Red Mountain Fatality

[MakersTeleMark]

I've stared that line down for well over a decade. I remember it going down, as do other mags. When it was named, Stan did so for a reason. He could not ski it.

Maybe Dave named it , but I think it was Stan.

I have a 1st right up and across from it.

Anyway, this whole thing was a fuck up, and not much more you can take from it.

The snow science on this one is child's play. The rest is pure stupidity.

Little red riding hood was just to their right.

[BFD]

how does the body recovery work in the wilderness? can they use a helicopter or do the have to move the victim from the wilderness area?

[Kinnikinnick]

From the Summit Country Rescue fb page-

Attachment 325627

There was a time when I would have skied that on a corny day, which would likely mean nasty, firm snow and ice on that line. Prolly would never have ventured into terrain like that in fresh winter conditions though. Seems like that's how it was back in the day. Stick to low angle and/or low consequence terrain in winter and save the big lines for after spring consolidation. I'm a beater, but man, my appetite for risk in the mountains like that was just never there. For better or worse, it's zero now.

Rip In Peace Dude.

Yep


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[Name Redacted]

how does the body recovery work in the wilderness? can they use a helicopter or do the have to move the victim from the wilderness area?

They used a heli.

[Name Redacted]

Here's a link to back when Stan and Dave started skiing it. Not sure if they were the first, but maybe. Either way.

"This route is probably the most serious route that appears on my web page." and that says a lot if you have ever used Stan's page.
http://www.stanwagon.com/wagon/colos...cogore_14.html

[BFD]

thanks just read this about recovery https://www.summitdaily.com/news/sum...-silverthorne/

[Kinnikinnick]

thanks just read this about recovery https://www.summitdaily.com/news/sum...-silverthorne/

Why do the journalists always fuck these stories up?

“Anyone lacking the experience or confidence to avoid dangerous avalanche conditions should stick to lower-angle slopes and more forgiving terrain, according to officials.”

How about: People should stick to lower angle slopes and more forgiving terrain, according to officials.

And they always say “highly experienced” and “equipped”

Not specific to this case cause I dont know, but typically these are guys in their 20s or 30s. IMO you cant be “highly experienced” without 10-20 years under your belt.

And “equipped,” so what? If you give a 18 outs high school an m16 and helmet and tell him to go behind enemy lines will he be successful?
Because he’s “equipped?.”




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[Name Redacted]

Article about the recovery. Not an easy task. We are lucky to have a very good SAR team in Summit.

https://www.summitdaily.com/news/sum...-silverthorne/

[skifishbum]

I pass no judgement
I offer vibes and condolences to those who knew him
and respect for sar

[wordbird]

RIP

Another accident that moves the need of public opinion against backcountry skiing.

[alpinevibes]

Here's a link to back when Stan and Dave started skiing it. Not sure if they were the first, but maybe. Either way.

"This route is probably the most serious route that appears on my web page." and that says a lot if you have ever used Stan's page.
http://www.stanwagon.com/wagon/colos...cogore_14.html

The story at the bottom is spooky in light of this week’s accident:

“On Feb. 6, 2017, CAIC reported the following anonymous “observation” of an avalanche in Big Eyes that could have had more serious consequences than it did. Here is the report.
“A dusting of new snow at the parking lot, increasing to around 6 inches at 11,000 ft. We set an anchor atop the couloir and I preformed a “hasty” pit as well as two ski cuts while on belay. I found around 4-8 inches of extremely light-density snow on top of a thick homogenous slab of snow (1F hardness) that went beyond 1.3m deep (the extent of my digging). The overlying snow was not cohesive at all and there was no evidence of slab formation.

“After deciding we were comfortable with the snow stability, I proceeded to ski the first pitch of the chute. After 10 turns or so the snow became much deeper and I stopped to yell up to my partner to not venture any further than skier’s left of my tracks in the chute. Another few turns and I paused again, feeling very uncomfortable now in 18 inches of new snow. At this point in time I was two turns away from our first safe zone and the entrance of the four skiers’ tracks just an hour or two prior of us. The chute “Y’s” at the top and they had used the eastern entrance. It was during this next two turns where the slab released. I was then carried down the entirety of the couloir while my partner watched in horror. I came to rest sitting up as the debris slowed down after a brutally violent ride nearly 1500 feet long. It is nothing short of a miracle that I sustained no major injuries. I lost both skis and poles in the slide. The debris however was only 2-3 feet deep at most, not that much snow moved. I would suspect the slab was around 75 ft. x 100 ft and 18 inches deep. SS-ASu-R3-D2. I should have been Colorado’s 1st fatality this season. Don’t let this season’s somewhat atypical Colorado snowpack lure you into terrain of high consequence without proper risk assessment and confidence in your decision-making abilities. I was overly confident that the conditions I found while on the belay at the top of the chute would be the most suspect stability-wise. After deeming the entrance safe I should have been more diligent in my ongoing observations of the snow. I also should have trusted my intuition when I stopped for the second time due to the deeper snow farther down the couloir. Two turns away from a safe zone and 4 tracks from the same day also gave me a false sense of security and I proceeded without doing a thoughtful reassessment of the conditions. Do not underestimate the potential for unsuspecting large loads in couloirs such as this one, a dusting at the car and I ended up triggering an 18-inch soft slab. I plan to write a more in depth analysis of the day at some point once I have fully processed the situation. Be thankful for the beautiful mountains we get to plan in and live to ski another day.”


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[srface_hoar]

Yeah many questions on this one. Why were they skiing a huge line like that on a considerable day with a clear wind/storm slab without at least first managing the slab? Why were all three of them on the slope at the same time? This wasn't a buried, difficult to assess weak layer, the risk was there the whole time staring at them in the face. At the very least, they were not following proper backcountry protocol, i.e., ski one at a time.

I am a proponent of folks getting out during this time. I think it is important to get out of the house for physical and mental health. I also think that for some, the mountains are the only thing that can provide a sense grounding in these crazy times...BUT I can't defend skiing that line on that day using the protocol that appears to have been used.
.

There is no managing of that type of wind slab. Condolences to the friends and family. Be safe out there!

[summit]

Tragic

Here's a link to back when Stan and Dave started skiing it. Not sure if they were the first, but maybe. Either way.

"This route is probably the most serious route that appears on my web page." and that says a lot if you have ever used Stan's page.
http://www.stanwagon.com/wagon/colos...cogore_14.html

Kya and I were the other two that day with Stan and Dave. I've been back.

It's a gorgeous line of consequence.

When there is any concern about slab avalanches, particularly wind, one never approaches this line from the top. In fact, one avoids this line in any appreciable avalanche danger because of the exposure and because there is no way to "manage" risk apart from managing wet slide danger by going early enough. "Goldilox line" is what I mentally call it when everything has to be just right.

It takes thoughtful and deliberate communication and group management to use true safe zones. While not a super technical line unless the choke is out, it has so many consequence multipliers and it can hold funky and variable snow. A fall is very high consequence even before you consider that it is remote.

Stan named all the lines listed on his page for Red.

[cravenmorhead]

Final report is up: https://avalanche.state.co.us/caic/a...UgVFeFjjNBxHrI

One thing I don't quite get: from the photo of the crown, it looks like the entire entrance released (or at least the entire west entrance). Why are they classifying that as an R2 avalanche?

[Name Redacted]

Damn, it sounds like they were in the exact spot we've used as a safe zone under the rock outcrop on the right. No idea how they got washed out from under that rock outcrop unless they were too low and it either washed out over the outcrop, or they were standing on a slab too. Sad.

[North]

Final report is up: https://avalanche.state.co.us/caic/a...UgVFeFjjNBxHrI

One thing I don't quite get: from the photo of the crown, it looks like the entire entrance released (or at least the entire west entrance). Why are they classifying that as an R2 avalanche?

This topic was covered in a different channel of mine. R-scale includes depth, and in this case the slab was 8-10" thick. Room to go bigger I guess.

Damn, it sounds like they were in the exact spot we've used as a safe zone under the rock outcrop on the right. No idea how they got washed out from under that rock outcrop unless they were too low and it either washed out over the outcrop, or they were standing on a slab too. Sad.

The rock outcrop on the "shadow line" looks to be firmly in the start zone, or at least in it enough to be dicey. Tough to make an exacting assessment from photos, and it's been a few years since I've been up there though.

[skaredshtles]

Is this the "safe zone" that folks are referring to?

[Name Redacted]

The rock outcrop on the "shadow line" looks to be firmly in the start zone, or at least in it enough to be dicey. Tough to make an exacting assessment from photos, and it's been a few years since I've been up there though.

Yeah, I'm talking lower, but where they have the circle, just lookers left of the circle. Either way, it obviously didn't work out.

[North]

Yeah, I'm talking lower, but where they have the circle, just lookers left of the circle. Either way, it obviously didn't work out.

Gotcha. Yeah the lower outcropping where the alternate entrance meets the main line (near the circled "crux" in the photo you posted) seems like the more obvious safe zone to me - at least it's the one I believe I've used. The upper outcropping where they stopped seems still very much in the prime location for loading, but again, I have no sense of scale from my desk. RIP regardless.

[summit]

If you are standing on the slab, you aren't in a safe zone. If you are standing where debris can sweep you, you aren't standing in a safe zone.

In a couloir like this, a safe zone is standing on a rock while tucked up behind a rock.

2 people were caught.

Only because the slab broke beneath the skis of the triggering skier were they not a 3rd person caught.

[cravenmorhead]

This topic was covered in a different channel of mine. R-scale includes depth, and in this case the slab was 8-10" thick. Room to go bigger I guess.

Huh! So it is! Makes sense now that I think about it, but I have been misunderstanding the R scale for a while now.

[Name Redacted]

If you are standing on the slab, you aren't in a safe zone. If you are standing where debris can sweep you, you aren't standing in a safe zone.

Yeah, that's what I'm saying, they must have not been tucked up under the rock far enough. I guess that's one of the lessons to be learned here.

[Lindahl]

I've always entered from the alternate entrance. That western entrance spooks me. So much loading. Yeah, it sucks but at least you can assess with a lot less exposure.

[StanWagon]

Just for the record, Summit, Kya, and Dave Bourassa were involved in the first descent of this (2007), but only Dave made it to the proper peak. So he came down solo. I was helping in the sense that I was perched on the opposite side with a long lens. Sadly, our radio communication failed. I was going to guide Dave out and I could hear him perfectly, but he could not hear me. So I got the pics, and he had to fend for himself on the exit in a valley he did not know. I could hear his whoops when he finished with the apron. I have never skied it. I don't think the steepness is too much, but it is narrow. And, yes, I named the three lines (Big Bad Wolf, Little Red Riding Hood, Big Eyes) after the obvious fairy tale. All three are beautiful lines.