A "Moderate" discussion of the avalanche rating scale.

[spook]

i don't know shit about shit but i can't believe that the "human factor" can be so considerable if all these people are knowledgeable and informed and read about all their buddies dying in avalanches that should have been avoided and say "oh vibes, man" let's honor our dead friends by not learning a damn thing and do exactly the same thing.

or maybe another way to say it is if you can't immunize yourself from the "human factor," which seems to be based in human stupidity and ego, you shouldn't be going in groups.

[klar]

i don't know shit about shit but i can't believe that the "human factor" can be so considerable if all these people are knowledgeable and informed and read about all their buddies dying in avalanches that should have been avoided and say "oh vibes, man" let's honor our dead friends by not learning a damn thing and do exactly the same thing.

or maybe another way to say it is if you can't immunize yourself from the "human factor," which seems to be based in human stupidity and ego, you shouldn't be going in groups.

It is not that easy. You can choose your partners carefully and you can try to practice an honest know thyself philosophy but you can never be "immune".

[icelanticskier]

And people always question my sanity when i tell them going solo is oftentimes
safer.

What say you now?

Rog

[LeeLau]

And people always question my sanity when i tell them going solo is oftentimes
safer.

What say you now?

Rog

It depends on the partners

[icelanticskier]

It depends on the partners

Qft.

Rog

[hortence]

i don't know shit about shit but i can't believe that the "human factor" can be so considerable if all these people are knowledgeable and informed and read about all their buddies dying in avalanches that should have been avoided and say "oh vibes, man" let's honor our dead friends by not learning a damn thing and do exactly the same thing.

or maybe another way to say it is if you can't immunize yourself from the "human factor," which seems to be based in human stupidity and ego, you shouldn't be going in groups.

This post is a great example of the heuristic trap (AKA human factors). You acknowledge that you don't know shit, but then claim that your "belief" trumps many observed and well accepted phenomena of what happens when people get together to ski.

This is similar to what happens to some BC skiers. They may not know shit about what they are skiing, but based on various beliefs (such as previous tracks, they may have heard it was safe, it's a nice sunny day, it looks awesome!) they decide to ski it anyway.

[icelanticskier]

It depends on the partners

2ND reply. even solid same page partner skiing adds that extra lil bit of comfort which can lead to complacency, which can lead to........

rog

[simplypow]

how then do you maintain the if i fuck up im going to die mentality when your not out by yourself?? Because clearly that's the level of stress I want people to have when we're in the "zone"

[icelanticskier]

how then do you maintain the if i fuck up im going to die mentality when your not out by yourself?? Because clearly that's the level of stress I want people to have when we're in the "zone"

can you re-word that 1st part a bit?

rog

[simplypow]

yeah maybe I'm just diving into the conversation haphazardly, but what I thought I saw was a comment about complacency, and how skiing with other people is a guarantee for that happening...

[simplypow]

I know that when I am in the cold, and not counting on someone other than me to get up and down and back again, I spend more time analyzing things, and have an easier time bagging a loaded line

[icelanticskier]

yeah maybe I'm just diving into the conversation haphazardly, but what I thought I saw was a comment about complacency, and how skiing with other people is a guarantee for that happening...

I said "can", not guarantee. how many incidences, deadly and close calls, involve multiple people vs going solo? many less when going solo I'm sure.

rog

[simplypow]

no question about it. And to take that mentality and apply it to a group situation? Not possible is the point. You come exceedingly close however if you identify a decision maker up front, and then shut up for the rest of the day. Less talk-more time spent skiing

[icelanticskier]

^^^^^^^^^^^agreed.

rog

[raisingarizona13]

This post is a great example of the heuristic trap (AKA human factors). You acknowledge that you don't know shit, but then claim that your "belief" trumps many observed and well accepted phenomena of what happens when people get together to ski.

This is similar to what happens to some BC skiers. They may not know shit about what they are skiing, but based on various beliefs (such as previous tracks, they may have heard it was safe, it's a nice sunny day, it looks awesome!) they decide to ski it anyway.

If you want to see green lights instead of red flags you are probably going to see green lights. This is where scientific critical thinking needs to come into play. Three key things that contribute to critical thinking are curiosity, skepticism, and humility. In this process you evaluate evidence, assess conclusions, and examine our assumptions. The last one is the big one. Humility and an awareness of our own vulnerability to error with an openness to new perspectives and surprises. Basically always be aware of wanting to see green lights and then take a step back because big egos can lead us to cling to our pre-conceptions and that can be very bad with snow science and back country powder skiing.

It's my 2nd day in Psych 101 so I'm a fucking expert now , and yes that was slightly adapted to fit this discussion but straight out of the text book but I figure this is sort of like studying.

[simplypow]

If you want to see green lights instead of red flags you are probably going to see green lights. This is where scientific critical thinking needs to come into play. Three key things that contribute to critical thinking are curiosity, skepticism, and humility. In this process you evaluate evidence, assess conclusions, and examine our assumptions. The last one is the big one. Humility and an awareness of our own vulnerability to error with an openness to new perspectives and surprises. Basically always be aware of wanting to see green lights and then take a step back because big egos can lead us to cling to our pre-conceptions and that can be very bad with snow science and back country powder skiing.

It's my 2nd day in Psych 101 so I'm a fucking expert now , and yes that was slightly adapted to fit this discussion but straight out of the text book but I figure this is sort of like studying.

scientia paribus animatum...any scholars out there, because as far as I'm concerned it means better to be alive and lacking than otherwise fulfilled...

[spook]

This post is a great example of the heuristic trap (AKA human factors). You acknowledge that you don't know shit, but then claim that your "belief" trumps many observed and well accepted phenomena of what happens when people get together to ski.

This is similar to what happens to some BC skiers. They may not know shit about what they are skiing, but based on various beliefs (such as previous tracks, they may have heard it was safe, it's a nice sunny day, it looks awesome!) they decide to ski it anyway.

my disbelief is really amazement, because i do read the stats and such. at the same time human factors can't really be more than excuses at the moment they occur -- at minimum a lack of somebody speaking up, assuming the danger is obvious, which it seems to be in a lot of these cases. to a lay person, classifying something like that -- moments when people do not act responsibly against their own knowledge and safety and then apparently cause the rest of a group to do the same -- as the human factor sounds a little whitewashed of responsibility.

fucking up is fucking up.

[simplypow]

so, if I lay out two scenarios with nearly identical outcomes, is distinguishing responsible vs. irresponsible possible...Comparison is 2007 hotdog bowl accident on Cameron Pass to Sinaktu from last year. To the casual dick tracey it's all just another golden shower... See links below for CAIC reports

http://avalanche.state.co.us/caic/ac...ident=20071202

http://avalanche.state.co.us/caic/ac...=505&accfm=inv

[spook]

i haven't had time to look at those yet, but i was speaking about the "human factor" in particular. i don't see why there's a problem saying the human factor is someone fucking up. sure, i'm a casual dick tracey with a growing interest. but i haven't read too many reports in here where everybody was like "oh nobody could have seen that coming." in fact, it seems most of the time to be the exact opposite, that the errors are glaring. obviously, i'm oversimplifying but in the end somebody's dead, others are sad and regretful, and often lingering is the sense of if only, which is not usually finished by something drastic and miraculous, but something simple, like, if i'd only said something or if we'd only not willfully ignored this or that.

i don't even hear "yes, we knew the risk and took it."

[SchralphMacchio]

Spook, when you first start out this game you are humble and scared. A hundred days in the backcountry without an incident can make you way more comfortable than you ought to be ... And more susceptible to getting tricked. It is good to remember what it feels like to be scared. Making a series of mistakes that takes your group into the danger zone is obvious when you have the bird's eye view - but guess what, our AIARE curriculum does not train for the firsthand view of what it is like in a group situation. In other words, it's easy to see the traps in the maze from above, but our current training standards don't show you what they look like from within the walls of human belief and heuristics. Does that make sense?

I will ask you to read my comments in the East Vail Tony Seibert thread in Slide Zone if you care for more. I am not excusing our group's mistakes, only providing context that studying them alone will not inoculate you. It takes situational practice (of communication and protocols) to avoids the traps - something that very few people do. If you still don't believe it, I would suggest looking at situations where your own assessment of the world around you is framed by your mental state and not by the quantifiable evidence. A person can look at the same exact situation in different mental states and draw different conclusions.

I can understand if you disagree, but I ask that you use a respectful tone because learning things the hard way is an incredibly humbling experience. Every single industry professional that I have talked to in the aftermath of our incident has told me, "I understand because I have been there. So take that for what it's worth ...

[spook]

there was no disrespect intended. as far as i knew this was a generic avalanche thread.

[simplypow]

Spook, when you first start out this game you are humble and scared. A hundred days in the backcountry without an incident can make you way more comfortable than you ought to be ... And more susceptible to getting tricked. It is good to remember what it feels like to be scared. Making a series of mistakes that takes your group into the danger zone is obvious when you have the bird's eye view - but guess what, our AIARE curriculum does not train for the firsthand view of what it is like in a group situation. In other words, it's easy to see the traps in the maze from above, but our current training standards don't show you what they look like from within the walls of human belief and heuristics. Does that make sense?

I will ask you to read my comments in the East Vail Tony Seibert thread in Slide Zone if you care for more. I am not excusing our group's mistakes, only providing context that studying them alone will not inoculate you. It takes situational practice (of communication and protocols) to avoids the traps - something that very few people do. If you still don't believe it, I would suggest looking at situations where your own assessment of the world around you is framed by your mental state and not by the quantifiable evidence. A person can look at the same exact situation in different mental states and draw different conclusions.

I can understand if you disagree, but I ask that you use a respectful tone because learning things the hard way is an incredibly humbling experience. Every single industry professional that I have talked to in the aftermath of our incident has told me, "I understand because I have been there. So take that for what it's worth ...

Like the complete absence of two way comm devices in pretty much any of the incident reports. And you mentioned it above so keenly...Even casual observations such as what color someone sees are documented to be relative to an observers perspective. I'm referencing a study that parallels stroop effect, that examines how the color blue is seen by people from different tribes in neighboring regions. I will try to find it if anyone is interested. But back to the topic at hand, and there is a degree of distinction here, when I'm an observer in an inherently dicey situation, and I put the headset or radio on, my world changes. This is not metaphorical. There is massive potential to alter one's perspective in the direction of safe and timely observations, and unfortunately the go big technology seems to be showing the opposite. So back to Temper. Rite and ritual the right way.

[raisingarizona13]

my disbelief is really amazement, because i do read the stats and such. at the same time human factors can't really be more than excuses at the moment they occur -- at minimum a lack of somebody speaking up, assuming the danger is obvious, which it seems to be in a lot of these cases. to a lay person, classifying something like that -- moments when people do not act responsibly against their own knowledge and safety and then apparently cause the rest of a group to do the same -- as the human factor sounds a little whitewashed of responsibility.

fucking up is fucking up.

Hindsight Bias, "The I knew it all along phenomenon", The tendency to believe that after learning an outcome, that one would have foreseen it.

[SterlingSpikeDancer]

- but guess what, our AIARE curriculum does not train for the firsthand view of what it is like in a group situation. In other words, it's easy to see the traps in the maze from above, but our current training standards don't show you what they look like from within the walls of human belief and heuristics. Does that make sense?

So, with the unfortunate firsthand experience that you have recently gone through, would you change the AIARE curriculum, and if so, how? Is it something that we, as skiing and outdoor enthusiasts and you as trained professionals, even learn to avoid in a group? SHOULD the curriculum discuss and teach how to avoid those traps? Not knocking you or the curriculum, just wondering if you would change it now with your current level of hindsight.

[hortence]

^^^

change the AIARE curriculum

I just finished AIARE Level One and have been thinking about it. The main thing is too much classroom time, not enough time talking specifics in the backcountry. I would suggest something along the lines of:

Day One: 8-1 Do a tour, with two beacon rescue scenarios. Have the instructor lead the group through the decision making process. In the afternoon, discuss the process that was modeled that morning, discuss the issues that were observed.

Day 2 -3 is more of the same.

I guess the hard part is balancing the need for theory discussion (how various slabs form, different types of hoar, and all) with the practicalities of today's snowpack and decision making. Plus maybe there is a minimum number of classroom hours required. (If so, maybe that should be revisited).

Another option might be to have an actual three day hut tour, with several hours each day in the hut discussing theory and generalities but with the bulk of time spent applying that to the day's touring.

Maybe offer a course entirely on snow, after a student has tested out of the material contained in books such as Staying Alive In Avalanche Terrain.

I'm sure that here are practical considerations that would make these approaches difficult, but I feel that the most valuable aspects of the class occurred when out on the snow, looking at terrain.

Maybe these are more pedagogical changes than curriculum changes. I thought the material covered was fine, though naturally I'm not an expert.