PSA. Chapter 1, Call of the Sirens, just launched. Well done.
http://www.powder.com/human-factor/index.php
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PSA. Chapter 1, Call of the Sirens, just launched. Well done.
http://www.powder.com/human-factor/index.php
I thought it was well done too. Wish it wasn't a full week until chapter 2 was released.
You know I got a lot out of the WAC report that is hosted on the CAIC site.
This article seems to be riding on the coat tails of the NYT 'Tunnel Creek' article. Is there going to be a multi media 'expose' after every high profile incident from here on out?
I spoke with one of the survivors QD about it few months after the accident, he was obviously still shaken having lost a good friend and having his mom hurt pretty bad. He'd been so psyched to go on this trip, is super smart guy, calculated, and risk averse, though I haven't been out touring with him to assess ski skills. He didn't say too much outside of feeling like their group had been cautious, followed the guide's lead, they had assessed the snow continually throughout the day and the trip, ie despite doing what they felt was "everything correctly" the accident still occurred.
Hindsight usually identifies the clues and the subtleties as to what went wrong and what was overlooked in leading up to a tragedy, sometimes it amounts to a game of inches on a slope-straying too far left found the trigger point. If only they'd stayed further right... doesn't really matter now. Translating hindsight into foresight is tricky, especially in those grey areas of moderate to considerable where hazard may exist but may offer safe passage and excellent turns.
Interested to see where the rest of this article goes. It seems these types of articles are great at pointing out the heuristic factors that lead to poor decision making after the fact, but do little to address how to truly correct these heuristics while in the moment. F.A.C.E.T.S. is a nice mnemonic to remember the 6 heuristric factors, but it's still hard to simplify into black and white when familiarity becomes a trap, over reliance on a guide (expert halo) becomes a trap, etc.
Totally different audience. Totally different purpose. I don't think exposé is the word you were looking for.Quote:
Originally Posted by AaronWright
I know what expose means. This Powder article has the same purpose as the NYT one, to talk about what went wrong with an experienced group of bc skiers and how they did everything right but they're human after all so they fucked up. Yes, it's well done but it copies the format and presentation of the NYT piece and lacks originality.Quote:
Originally Posted by LightRanger
Like I said, I think the WAC report is well done and objective without being the slightest bit sensationalistic.
Agree to disagree then. It's hard to say that it lacks originality when the NYT Tunnel Creek piece was literally the first of its kind, and there have only been a handful since then. It's not like these types of pieces are a dime a dozen. And it best serves the audience by diagramming the incident and keeping people engaged with video. It's not like I don't see the similarities, but I don't get the criticism. What's your point in saying, "Is there going to be a multi media 'expose' after every high profile incident from here on out?" It's not like anybody's forcing you to read it. I don't see any sensationalism in either this or the TC article either. You can write an article that isn't a purposefully dry and scientific incident report without it being sensationalistic. The criticism also, even if warranted, seems a bit premature considering we've only seen the introduction and first "chapter."Quote:
Originally Posted by AaronWright
Further, I don't recall the the TC article incorporating interviews with Tremper and McCammon, or anybody similar. This first chapter doesn't have any interviews of the involved persons (which was a cornerstone of the TC article), and includes interviews of avalanche experts/educators. You said, "This Powder article has the same purpose as the NYT one, to talk about what went wrong with an experienced group of bc skiers and how they did everything right but they're human after all so they fucked up." But this goes beyond that by targeting it specifically at, well, you and me, as opposed the the NYT's vast and general (compared to Powder Online) readership, and by having an educational tone and purpose. They're both exercises in exploring human psychology, sure, I get that. But this seems to be taking the next step beyond that and trying to address the underlying psychological issues. Besides, the Tunnel Creek piece never talked about how that group of skiers "did everything right." It was an exploration of how such an experienced group could ignore such obvious clues. In the Wallowa incident in this first chapter, the guides were explicitly trying to mitigate the hazard, and obviously something went wrong anyway.
Do you know any of the victims, Aaron?
Didn't know anyone in the Wallowa incident, I did know Jim Jack. That doesn't matter. It just didn't seem very original to me and a poorly executed copy of the NYT piece. Sorry I didn't like it and expressed an opinion you take issue with.
Did you read the WAC report hosted on the CAIC? Objectively it sounds like some of the 'guests' disregarded the lead guides instructions and skied too far to the left, inching into the slide path until it bit them. People want fresh turns and get excited, that sounds like the human factor to me. It's not a mystery, we've all fallen victim to the impulse and most of the time we get away with it. Hopefully over time we will develop better discipline but we are fallible.
People like to quote McCammon because he's done a lot of research, but then they can miss the actual gist of his message: just knowing about heuristic traps doesn't actually make us safer skiers. We need a process to overcome these things, by controlling terrain selection. McCammon's research on Obvious Clues Method for terrain selection (ALPTRUTH) is his main message regarding, "what do we actually do about the human factor."Quote:
Originally Posted by Mofro261
I'll be waiting to see how the rest of the article turns out.
I only asked because at least one of the victims was from Wenatchee. It doesn't matter, but I wondered.Quote:
Originally Posted by AaronWright
You're obviously entitled to your opinion. Not trying to squelch it. I just didn't get the same thing.
I read it. It states, "Subject 2 descends 'fall line' from ridge top location, through a line of trees, along the edge of the no-go zone. Subject 8 restates to follow lead guides tracks, Subject 3 skis just left of Subject 1's tracks, Subject 4 taking a line left of 3's and following closely behind. Subject 5 follows pattern skiing left of 4's. Subject 6 takes a line to the right of Subject 1's tracks. Where Subject 7 and 8 descended is unknown." The bolded language is important. Did the last client ski too far to the left after being reminded a second time to follow the lead guides tracks more to the right? Did the guide ski too far to the left? He presumably was the last skier to descend because he was the tail guide. It's also possible one of them hit an isolated trigger near where the other skiers had already skied through (and moved nothing) and the path of the slide pulled the last two skiers farther to the left because of the way the fall line pulled higher up on the line where they were. We don't know the answers to these questions, as the author of the Powder article reiterates when he states, "We will never know which line they took." And it's important because it [potentially either casts shade on the guides' judgment, or casts shade on the clients' ability to listen--which are two distinct sub-issues within the larger "human factors" rubric.Quote:
Originally Posted by AaronWright
It's not a mystery, sure. But preventing it from happening as often as it does seems to be a mystery to the avalanche education community and the larger community of backcountry skiers. To me at least, that seems to be the point of the article...Quote:
Originally Posted by AaronWright
When that accident happened last winter everyone I know in the ski/ski touring community was wondering who that lady was. No one had any idea who she was.
It's interesting that the 2nd-5th skiers all skied left of where the guide skied despite the instructions to follow his tracks traversing to the right and warning to stay away from the gully on the left. Starting with the 2nd skier who took the fall line and 3,4 and 5 each skiing further to the left. Skier 6 went right of the guides tracks and wasn't caught in the slide. We will never know what path the last two skiers took, but I would guess that the 7th skier or the tail guide hit the sweet spot where skiers 2-5 had skied down and either pulled out high and took the tail guide or the tail guide triggered it and it took everyone else. Skier 3 seems to have been lucky to pass skier 2 and get to the safe spot before the slide went. It would seem the only skiers not exposed to the slide were the lead guide and skier 6.
Looking at the pictures, that seems like an awfully high risk spot for a guided group and the margin for error threading safely through that terrain seems very small. I have skied with WAH but not on that side of the range. I do remember meeting and talking to Sunshine on two occasions when we were there, I think he was portering or doing some snow assessment, can't remember. Anyway, the 'hosts' as they call them seemed very good with safety. Usually the lead would say stay on a certain side of their line and point out a landmark below were the stopped to spot and give directions on what to avoid. Pretty standard I think. We skied some nice stuff on the McCully side but nothing as complex as that slope on Cornucopia. I don't think I'd want to be there with more than 2 or 3 people.
Edit to add: Our 'hosts' never had more than one skier on the slope except on the most gentle(<25 degrees) terrain with no terrain traps or other hazard. Usually skiing the glades off the moraines on the way back to camp. It was always one at a time, so it surprised me when I heard about the incident and read the report about having as many as 8 skiers at once descending that slope.
I don't get why people think it's a mystery that these accidents continue to happen, people make bad decisions for reasons unknown and it's not unique to ski touring. Hell people make bad decisions that get them killed driving to and from work everyday. I don't think we will ever know exactly why people make these decisions but it's not a surprise when they do. I can't believe the stupid shit people do(myself included) that gets them into the ER or OR where I work.
Thanks for the additional thoughts and anecdote. I've had a WAH trip high on my list for a while. Some point in the next couple of years for sure.
On the last point, do we throw up our hands? Or do we continue to try to do better/come up with something helpful? I agree that people make poor decisions for all sorts of known, but irrational reasons, and unknown reasons all the time. Not all of them can be explained in our abstract setting here. But it seems to me that we should continue to have these conversations, even at the risk of sounding like broken records.
Should be interesting to see the changes in the AIARE curriculum that I understand may be coming down the pike.
This is just the first chapter, I think we need to see what else there is before jumping to conclusions. Yes the first chapter is similar to the NYT piece, but I suspect this is going to play out very differently. Let's wait and see.
Lightranger, I give the avy education community kudos for NOT throwing up its hands. AAA, AIARE, AAI are all adding focus on the psychology of Avalanche Safety. Which is a good thing IMO. The science and data collection is important but the key is properly using that information. And how to filter out your own biases/baggage while evaluating.
Last I heard (this time last year), AIARE was making all of the science stuff self-study, and the class sessions would all be in the backcountry and focused on interpretation/decision skills. Is that still the case? Is AAI going to that model as well? Good idea IMNVHO - much better use of class time than PPT presentations. Should make everybody watch A Dozen More Turns as well...
^^^ Agree with you both.
This is all reminding me that I need to take a refresher. I took Avy I in 2006. A lot of changes in the curriculum since then, and they're continuing to change it.
DING DING DING ... exactly the attitude to take, in my opinion.Quote:
Originally Posted by LightRanger
The culture of continuous education is something that AIARE is definitely moving to support. I wish I could get a hold of Ben Pritchett's slide deck from his USAW presentation 2 weeks ago, about where the educational program is looking to head. (Ben directs the educational program at AIARE)
Pretty much all of my friends haven't refreshed or re-taken AIARE1 because they don't feel there would be much value, or that there haven't been "substantial changes to the curriculum." But the changes have been positive in the last 5 years. The forecast centers are using different tests now than in 2006, different communication formats than in 2006, and the current instruction has more emphasis on the avalanche problem, bigger emphasis on the communication checklist, etc.
The main value I see in refreshing or re-taking the class is reinforcing a dedication to the process ... one that you often don't have in the field unless your partners demand/expect it. Experience provides a lot of great learning but it could also provide subconscious bad habits (never had a problem doing it like this before, so ...).
Is that because the journalism standards for Powder are so high?Quote:
Originally Posted by hutash
I read the accident report when it was published and I read the Powder feature the other day.
The thing is that these skiers weren't being cautious at all. They simply ignored obvious signs of instability down low and failed to follow any of the basic principles of avalanche forecasting such as extrapolating to the worst case scenario or even recognizing the incredibly obvious fact that instability would almost certainly increase with elevation. The terrain itself was a very obvious avalanche path in very obvious avalanche terrain. I could go on ( but I won't ).
This is just a common pattern: push it until margin of safety is gone and then act surprised when something happens.
Don't tour this way.
2nd episode is out.
One of the main threads that I see is the lure of steeper and avalanche prone terrain. Often it is somewhat easy to stay out of trouble by keeping to lower angled terrain, but that is not where we want to ski so people end up finding rationalizations and/or falling into heuristic traps and end up exposed. AND then most of the time we get away with it and it becomes easy to conclude that it wasn't as dangerous rather than simply you just dodged a bullet - ie luck.
Then once you're exposing yourself on days with slide potential in slide terrain, like Andrew McClean says in the 2nd piece, it's just a question of whether it's the 5th day or the 5,000th that will be the day that you are caught in a slide.
Ask yourself: Am I good at making the calls or just lucky?
The article talks about caution, but they were being the opposite of cautious as Cookie observed.
More of the same, skiing is fun, skiing steep and deep is really fun, we're getting away with it so it's safe, oops, no it's not.
Still nothing new in terms of content or presentation.
Since the Cornucopia slide has been mentioned here, just saw that Subject 7's widow started a fund for improving forecasting in the Wallowa's
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/northw...-crowdfunding/
Not sure this would have changed the outcome in February, but nice to see the grief channeled to something positive. WAC runs on a damn thin shoestring..Quote:
Wallowa Avalanche Center, of Joseph, Ore., an information source for winter visitors to the region’s backcountry, has accepted $21,500 from the Shane Coulter Memorial Fund.
Coulter, 30, an aerospace engineer who lived in Seattle, was one of two skiers killed in a group of six backcountry skiers and two guides. Bellingham ski guide Jake Merrill also perished, and two in the group suffered broken bones.
Coulter’s widow, Laurel Coulter, opened the online memorial fund in her husband’s name to generate a source of funds for the avalanche center. “I firmly believe he would have wanted us all to channel our grief from this unfortunate accident into something positive — and we did!” she said in a written release.
Etc. Etc. Etc. All true.Quote:
Originally Posted by smitchell333
A very significant part of being a competent backcountry skier involves not falling into those bad habits.
***
Sometimes people talk about human factors as if people aren't under their own control. Does anyone really benefit if the community at large decides that it's okay to use human factors to cover up incompetence?
Yeah I felt that part two was a let down, more focus on very experienced mountain professionals making the same old mistakes. The after affects of the slide in Alaska was a pause of 2 days before heading back into the same terrain and conditions.Quote:
Originally Posted by AaronWright
Is surprised better than fatalism or egoism and pointing to skill (that was obviously insufficient in the incident)? So much of the problem is lack of good data with instructions to "spend time in mountains" or "more education" which doesn't necessarily produce better outcomes perhaps because it simply reinforces poor decisions and habits, not challenges them, or you sit and review general dreck like most of what gets posted here as informative. At least in finance bullshit there's real reasons someone can claim proprietary data/competitive advantage with their data. Oh well.Quote:
Originally Posted by CookieMonster
I fear familureality will be my demise ...
Then once you're exposing yourself on days with slide potential in slide terrain, like Andrew McClean says in the 2nd piece, it's just a question of whether it's the 5th day or the 5,000th that will be the day that you are caught in a slide.
That's the million dollar question right there. I think this is one of those areas where, as a culture, we need to first accept that the core of our user base is likely "incompetent" and/or unable to use training to overcome our traps. In other words, getting over the denial factor and accepting that we need to stick to process rather than shortcuts or subconscious guidance to make terrain / exposure decisions. It's a hard pill to swallow when you get away with it 99.9% of the time.Quote:
Originally Posted by CookieMonster
I don't think we are there yet from a training perspective. I think about Hohes/neck beard's stellar comment in the Pucker Face thread regarding the idea of "operations mentality": view yourselves as an avalanche operations team who happens to ski, not a ski touring group who happens to talk (or not) about avalanches. Again, we are not there yet either, culturally.
It'll be really interesting to see how the rest of these turn out. I've been trying to not read these as they come out, to save them all for the end, but having Jake be the focus of the articles so far has been hard.
Having my inbox, facebook, and other media saturated with the story of a good friends vibrant life cut short has been rough on myself and our group in town. I'm currently crashing on a couch in Katie's old home, now passed down to a new group of college-house-dwellers and chocked full of brothers that knew Jake in various respects. Many of us were his friends, some of us, his students. It was not hard to see the change in mood, the somber tone that this house took on today as people read through and reflected. There is so much Jake here within these walls.
Seeing his smile, and hers, and knowing that everything they said in the article about his character was true made it a little better. Reading Katie's quotes and hearing her talk in my head. But the conversation we held tonight really honed in on what we all knew everyone else thought.
He was the best of us.
When the person that fills that niche in your group of riding partners succumbs to what we all had at one point looked to him for advice on, where do you go? We did not rely solely on his voice, but it held a gravity in our circle that pulled you to reconsider and see things from a view slightly closer to his.
Did I miss something in part 2 or does it skip over the incident that took Jake's life? I remember the incident and can find the details but it seems a little weird to gloss over what exactly happened after building up to it.
Str8chuter can chime and and clarify, but he seems a bit more indifferent to risk in this article than he normally is. Not sure if its the best representation or not.
Wasn't that covered sufficiently in part 1? Maybe I'm missing your point.Quote:
Originally Posted by snapt
To the argument that this is too much like the Tunnel Creek article, I think the more article like this the better. The more likely people will read them and understand the whole story and not just the report which tends to be a little dry. I don't feel that this is sensationalizing the event (so far), which I am completely against, but telling the story leading up to and examining more in-depth the events leading up to the accident.
The article (especially part 2)does have a more emotional aspect to it which might leave more of an affect on some people, which I think is a good thing. If it gets more people to read and be affected by the story, then maybe they will think a little more cautiously before heading out. I find that after some experiences with these kind of events, I definitely think more about the consequences of my actions out there than I did before.
Well shit, part one never loaded after the video on my work comp. See it now on my phone, thanks for clearing that up.Quote:
Originally Posted by shredgnar
What are everyone's thoughts on the whole, "wait 5 to 10 turns before you go" method applied in this case? I could see the potential for confusion with wait 5 to 10 seconds accidentally slipping out. The groups I've been in have always used a marker (i.e. wait until the skier in front of you goes past those trees down there). Is "5 to 10" turns fairly standard or not?
Either way it was stupid. If you throw out the valid point that they shouldn't have even been on that slope, they should have skied it one at a time from the top to the safe spot and if they couldn't see the whole slope they should have communicated with the radio they had. That was the standard practice when I skied with WAH.Quote:
Originally Posted by TahoeJ
No one else sees the irony of McLean talking about the importance of intuition in the first episode, then just sort of glossing over in Ep 2 how intuition totally failed them when Grove took that ride?
or Roman Latta?
Skiing one at a time on any slope is just better form in general whether there are instabilities or not.
The five to ten turns between skiers could be all it takes to load a slope to release, imho.Quote:
Originally Posted by TahoeJ
Safe zones minimize multiple burial potential.
One would hope McLean's intuition has improved since then.Quote:
Originally Posted by telemike
What I see setting up in all of these articles is a binary argument where the only "good call" is the decision not to ski in avalanche terrain since any amount of risk we accept and get away with becomes "getting lucky". No amount of rehashing of accidents like these will have a dramatic effect on behaviors or outcomes because the element of risk is what makes us feel the activities are worthwhile. Do you know anyone that only skis in non-avalanche terrain? I can't say that I do. I remember a convo I had with Andrew ~20 yrs ago where he said that he found just skiing powder to be boring, he craved the risk. This was maybe a few years after the Wolverine accident before the chuting gallery came out. The video in episode 2 clearly shows this opinion hasn't changed. The comment something could happen on day 5 or day 5000 is certainly true-we have an incident (hopefully not accident), try to analyse the clues as to what we missed, back off our accepted amount of risk in the near term, then continue pursuing activities that involve risk and slowly build back up to the level we were at previously. Intuition fails us when we choose to ignore it.Quote:
Originally Posted by telebobski
Whether we label it heuristics or incompetence when discussing factors the add to the risk, the reality is they mean the same thing- an error in judgement was made. Labeling it heuristics merely lessens the blow to the friends, family, survivors, and memory for those we felt were highly competent and yet still made incompetent decisions within that moment.
so long as humans keep being human........Quote:
Originally Posted by Mofro261
I fear that you're still missing the point. Incompetence is when someone can't / won't / doesn't use their training to manage/overcome susceptibility to human factors, or when they don't rigourously apply their training, or when they pick and choose best practices, or when they ignore obvious signs of instability, or when they fail to follow even the most basic principles of backcountry avalanche forecasting and decision making with respect to margin of safety. Incompetence is when someone conflates their accumulated experience as a backcountry skier with actually being skilled at backcountry avalanche forecasting and decision-making or any other principle of winter mountain safety. Knowing how to do something ( experience ) is not the same as knowing how to do something the right way ( skill ).Quote:
Originally Posted by SchralphMacchio
So much of this talk about human factors seems to paint backcountry skiers as zombies devoid of free will who have had their agency removed. This is very rarely true and it is especially untrue for backcountry skiers who are aware of these issues beforehand. Assuming we're talking about legally competent adults, then I absolutely cannot see how someone is "unable" to use their training to tour in competent fashion. I think it's much more fair to say that people become lazy and complacent and just do what they want, with small varnishes of safety added on for effect. The thing is that the physics of snow and avalanches mean that being complacent and lazy and using small varnishes of safety is almost always good enough. Until it's not.
***
For the record, I'm using "incompetence" in the most clinical and non-judgmental sense possible.
***
Dale Atkins wrote an ***absolutely incredible*** article on uncertainty in this issue of The Avalanche Review. It taught me a lot and really should be required reading.
http://www.americanavalancheassociat...31_4_LoRes.pdf
The article begins on page 22 ( where page 22 is on the top left of the page, which is not necessarily the page 22 indicated by your PDF reader ).