry for the heartache of the family and friends...hope the rescuers get to debrief. Those kind of horrors stick with you. Airing it out
can bring tremendous relief. Look to your family and friends and remember every day is a gift.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Lindahl

Expert halo is a really nasty trap and happens all the time, with no real fault.

---

It certainly is.

Unfortunately when I talk to people who think they have good training and experience... they often do not even know what the Expert Halo is. They certainly do not utter the phrase in the field, when in fact those words should be part of their daily backcountry group vocabulary. Perhaps more so than "have you armed your airbag?"

I do not agree with "...no real fault". It is the job of all of us in the backcountry to identify the ever-present human emotional bias in our assessments and decisions. It is just as important as knowing how the snow is sitting on the terrain shape.

Bottom line.

These guys were not really doing anything overly risky in my book, their location is not suspect, by staying low in the gully, in the treed area, (anchor points), and doing a short but fun run, they were minimizing their risk by not being higher up on the wall. Freak of nature. Wrong place at the wrong time. And that is what sucks the most.

Really struggling with this, didn't know them directly but it really hits home hard.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by fastfred

Bottom line.

These guys were not really doing anything overly risky in my book, their location is not suspect, by staying low in the gully, in the treed area, (anchor points), and doing a short but fun run, they were minimizing their risk by not being higher up on the wall. Freak of nature. Wrong place at the wrong time. And that is what sucks the most.

---

I'd disagree. That's not very tree'd at all, the gully is a gigantic terrain trap, and naturals have been ripping all over the place just the prior day. Not saying I don't do anything risky (hah!), but man... that level of risk is pretty damn high, IMO, especially for no real reward. That terrain trap is nasty enough that you could easily be looking at a death even in a group of 6 that could pinpoint almost right away. If I popped out of the trees looking at that thing on that day, I'd be nervous as hell! Looking at the topo didn't really do it justice compared to seeing the real thing. There's a lot of gullies like that where I often ski (with much less imposing slopes above), and we avoid them like the plague on those days, even though we rarely see them rip (once or twice in the last 2 years - usually in Dec/Jan).

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by PNWbrit

I was expecting a really stupid dick waving reply from Rog to Cookie.

Not close to that stupid though.

---

oh it was perfect, brit. cookieman could use a lil simplicity in his life. maybe he could write about it in his snowgeek blog. hmmm, let me see, ah yes. some folks have a different approach than others. riveting stuff.

butter lynchy?:fm:

rog

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by fastfred

Bottom line.

These guys were not really doing anything overly risky in my book, their location is not suspect, by staying low in the gully, in the treed area, (anchor points), and doing a short but fun run, they were minimizing their risk by not being higher up on the wall. Freak of nature. Wrong place at the wrong time. And that is what sucks the most.

---

Not sure if you're being serious...

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by fastfred

Bottom line.

These guys were not really doing anything overly risky in my book, their location is not suspect, by staying low in the gully, in the treed area, (anchor points), and doing a short but fun run, they were minimizing their risk by not being higher up on the wall. Freak of nature. Wrong place at the wrong time. And that is what sucks the most.

---

Really? Do you backcountry ski? So you personally feel like traversing avalanche paths in a five person group is an acceptable level of risk?

I have as much empathy as anyone but at bare minimum we need to collectively admit that mistakes were made.

Good words Monster & Beard. Ask yourself, when was the last time you challenged the decision making of your group?

Oh yeah, Rog..stick to the surfing fourm.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Foggy_Goggles

Really? Do you backcountry ski? So you personally feel like traversing avalanche paths in a five person group is an acceptable level of risk?

I have as much empathy as anyone but at bare minimum we need to collectively admit that mistakes were made.

Good words Monster & Beard. Ask yourself, when was the last time you challenged the decision making of your group?

Oh yeah, Rog..stick to the surfing fourm.

---

heh, another one:rolleyes2

rog

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by fastfred

Bottom line.

These guys were not really doing anything overly risky in my book, their location is not suspect, by staying low in the gully, in the treed area, (anchor points), and doing a short but fun run, they were minimizing their risk by not being higher up on the wall. Freak of nature. Wrong place at the wrong time. And that is what sucks the most.

---

I was going to stay out of this because I am not an expert and I certainly fall in the category of experienced and less knowledgable - although working to change that now that I can play again since the kids are older.
Here goes:
Based on this comment alone, you and others like you scare me way worse than a few of "the experienced experts" I have met in the last couple years and no longer will tour with.
It is close but not really. It just takes longer to figure out the true character and decision making process of those "experienced" former partners. You on the other hand are easy (and to be fair, I will use you to refer to the you who made this asinine comment).
I don't know you but based on this comment alone I know if I met you I am pretty sure I would not tour with you based on a short conversation abd a few questions. Anyone who does may want to rethink the partnership. Sorry buddy but you are tapped or at least your comment was. So dumb. Five people are dead. Wrong place at wrong time? Aaaaahhh ....!
With respect to the deceased, I agree that many mistakes were made. Trust me, we all make them and I know I have. I hope none of us ever make one like this again.
I do not know this area but are the trees down lower too thick to navigate? Are the north west facing slopes that they wanted to ski not accesible from any other access? If there was no other way than someone should have spoken up and the days destination should have been changed.
Unnecessarily crossing a terrain trap / slide path with these known deep instabilities was the key mistake as had been played out day after day before this incident based on other CAIC reports alone.
Taking this risk and the unsafe travel procedures in which they attempted to cross was fatal. So sad.
IMHO, groups of six are too big for avy terrain unless guided where the heirarchy is clear and decisions are made by the guide. Please note, I did not say that guides are infallible but at least the heirarchy is known. I no longer travel in avy terrain in groups larger than four and have not in decades.
That said. Again, my deepest sympathies and condolences to all involved and their family and friends.




Sent from my SCH-I535 using TGR Forums

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by fastfred

Bottom line.

These guys were not really doing anything overly risky in my book, their location is not suspect, by staying low in the gully, in the treed area, (anchor points), and doing a short but fun run, they were minimizing their risk by not being higher up on the wall. Freak of nature. Wrong place at the wrong time. And that is what sucks the most.

---

No way. This was a terrible route selection into a terrain trap after they read the CIAC warnings and dug a pit to observe the weak layers and fresh loading. It's technically at tree line where they started and the full route heads up over tree line. They could have avoided the exposure from the N/NE aspect with a bit more work either by gaining the east side of the drainage from lower in the valley or coming up and above from the ridge that's accessed at the LP top lot.

I suppose I should start by saying this: I am young (22) and inexperienced (2nd year in the BC). I have been thinking about this incident a lot especially because if I was with this group I'm not sure I would have questioned the travel plan or method.

That said, I am trying to find the silver lining so I can learn from it. Ignoring the expert v. expert dickwaving here is what I will take away from this tragedy:

1) Persistent weak layers do not persist on every slope, angle, aspect or elevation; BUT,

2) Persistent weak layers form most seasons in CO (where I live) and they are fucking scary.

3) PWLs are hard to trigger, but when they are triggered they will RIP WIDER, RIP DEEPER and RUN LONGER than I would first think. aka my safe zone better be safe and spacing between partners better be larger than I would first think.

3) PWLs are often triggered from the margins. In other words, as CAIC noted many times this season, you could lay many tacks down the gut of a path with no result. But travel around the toe of a path and you bring the whole mountain down. Adjust travel plans to avoid the margins (if you must travel through an area that might have the risk of a PWL.)

4) If you have an avalung or bag available. Make it deploy-able at the trailhead.

As I said before, I am a rookie and I know that in theory these things are easy. I hope that I will remember these lessons every time I leave the trailhead and that I have the courage to actively discuss these things with my partners.

RIP to the victims, I hope their families and friends are surrounded by love.

^^^be careful of your terminology. Especially re: your #3

Know the difference between persistent weak layers and deep persistent slabs.

Here's a good primer.

I wonder how many maritime backcountry skiers who practice good travel habits would have made a similar route choice, thinking that a wide enough berth had been provided considering the terrain and primary problem on the day?

I live in an area where "at least half" would not manage a season without serious incident in a continental pack if they transferred what they thought were good habits to that snowpack (they are good habits, just not applied liberally enough?) That statistic may include myself. Actually, a lot of maritime pack skiers that I see have very few good habits developed at all. Many happily kick the dragon in the face on a regular basis and get away with it.

Doing the right thing, and doing it right enough is important when it comes to PWLs and DPSs. Low frequency situations are not good environments for us to learn whether our good habits are good enough... until they are not.

Leaving all that for a moment, I thought this was a tough fact to read. Tougher for the man involved. Be strong dude, your friends will help you through.

Quote:

---

The survivor continued to yell for help, but to no avail, as there was no one left unburied to hear him and no other people in the area. The survivor was stranded in this position for approximately 4 hours before rescuers arrived at the scene.

---

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by neck beard

I wonder how many maritime backcountry skiers who practice good travel habits would have made a similar route choice, thinking that a wide enough berth had been provided considering the terrain and primary problem on the day?

---

This section is probably the most skied (Backcountry) in Colorado. It is a very high traffic region with very easy road access. It is an unusual up climb because that gully and the face in the trees under the road unfortunately breaks away frequently. It is also an unusual upclimb location because on one side of the gully you are literally climbing from a parking lot to an open paved road. This creates a situation where many clueless individuals would drop in on you as you climb. This could be unintentional because they didn't see you or in ignorance of saftey protocol.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Canada1

This section is probably the most skied (Backcountry) in Colorado.

---

Not true.