
Originally Posted by
Summit
Some takeaways for us who remain:
1. Always reevaluate your situations and be willing to change your plans. This group realized they were in a bad spot and changed their plan to avoid the danger they rightly perceived.
2. They considered scene safety: they moved to a safer location to continue treatment due to worry of hangfire. First rule of rescue: make no more victims. Ask yourself: "do I have the gear and knowledge to move my buddy over snow even a few hundred meters?" Do you carry a tarp or bivy or rescue sled? (emergency blankets will not do this... they'll shred)
3. It was probably a few feet of miscalculation between safety and death. Who knows why they got off route. If you must stay precisely on route to avoid avalanche hazard in terrain where it is easy to get off route, you should consider if you have a comp skier's line memory. You can also go to a different zone and come back another day. The slope will still be there.
4. If you are already on the slope, don't forget that Plan Z is going back the way you came.
5. During your beacon search, do not bury your nose in the beacon. Constantly scan for surface clues. If you can ski right to a glove or a boot, you don't have to futz around with flux lines and probes. You must frequently practice with your beacon to gain a comfort level where you are able to take eyes off during a search.
6. Even if your hackles are not up, you need to take disciplined care with managing your group travel. It is so so so so so easy to get lackadaisical about signalling, communicating, using true safe zones, and being truly eyes on. This accident was actually two skiers caught in two separate slides and one self-rescued. It could have easily been a double fatality. If you practice disciplined travel techniques when things are good, it will be ingrained and automatic.
7. It struck me was how little snow there was, how there was no obvious hard slab... how seemingly innocuous the terrain was... but we run ourselves through our mental checklists:
Avalanche activity on similar nearby slopes noted by the group and this group triggered a slide prior to the fatal slide.
Loading from new snow and wind transport
Path was identified to avoid
Rating was Considerable with storm and persistent slab problems foretasted on their chosen aspect and elevation.
Terrain traps... gully and trees, identified to avoid
Unstable snow? Cracking and whoompfing reported by multiple parties
McCammon created ALPTRUTh because it was the list of criteria that seemed ever present from his statistical analysis of accidents, even among educated parties.
8. Communications: We've covered the gun vs whistle. Think about what other methods you have so that you don't have to leave your buddy to get help. Radios, cell phones, and/or sat beacons...
With those tools they would have had 4 people to help treat and move the patient instead of 3... then 2... then 1.
9. Medical: they knew CPR! Good. Everyone in the BC should should CPR and at least first aid. I'm not a doctor, but I'll tell ya that if an avalanche victim needs CPR, you probably should crank out several minutes (WMS says 30 minutes) of CPR before you leave to get help. Stopping CPR and resuming it 10 or 20 minutes later is a futile though valiant effort.
Summit, great summary of lessons learned not only from this but pretty much every single incident I have ever been directly or indirectly involved in. Thanks for summarizing, in an analytical and not judgmental fashion. I try to run through a lot of these items in my head every single time, and it is ho so hard to stay focused when that overhead blower kicks in the adrenaline.
My sincere condolences to all involved.
Samuel L. Jackson as Jules Winnfield: Oh, I'm sorry. Did I break your concentration?
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