Tuckerman's crevasse/moat hiker fatality: lessons learned

[Jonathan S.]

mmqb often leads to some learning and positive take aways. some folks are here to listen and learn.

we aren't born knowing stuff. learning from experiences, faults/triumphs from others is a way for less experienced folks to think about things in ways that they never could conceive of on their own and maybe peak their interest to go out and learn more through courses, hooking up with more experienced folks, reading, or whatever. speaking the obvious? maybe, but folks continue to foolishly fuck up even when all of the warning signs are right there in front of them.

i would urge less experienced folks to ask q's here (altho i think i'll start another tr regarding good/safer mountain travel habits) and maybe some good thoughtful insights can be shared.

Until recently I thought this was the worst eastern ski season ever. But after skiing over two feet of fresh untracked powder this week, no, I now realize it's just the weirdest eastern ski season ever. And to bolster that weirdness, in forum debates I'm now on the side of Rog. (Maybe we can pick a fight over ski bindings just to relive the old days?)

sorry for not getting back to you on that email (of course you had to send me more cute micayla pics, which always throws me off, but anything you could share regarding a shift in avy course content and/or an avy instructor exposing himself to non-low danger conditions and some org getting all hot n bothered about it? whatchoo got?

Yes, pictures of Micayla and her cousins have the power to cloud men's minds!
But anyway, fortunately the person at the very top of the food chain is supportive of my course format that actually involves real discussions about real tour planning and real tours that actually go into real avalanche terrain. Unfortunately, I still face lots of grumbling and sniping from certain others higher up than me in the food chain, and we also face a supervisory requirement that if followed in the traditional manner would probably render the course format nearly untenable. Fortunately we might be able to use somewhat of a loophole in this requirement -- to be continued... (And if all that sounds inscrutable, well, it pretty much is, ugh.)

Returning to the original issue, although the video with the son is emotionally compelling (and I suspect his odd demeanor is explained by a combination of media nervousness and grief-induced excitement), it raises far more q's than it answers. Getting the answers would help us all be more safe, and even just posing the pertinent questions would help us too. By contrast, the usual chorus of “s*** happens,” “accidents happens,” etc. etc. reminds me of this excerpt from the video my toddler daughter keeps watching, and about as effective too.

[icelanticskier]

But not as much as Rog.

QFT. don'tchoofergetit.

jonathan. good stuff. thanx for the pic links as well. cutie. unreal.

ah the ole binding wars you dynafiddle, me marker, we can tour/live in harmony.

remember our 1st ever IRL encounter?



what a great ski day that was.

let's do it again!

rogout

[Jonathan S.]

what a great ski day that was.

let's do it again!

Indeed yes -- on both counts!

I had even been contemplating skiing there tomorrow, but given the current conditions, and being only two days away from a fourth-year anniversary (see 2nd article), I think Stratton beckons.

[kingdom-tele]

Returning to the original issue, although the video with the son is emotionally compelling (and I suspect his odd demeanor is explained by a combination of media nervousness and grief-induced excitement), it raises far more q's than it answers. Getting the answers would help us all be more safe, and even just posing the pertinent questions would help us too. By contrast, the usual chorus of “s*** happens,” “accidents happens,” etc. etc. reminds me of this excerpt from the video my toddler daughter keeps watching, and about as effective too.

Speaking of contrasts. 2 pages ago there was nothing to learn. Now seeking answers to pertinent questions.
Like what? I am curious now. What obtuse detail is eating at someones ability to comprehend this man's demise.
Accidents(unexpected events) do happen. Is there a determined amount of denunciation that is required to be considered a learning experience?

odd demeanor? seriously. Just about anyone I have ever met in the mountains has an "odd" demeanor. The fucking shadows you guys cast as you peer down on us mortals are intimidating

[Jonathan S.]

Speaking of contrasts. 2 pages ago there was nothing to learn. Now seeking answers to pertinent questions.
Like what? I am curious now. What obtuse detail is eating at someones ability to comprehend this man's demise.
Accidents(unexpected events) do happen. Is there a determined amount of denunciation that is required to be considered a learning experience?

odd demeanor? seriously. Just about anyone I have ever met in the mountains has an "odd" demeanor. The fucking shadows you guys cast as you peer down on us mortals are intimidating

I have to admit, if you're going to continue descending down into ad hominem attacks, that final sentence of yours is quite clever and amusing.

As for the son's demeanor, I was actually defending him (in response to the issue being brought up in another poster's comments).

My questions are related to whether there is anything to learn from this incident. Now from a glacier travel perspective, no, even though the word "crevasse" comes up, it's totally different. But from a ski mountaineering perspective? Based on the initial information, it sure sounded like the typical Tux scene of mountaineering without any mountaineering skills or gear, in which case, nothing to learn.
Well, okay, so I suppose that is something to learn from: treat mountaineering terrain as, well, mountaineering terrain. A pretty obvious lesson, but sometimes the most important lessons are the most obvious lessons. Based on the additional information we have now, that still might be the case, but we'll probably never find out exactly how he was equipped and whether he did have any steep snow climbing skills. (Being described as an "experienced" Tux skier and Mt Washington hiker is not exactly a compliment.)

So, yes, some of us still would like to ask questions and learn from the answers.
If instead you just want to keep engaging in ad hominem attacks upon your fellow posters in this thread, well, actually, since you've quite good at it, and entertainingly so, sure, keep at it!

[kingdom-tele]

... folks continue to foolishly fuck up even when all of the warning signs are right there in front of them.
rog

... in my big slide,...
rog

...(almost?) Everybody that travels in the backcountry with any frequency has "gotten away with it" at least once and probably multiple times weather they know it or not.

... i've reports here in which highly experienced people made the exact same stupid mistake...that i wouldn't have considered...

Apologies Jonathan if the cynicism is to thick, still working on it.

So far we have self proclaimed mountain genius who is proof of our fragility. The reality that everyone makes error in judgement for reasons beyond having experience applying a skill and critical thinking to an environment, the fact that people are going to pull off amazingly stupid shit day in and day out (like hiking katahdin in heels, not hyperbole) and for the most part just have an intriguing story to tell, and the realization we don't or can't account for every variable within our day. I really am not disparaging the format of case study analysis, your right, it has a role, but, any of the questions raised, the answers that are nicely constructed, the experience in critical thinking it provides are merely situational, while they may be applicable for a personal event in the future, it will always be under the looming shadow of the individual's preferences, which in themselves are highly variable.

So when Rog (and others, not entirely picking on you Rog) starts handing out unsolicited (personal preference) techniques for safe mountain travel I find it about as useful as tits on a bull, I can throw a snowball down a chute too, can even acquire the skills to assess snowpack, route finding, etc, but their utilizations and applications are different for everyone. Without a more clear picture of my own frame of reference all this nice objective information is moot.

Just because I thinks it crazy to hike around Katahdin in heels, maybe she was a cirque de soleil performer, maybe she had a congenital deformity and she could only wear heels, my judgement of the objective is pointless, well not pointless, but pretty limited, without knowing all the context..

Looking at the objective is necessary. Its the notion that people can make such leaps in judgement, whether about demeanor, or experience, or choice that grinds my gears. Oh well, personal issue. Done

[Jonathan S.]

So, skinning the long Baxter approach with heel elevators instead of bindings in flat position? Oh, actually hiking in high heels -- wow, almost have to respect that, both for the requisite skill and inevitable suffering!

I also couldn't resist taking a picture of my own shadow yesterday, both since I found that line genuinely funny, plus look at how my Italian skis, German/Austrian toe pieces, French heel pieces, and Italian boots are all getting along so well together -- if those once-warring nations can peacefully coexist in a ski setup, then can't we fellow backcountry skiers do the same on the internet?



Okay, seriously though, those are all valuable observations, and I understand your viewpoint better now.
Following up on some of those thoughts (I think?) -- in my avy course, we start off with introductions. The usual stuff, but also a mistake you've made in the backcountry (whether skiing or otherwise). And I lead off first with a pictorial presentation on two (of many) mistakes that *I* have made. (And no Rog, it wasn't when my lycra rando race suit wasn't color coordinated with my helmet or skis!)

The students also have an assignment in which they watch (on their own, before the course) "A Dozen More Turns" then write an essay in which they identify at least three human/psychological factors that they think contributed to the incident, and in which they describe how they once succumbed to such a factor (in any context, skiing or anything).
I had planned during the classroom session to then lead a discussion analyzing the incident. But then I thought about how all the other party members had just gone along with the de facto party leader, who had charged up higher into more dangerous terrain. Who was now dead.

The more I thought about it, the more I though about this passage toward the end of the novella "A River Runs Through It" (whose movie version moves it to the beginning, and also mangles it so much as to change the meaning).

So at the course instead I just quote that passage and show a picture of the victim, and I'll do the same here.

“You like to tell true stories, don’t you?” he asked, and I answered, “Yes, I like to tell stories that are true.”

Then he asked, “After you have finished your true stories sometime, why don't you make up a story and the people to go with it?”

“Only then will you understand what happened and why.”

[powder11]

But not as much as Rog.

No doubt, his constant input and knowledgable advice has really inspired me in my training for Alaska. I think he is an apostle of the great GSA.

[Duncan50]

I may have missed the relevant discussion earlier in this thread, so this may be a duplicate -- but there is a lesson to be learned here. Nothing to do with the choice of gear, or whether to rope up or not, but rather the decision to "hike" in that area of the ravine in the first place (the pitch and conditions made this more that a simple snow hike). The reports posted on the web by the snow rangers provide excellent, up-to-date info on conditions and risks. The report, copied below, warned of the conditions in that part of the ravine. If you read these reports regularly, you will note the strong wording.

The crevasse risk was known and posted. Plenty of other places to hike in Whites, and in Tux, without taking this risk. To me, that's the lesson -- the known risk outweighed the reward, the accident was unnecessary.

Here's the report on the Friday before the accident (I added the bold):

Due to frozen surface conditions long sliding falls are a significant threat to all mountain travelers in angled terrain. The slick icy surface will allow for rapid acceleration down slope potentially sending you into numerous obstacles below you. Exposed rocks, chunks of ice, trees, and moguls that feel like rocks all make the sliding fall potential much more hazardous. An ice axe, full 10-12 point crampons, and real mountaineering boots are absolutely critical for climbing in these conditions safely. Because the current surface conditions have made most steep slopes “no fall” territory the experience and skills to use this equipment is imperative. If you have to rent this equipment I would think twice.

Undermined snow and crevasses have emerged in recent weeks. Overall, the worst of the crevasses can be found in the Sluice, through the Lip and into the Center Headwall. Undermined snow can be found in many locations, including Hillman’s and Left Gully. Cold temperatures this week have strengthened snow in relation to these issues, but you’ll still want to know where they are so you can avoid them. Realize falling into an open crevasse from above is potentially more likely due to the icy surface conditions and fog than when it’s soft and clear. We recommend climbing up what you plan to descend so you can learn about these hazards.

[Jonathan S.]

Continued exploratory probing on Saturday, successful body recovery yesterday, and body taken off the mountain today.
Full incident report will be written up by USFS later on -- many interesting details to be revealed.

[userA]

thanks for the update on the recovery.

[icelanticskier]

4/1/2012 Tuckerman Ravine–Crevasse fall fatality

At approximately 3:45pm, Norman Priebatsch was hiking with his son and two others when he fell on steep icy terrain. The group members reported that he fell over a rock band and began sliding downhill. The group received no response to their shouts as the victim slid downhill, and the victim was not attempting to stop his fall at the time. He slid into an open crevasse in the lower portion of the Bowl, below the Lip, in the vicinity of the “Open Book” area. The other members of the group immediately went to the edge of the crevasse, but could not make contact with the victim. One member, along with one bystander who was not part of the group, quickly went to the AMC caretakers’ cabin at Hermit Lake to report the accident.


Circles in the Lip area mark the approximate location from which the victim fell and the location of the open crevasse at the top of the Open Book.

USFS Snow Rangers were notified of the accident shortly after 4pm. While the Snow Rangers made their way to Pinkham Notch, the AMC caretaker and other bystanders went to the ravine to gather more information and began preparing for the rescue effort. In addition to the USFS Snow Rangers, assistance was requested from Mountain Rescue Service of North Conway and Androscoggin Valley Search and Rescue of Gorham. The caretaker from the Harvard Mountaineering Club cabin also assisted at the scene, while the AMC staff at Pinkham Notch Visitor Center and the Mt. Washington Observatory provided organizational support and spot weather forecasts.

USFS Snow Rangers established two anchors for use in a technical rope rescue system. One Snow Ranger was lowered into the crevasse to a depth of about 40 feet. From this point, he could clearly see another 40 feet down. As the slope angle decreased, the crevasse narrowed to about 4 feet in diameter. There was no sign of the missing hiker in the area that could be seen. Due to the objective hazards involved in descending into the confined space, the decision was made to not descend farther into the crevasse. The Snow Ranger was raised back to the surface and rescue efforts were suspended for the night. Snow Rangers returned to the site the following day, but again the decision was made not to descend into the crevasse due to the hazards involved with such a recovery effort.

In the weeks following April 1st, Snow Rangers continued to monitor conditions in the area. Numerous attempts were made to visually check the crevasse, but further descents into the crevasse were not safely possible. On May 20th, Snow Rangers were able to safely descend underneath the snow using an access point located below and to the side of the waterfall. Using this new entry point, the victim was visible approximately 90 feet from the opening, or 125 feet below the original crevasse opening. That evening, plans were formed to recover the victim from the crevasse the following morning. On Monday morning, May 21st, the victim was recovered by a team of four Snow Rangers, with assistance from Androscoggin Valley Search and Rescue and the Appalachian Mountain Club caretaker.

Analysis

Earlier in the day on April 1st, two Snow Rangers had climbed through the Lip area, with the intention to assess and better understand the extent and severity of the crevasse hazard. They found crevasses to be very large and deep, though the magnitude of the hazard was not easily visible from above. They specifically looked into the opening that the victim later fell into. Climbing through the Lip, they also noted that the snow conditions that day were very hard and icy. These conditions and the Snow Rangers’ assessment were not unexpected. The avalanche advisory from that morning stated, “With the frozen surfaces comes the potential for very dangerous sliding falls. Every year we see numerous people climbing very steep and icy slopes (e.g. the Lip) without an ice axe and crampons…even very experienced mountaineers with all the right equipment would still have a very difficult time self-arresting under the current conditions on some slopes in Tuckerman, so play it safe.” It continued, “Climb up what you plan to descend. This gives you an opportunity to check for hazards such as crevasses at a leisurely pace.”

As mentioned in the advisory, having equipment is not a guarantee of safety. Down-climbing this route in these conditions is a very difficult endeavor; to do so safely would likely require facing into the slope and front-pointing one’s way down. The fact that three of the four group members were able to safely descend the Lip on this day is remarkable. None in the group were wearing winter mountaineering boots, no one besides the victim was wearing crampons, and though they did have ski poles, they were not carrying ice axes. In this very unfortunate accident, it would be an over-simplification to blame the lack of an ice axe as the primary cause of the accident, but this could be considered one contributing factor.

The Mount Washington Avalanche Center often recommends springtime visitors hike up what they plan to descend. We make this recommendation to backcountry visitors regardless of their level of experience. Every season brings similar hazards of crevasses, undermined snow, icefall, etc., but throughout each season the location, severity, and extent of the hazards does change. In this particular situation, the party had ascended a different route than they descended, so they did not have the opportunity to assess the extent of the crevasses before descending. When Snow Rangers were checking the conditions earlier on the day of the accident, it was using roped climbing techniques and utilizing an avalanche probe to locate, evaluate, and avoid crevasses. Despite this technique, one Snow Ranger inadvertently broke through a snow bridge and nearly fell downslope. If this had happened, the rope safety system as mitigation would have prevented a long sliding fall. This roped and probing technique is rarely used by spring visitors to Mt. Washington, even though it would be considered standard practice for mountaineers in other glaciated mountain ranges.

Each visitor, according to his or her experience and skill set, should be prepared for the current conditions. It is important to understand that what may be a reasonable level of risk for one person may not be the same for another, and that each person or group is responsible for deciding when, where, and how to travel. It is also important to understand that no person begins his or her life with mountaineering experience. There is no better way to learn safe mountain travel than through the actual experience of traveling in the mountains. It is imperative to honestly evaluate one’s own experience, skill, and tolerance for risk."

rog

[emcee]

thanks for the report; it's interesting to see the detail on how it actually went down.

the scariest thing about tux is that it's pretty accessible, so you get a herd mentality going just about every weekend. I've been bootpacking up to the ridge only to see fridge-sized ice boulders tumbling down to the lunch rocks (luckily nobody was there at the time).

you've also got that sketchy waterfall-river-traverse at the bottom choke below the ravine on the way back to the ski-back trail. People are going one at a time playing russian roulette with a snow bridge above a 20 foot pit onto rocks. I'm guilty of it too: I probably would hike to find another route if it wasn't for the fact that there were so many people doing it which somehow makes it seem "safer", when it's absolutely not.

[wooley12]

So, what did we learn? The report told how it happened. Too bad the report didn't go a step further and suggest mistakes that were made. What would and experienced group done? I, a humble observer, want to learn.

[PNWbrit]

What would and experienced group done?

Spent the time learning how to do it?

[stevesliva]

So, what did we learn? The report told how it happened. Too bad the report didn't go a step further and suggest mistakes that were made. What would and experienced group done? I, a humble observer, want to learn.

Oh, it did:

As mentioned in the advisory, having equipment is not a guarantee of safety. Down-climbing this route in these conditions is a very difficult endeavor; to do so safely would likely require facing into the slope and front-pointing one’s way down. The fact that three of the four group members were able to safely descend the Lip on this day is remarkable. None in the group were wearing winter mountaineering boots, no one besides the victim was wearing crampons, and though they did have ski poles, they were not carrying ice axes. In this very unfortunate accident, it would be an over-simplification to blame the lack of an ice axe as the primary cause of the accident, but this could be considered one contributing factor.

[icelanticskier]

So, what did we learn?

READ THE DAILY ADVISORIES IN THE DAYS/WEEKS LEADING UP TO YOUR VISIT. THOSE DEATH HOLES HAD BEEN WARNED ABOUT IN LENGTH EVERY DAY FOR AT LEAST 2 WEEKS PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT. READ THE WARNINGS, HEED THE WARNINGS. VERY SIMPLE.

rog

[wooley12]

So with knowledge of the warnings, you would not have taken that route that day? What would you have done differently if you needed to down climb in a situation like they faced?

[PNWbrit]

So with knowledge of the warnings, you would not have taken that route that day? What would you have done differently if you needed to down climb in a situation like they faced?

....No, not necessarily, but if you were going to still go that route the correct gear, training and application of both become essential.

It's not very complicated.

[icelanticskier]

what brit said^^^^^, plus why anyone would ascend/descend the 50/55 degree lip area when the nice 40 degree right gully is sitting right next to it completely free of hazards is beyond me. has always blown my mind. i mean right gully is even more direct as a summit route. in well over 500 mt washington days, i think i've climbed the lip once in 20 years even tho i've skied it a gagillion times.

rog

[kingdom-tele]

. Every year we see numerous people climbing very steep and icy slopes (e.g. the Lip) without an ice axe and crampons…even very experienced mountaineers with all the right equipment would still have a very difficult time self-arresting under the current conditions on some slopes in Tuckerman, so play it safe.” It continued, “Climb up what you plan to descend. This gives you an opportunity to check for hazards such as crevasses at a leisurely pace.”

As mentioned in the advisory, having equipment is not a guarantee of safety. Down-climbing this route in these conditions is a very difficult endeavor; to do so safely would likely require facing into the slope and front-pointing one’s way down. The fact that three of the four group members were able to safely descend the Lip on this day is remarkable. None in the group were wearing winter mountaineering boots, no one besides the victim was wearing crampons, and though they did have ski poles, they were not carrying ice axes. In this very unfortunate accident, it would be an over-simplification to blame the lack of an ice axe as the primary cause of the accident, but this could be considered one contributing factor.

The Mount Washington Avalanche Center often recommends springtime visitors hike up what they plan to descend. We make this recommendation to backcountry visitors regardless of their level of experience. Every season brings similar hazards of crevasses, undermined snow, icefall, etc., but throughout each season the location, severity, and extent of the hazards does change.

Each visitor, according to his or her experience and skill set, should be prepared for the current conditions. It is important to understand that what may be a reasonable level of risk for one person may not be the same for another, and that each person or group is responsible for deciding when, where, and how to travel. It is also important to understand that no person begins his or her life with mountaineering experience. There is no better way to learn safe mountain travel than through the actual experience of traveling in the mountains. It is imperative to honestly evaluate one’s own experience, skill, and tolerance for risk."

....No, not necessarily, but if you were going to still go that route the correct gear, training and application of both become essential.

It's not very complicated.

and yet the only people who survived this incident had no "essential" safety gear, and the one who did perish was utilizing gear to reduce risk, seems to go against the mantra of the MMQB

what brit said^^^^^, plus why anyone would ascend/descend the 50/55 degree lip area when the nice 40 degree right gully is sitting right next to it completely free of hazards is beyond me. has always blown my mind. i mean right gully is even more direct as a summit route. in well over 500 mt washington days, i think i've climbed the lip once in 20 years even tho i've skied it a gagillion times.

rog

how many times was it mentioned to climb what you will descend in that analysis? Maybe heeding warnings isn't very clear afterall

I appreciate the last paragraph they included

[PNWbrit]

and yet the only people who survived this incident had no "essential" safety gear, and the one who did perish was utilizing gear to reduce risk, seems to go against the mantra of the MMQB

They were very, very lucky by the sound of it.

The guy who fell clearly didn't utilize gear correctly (IMnotsoHO) - crampons and no ax on that steep a slope with that degree of hazard below is not applying correct gear or training.

I don't really think that climbing what you descend really comes into it, although obviously one descends an un-climbed route with a far greater degree of caution and or protection. Just goes again to correctly learning and using technique and gear - fairly clearly this wasn't the case here.

Edit: the climb what you ski mantra is more important to skiers than in alpine climbing.

[emcee]

what brit said^^^^^, plus why anyone would ascend/descend the 50/55 degree lip area when the nice 40 degree right gully is sitting right next to it completely free of hazards is beyond me. has always blown my mind.

rog

I think that fact that they didn't see the situation for what it was is also really important. We read this and in hindsight can go "of course it was dangerous, they should have never gone down that slope!" Yet I can think off the top of my head plenty of times where I've been in a similar situation, done the same thing, and just gotten lucky. It's a lot easier to see risk in hindsight, and so if there's anything to take away from this, it's probably the need to actively question your plan as soon as you get into dangerous terrain. Things like "Is this safe? What's the chance I could fall? What's the consequences of a fall?"

Sometimes I try to look at a situation as if it was in hindsight, and say to myself "If I fell or got hurt, would people say I was unlucky? Or stupid?" and then avoid the plan that people would call stupid.

[icelanticskier]

how many times was it mentioned to climb what you will descend in that analysis? Maybe heeding warnings isn't very clear afterall

personally, if i know that dangerous hazards are gonna present themselves on a particular slope, i'll simply climb/ski something different. if i have a full view of a slope, no matter how gnar it is, and it looks good to go, i'll happily climb an easier less exposed route to ski the gnar. MANY of the lines i ski in the whites all winter, dodges, pipeline, dutchess, oakes, get skied from the top without ascending them. climbing them in potentially slabby conditions would expose you twice verses just once if you only descend. i always choose to manage potential instabilities from the top down verses climbing right up underneath the shit.

rog

[kingdom-tele]

They were very, very lucky by the sound of it.

The guy who fell clearly didn't utilize gear correctly (IMnotsoHO) - crampons and no ax on that steep a slope with that degree of hazard below is not applying correct gear or training.

I don't really think that climbing what you descend really comes into it, although obviously one descends an un-climbed route with a far greater degree of caution and or protection. Just goes again to correctly learning and using technique and gear - fairly clearly this wasn't the case here.

Edit: the climb what you ski mantra is more important to skiers than in alpine climbing.

or were they just really skilled with what is perceived to be inferior gear, afterall, they descended without injury, and removing the awful events that occured might have found it "sporting" in retrospect, I know other mountain travelers that look for such conditions to challenge themselves

with re to climb what you ski, hike, etc, just quoting the MTW rangers, I wouldn't presume to know more about mountain travel in their range than they do