WASATCH STOKE, CONDITIONS, OBSERVATIONS AND ASSORTED DRIVAL 17-18
I guided Class V whitewater for years and there were times when a rapid wasn't safe and we couldn't run it commercially. Clients would get pissy and say they paid for it and that we had to do it. Our answer was always that they paid for our judgement and for us to take them down the river as safely as possible, and that meant not happening today. Grumpy customers who live to come back another day are better for business than dead customers. Letting them bully you because they paid is just shitty guiding.
WASATCH STOKE, CONDITIONS, OBSERVATIONS AND ASSORTED DRIVAL 17-18
From the report:
Periodic storms during October, November, and early December interspersed by long durations of high pressure allowed the snowpack to develop weak, faceted layers of sugary snow. The only missing ingredient in the required recipe for avalanches was a slab on top. Storms accompanied by high winds from Saturday 12/23 through Monday 12/25 put put down 2' of storm and wind-drifted snow in upper Little Cottonwood Canyon, overloading these buried persistent weak layers.
Avalanche activity on mid and upper elevation slopes facing north through east, and continued reports of collapsing and cracking, throughout the week prior to this incident indicated continued instability.
This was a classic persistent slab avalanche:
1. There were numerous tracks on adjacent slopes with no evidence of avalanching;
2. The fourth skier on the slope triggered the avalanche.
With a persistent (or deep) avalanche problem, tracks on a slope are zero indication of stability. All it takes is for one person to find a weak spot and the entire slope can avalanche, taking out prior tracks. These types of avalanches also allow a rider to get well out onto a slope before avalanching, and it is not uncommon for the avalanche to fracture widely - and above the rider.
From reports we have received, more than one skier was on the slope when it avalanched. It is crucial to only expose one person at a time on a slope, and get out of the runout zone at the bottom, and then wait for the next rider to enter the slope.
Our current persistent slab structure can easily be identified by digging down 1 to 3' deeply in the snowpack. If you find the structure of strong snow (denser, harder to penetrate) over weak snow (softer, easier to penetrate) this is evidence of a poor snowpack structure, and the types of slopes that should be avoided. In the Wasatch mountains, this problem currently exists on mid and upper elevation slopes facing north through east.
WASATCH STOKE, CONDITIONS, OBSERVATIONS AND ASSORTED DRIVAL 17-18
I would call the above an objective criticism of the guide’s failure to recognize a common persistent problem and travel with his group accordingly. It’s certainly no scathing review but it clearly states the mistakes that were made. That accident could have been avoided.
As a government entity, UAC has to be careful what they say and how they say it. Lawyers are going to make some $ outta this one I bet.