Thank you Alex! You are an amazing friend.
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Thank you Alex! You are an amazing friend.
Thanks to both of you for the great write-up and tribute.Quote:
Originally Posted by SchralphMacchio
Whether intuition is a sixth sense, or an accumulation of knowledge we should all ask our partners,
"Are you comfortable with this?"
and hope we are traveling with good enough folks to accept no as a final answer and find another route.
Well done schralph and OM, thank you both for your candor.
Thats a very good practice, and one I always try to use if we're skiing a line with some intended acceptable level of risk. I make it a point of looking at each person in my group, and asking the person, individually, if they're comfortable with the decision and risk. If you ask the group collectively, you tend to run into cases where people may not speak up. Asking them individually helps break that group mentality, and you might just end up getting a 'no' when you wouldn't have otherwise.Quote:
Originally Posted by dewam
I also will often try to just turn to individuals and ask each one, what they think about the conditions, what we've seen and heard, just to try and eek out additional observations that I may have missed. Helps with the expert halo thing. I've notcied women in the group usually have something useful to add when approached individually.
I'm sure this technique can be used in other areas to help break down other group heuristic traps as well.
Thanks Oceanman and Schralp for your write-ups. I doubt I would have said No Go in your shoes.
Incredibly sobering and powerful Ocean and Schralp! Condolences on your loss and thoughts and prayers to Mike's family and to all that called him a friend.
Lindahl, great tools to slow things down and break the group dynamic force. Thank you
Tons of awesome vibes from everyone else. Y'all have a great weekend. Enjoy the pow and be safe
I never met Mike, but have heard wonderful things about him from a family member who I work with. The loss is unimaginable.
Thank you for taking the time to educate with your write up OceanMan.
Thoughts are with the family. Deepest condolences to all.
Bump, I wrote an article for The Avalanche Review about the accident that just got published and posted. I sincerely hope that it is both informative, and also valuable to the rest of you folks out there, for your friends, etc.
http://www.americanavalancheassociat...32_4_Cover.pdf
(See Page 20 for the case study and article, the other one on Page 18 is an opinion piece by Blase Reardon)
Many thanks to homemadesalsa and the rest of the Jackson community - everyone has been so supportive through the aftermath of our accident. Thoughts and vibes to all of those affected by avalanche accidents this season. Fingers crossed for nothing more than "close calls" for the rest of the season, in Wydaho and the rest of the West.
You did an incredible job on that article. Thank you. I will re-read it again to make sure I process everything in it.Quote:
Originally Posted by SchralphMacchio
Hey schralp- Thanks for your debriefing, and since you keep putting things out there I guess it is still up for discussion. I think the main lesson to be learned here is being slightly missed.
I'm sure both you and OM are suffering in your own way and I wish you peace, but I'd like to see you guys admit that egos were the driving factor that day bc, while you allude to it, you do not say that and I think that is THE BEST lesson to come out of this tragic event and to help Mike's legacy and others from similar losses.
You reference adding more 'standard practices', but you all knew the basic standard practices learned in your avi 1 and 2 and yet chose to ignore them or simply allowed yourselves to blinded by the exact thing that are drilled into our brains in the classes to not get blinded by
What do you think the benefit of adding more standard practices are if experienced backcountry people, as you describe yourself, already did not take into account the very first and most basic principles learned in avi classes in the face the red flags? Let’s focus on putting into practice what you already know until it’s like second nature rather than trying to put into practice some more standards for after an event. The focus should be not letting it happen in the first place.
It seems like you want this to be a learning experience for others so let’s recognize that the #1 factor that day- group dynamic is a fun buzzword but let’s call it what it is- ego. If you want to truly make a difference with writing about your experience then help other guys to simply and straight forwardly recognize when the ego starts to drive you and the group and how to get out of that mode and back to focusing on those standard practices you have been taught.
Don’t rely on fancy biz euphuisms and let’s just KISS…..bc you guys all honestly seem like smart, great, conscientious guys and yet you were completely blinded by the pow fever in the face of several obvious red flags.
And re: your conclusion "Getting back into the backcountry and "trying to make better habits"
As good ol yoda say "Do or do not. There is no try"
You keep saying it was their ego, I am not sure ego is the right word for it. Ego is the sense of self. I think in a group dynamic given the powder fever ego is the last thing that is given attention. And should quite possibly be the first thing that is addressed. Having been in several groups where the dynamics were clearly group driven and the individuals gave in to the power of the group I certainly can't point my finger since I have fallen into the same trap. I. This case individual ego would have been a good thing and may have prevented them from venturing into an area where I could be willing to bet non of them would have ventured had they been solo. The opposite of "ego" (in my oh so humble opinion).Quote:
Originally Posted by baby bear
I'm going to take a shot at this one. Baby Bear can correct me if I'm smoking crack.Quote:
Originally Posted by teleee
It seems like Baby Bear is using ego not in the Sigmund-Frued-psychobabble sense, but in the synonym-with-pride sense. Used in that way, it has near antonyms of disgrace, dishonor, humiliation, and timidity.
When you're standing at the top of a gnar line, are you going to ski it, or back down in humiliation, like a disgraceful, timid pussy? If your fear of looking like a pussy overrides your fear of kicking off an avalanche, your ego, or pride, is making the decision.
Gnarly well known test-piece lines stroke males egos more often than not. And that emotion, often difficult to recognise, overcomes common sense and practical training whilst at the same time inflates our sense of personal experience. Good post, BB.
You don't think "ego" drives most skiing groups? Find it hard to believe someone can spend so much time here on TGR and not see ego-driving most things.Quote:
Originally Posted by teleee
And guys I don't want my comments to be taken too harshly- when I look back up it's fairly clinical sounding but I wanted to address a couple things nagging at me as I've been thinking about this stuff a lot. I keep seeing this stuff happen and it totally bums me out.
Yea telee- you are probably right that ego is not really the perfect word I was going for and ego does tend to come off as negative in this sense, which I don't necessarily want.
Stradissimo yes- thank you for helping me out there- that's what I was meaning.
I like that the guys have been vocal about what happened that day- thanks for sharing. But I get the sense from the amount of writing you've done that you guys want something better to come out of this.
Shralp talks about 'root cause countermeasures" and I honestly think that if we can isolate exactly what it was in that group dynamic going on that we can learn more and be better.
I know that pucker face is a line to 'check off the list' so to say and I believe that came into play within the group dynamic. Maybe I'm totally off base on that but I doubt it. We all are similar animals us ski lovers.
You don't have to be 'egotistical' in the standard sense to have an ego. I think it is more within yourself
So I just wish there was a go-to to give someone the confidence to speak up that is questioning a situation at all. All the guys seemed nervous about it and I know we've all been there where we weren't sure. Maybe it's listen to your gut campaign. Maybe things'll never change and I'm just getting older and wishing people were more careful with their lives.
Baby bear, all good points. Pick up a copy of April 's Avalanche Review if you'd like an in-depth, human factor breakdown
And to answer your question. I will admit that my sense of comfort/confidence (ego, if you will) was too high, which led me to drop the ball when it came to concrete decisions. Tell me about your BC riding when you we're 26 years of age? I bet you might have made mistakes back then?
Well written. Good to see something like that come out of this.Quote:
Originally Posted by SchralphMacchio
Excellent read. Well written and comes off as appropriately analytical not making excuses. Thanks for sharing
Alex, sorry for the loss of your friend and the feelings you must deal with now. I cannot compair my avalanche experience with yours as we all walked away, but I want to go over the similarities and the way things go.
I have toured with Alex and can say He isnt the cowboy type and when I finally put two and two together and realized you were part of this I had flashbacks from my Wyoming Incident
Mine (ours) was at Togwootee pass . I was part of a much larger group ( 11 total) roaming around the back side of Angle mountain. I was from out of town and didnt have a lot of touring under my belt and was trailing behind .
Each time we grouped together for a drop myself and SanFrantastico would drag up about the time everyone was almost done with their transition. We didnt have much input on group decisions because of our slowness. Not enough to get left behind,but enough to not be counted.
We had dropped an old crownline on a steep slope and afterwards while having lunch the whole flat area we were in dropped about six inches whith a very large whump.
Having toured in the Sierra and San Bernadino mountains I had heard about 'whumping" but had never actually heard it.
This was another sign scremingat us to get the hell out of their.
The last settlement during lunch did catch the attention of the locals and it was mentioned we should pick our way out of the valley we were in very carefuly. We all started skinning up a farly mellow slope, then the groups stopped and decided to split into six and five. My partner and I were the lsat to arrive and just joined group two (we made five) . The two of us had no Idea what we were about to do, thinking we were inching our way out.
The guy we were following wanted to climb up to a small rockband for another drop.
As He approched a rockband the slope gave way and SanFrantastico and one other guy in the group were gone in a flash.
Luckily both guys ended up partially buried and noone got hurt.
I wanted to point out
we too were out of our usual area
touring with people we had just met
in unknow terrain
bringing up the rear so missing out on the group desicion
and followed into a slide
Sense that day I have turned back twice. Both time at Rogers pass.
I would turn back again if I had to choose agtain. I have ridden much powder sense, so no loss.
my advice is to listen to the slowest guys in the group if you happen to be the defacto leader and if your the slow guy raise hell if you need too but make sure your voice is heard
Thank you for having the corrage to write up everything. I know that part was tough
Just wanted to chime in and recommend folks check out the TAR article by Shralph (and the rest of the TAR too). Very well written and honest self evaluation. I recommend reading it carefully and spending some time pondering what is described.Quote:
Bump, I wrote an article for The Avalanche Review about the accident that just got published and posted. I sincerely hope that it is both informative, and also valuable to the rest of you folks out there, for your friends, etc.
http://www.americanavalancheassociat...32_4_Cover.pdf
(See Page 20 for the case study and article, the other one on Page 18 is an opinion piece by Blase Reardon)
Many thanks to homemadesalsa and the rest of the Jackson community - everyone has been so supportive through the aftermath of our accident. Thoughts and vibes to all of those affected by avalanche accidents this season. Fingers crossed for nothing more than "close calls" for the rest of the season, in Wydaho and the rest of the West.
But I did read it and that's why I came to what I'm still asking above. In fact I referenced a few different points from it. Yes, it's nicely written and gives a lot of detail but 'Group dynamic' is still too broad. It's not narrowed down enoughQuote:
Originally Posted by Oceanman
Ok babybear, let me break down our biggest take aways and the exercises we have adopted since. I'll try to keep things short and to the point but some personal detail should follow.
1. Assign a group leader on every day skiing the BC to ensure communication is on-going, throughout the group as a whole. This role can be tough because the leader must often play devil's advocate and ask deep questions sometimes individually in order to leave no stone unturned.
2. Assess the stoke and comfort. To me this was a big factor in our group:
- great energy the day after Christmas
- new partners who were really clicking on a social level
- big snow that had for the most part held up in quality
- a somewhat well settling snowpack with 48 hour given to release and/or settle
- looking down an untouched line of blower turns and really fun/challenging terrain
All of these factors led me and most of the others to let our stoke, individual and collectively, get the best of us. The adrenaline and other chemicals released here blinded me from the real questions and analysis that I should have been focused on.
3. Head out every day like your going out for "a walk in the woods" but also, do your homework on possible lines/terrain. It's important to keep an open mind and stay away from tasked focused objectives, in our case the un-tracked pucker face and the cornice cut. We showed no respect to the mountains that day when it comes to studying them and how they act. If I had done some research I would have found that pucker historically slides early season. Yes, we should have honed in on the unsupported slope with cliff bands/weaknesses/sweet spots using our avalanche eyes. Unfortunately I slipped up on this. With limited experience out the gates of JHMR, all I really knew about pucker and the rest of Cody was that it was aesthetically pleasing and that on any given "moderate" day, 48 hours after a storm, people got after it with tons of lines as evidence.
3. Keep groups to 4 or smaller.
4. Start small with new partners and slowly build a working relationship.
5. Watch out for "moderate" ratings and pay attention to every detail on the bulletin. These days we tend to go straight to the avalanche problem, then check out the rating. Look for trends in avalanche activity. Christmas night I read the 5pm forecast and basically stopped reading after they spoke of dropping the rating to moderate. Had I kept reading and focused on the details I would have read that a similar aspect/terrain on Taylor had slid. But I was at a Christmas party and kept the iphone surfing to a minimal. That morning I checked the avalanche event map and did not see the Taylor slide.
6. Ski smart and extra cautious with persistent weaknesses. It's almost impossible to judge whether these persistent problems will release and when they do, equally difficult to manage one if caught.
7. Don't let other groups, guides or professionals (social proof) give you a false sense of security.
8. Treat every line like it is guilty until proven innocent. If your cutting a cornice as your only piece of evidence get out of there. Being a big tourer who spends most of my time in GTNP where I can assess snowpack as I ascend, the "side country" through me for a loop that day with my limited beta on the slope and it's snowpack. Sure, I had spent the 24th observing instabilities on 25 short and the 25th at the village speaking to ski patrol about mitigation efforts and mountain guides about observations but what I missed was my usual "marination" if you will, where one spends countless hours ascending a slope, feeling the snow and then dissecting the line.
9. If plans change ask why. That day our decision to look at pucker instead of no shadow or 4 shadow would have had only one answer: because the other two have seen a lot of traffic and pucker is UN-TRACKED. Not the best reason to change objectives...
10. Slow is swift, and swift is fast.
11. Assess worst case scenario if it slides and make sure everyone is committed.
12. Discuss the slope, letting each partner point out his thoughts on weaknesses and or strengths. Where are possible islands of safety if it rips?
13. Come up with a solid search and rescue plan for each and every line if something goes wrong. In our case, the quickest way was to billygoat straight down the rocks. After no visuals of Mike, I assessed hang fire and chose to descend pucker. Luckily I had the help of Dave Miller at the toe of the avalanche as I worked the top of the debris looking for visuals while doing a grid beacon search. If we were in the park outside help probably wouldn't have been there.
14. Most importantly, review these takeaways before, during and after skiing with your partners. If you discuss all of these in depth and everyone is included, then you have done your best and only risk tolerance is left.
Hope this helps babybear. Y'all have a great wknd!
And if you want me to touch on the "ego" piece your so stuck on, I'll say that yes we were/are a group of young skiers who like to push our skiing abilities on extreme terrain. Everyone of us has our own risk tolerance and it's hard to mitigate that other then choosing your partners wisely for the snowpack and terrain you plan to adventure out in. Cheers
Errr - did you mean to write it that way? Surely you mean choose the terrain to fit the snowpack and hazard?Quote:
Originally Posted by Oceanman
14 bullet points to review before each run? good lord, no
Yeah, of course you want to match terrain to the snowpack and hazard. I was trying to look at it from a partner/risk tolerance POV.
It would be cool if y'all spent less time picking apart any small errors and looked at it from a more positive and constructive perspective. But I guess I might me in the wrong place for that....
And yes, 14 bullets before, during and after each run. It's a lot I know. But what if your car mechanic or doctor skipped procedures?
People don't want a 14 point bullet list. There are safety cards out there, now. Like pilots use for preflight checks.They rarely sell and rarely get used. If it works for you, great, just pointing out the issues. That's me being positive and constructive - redirect elsewhere.Quote:
Originally Posted by Oceanman
Thanks for writing, Alex and OM. I got a lot out of reading.
Like I said, the most important thing about checklists is whether we agree to use them in the first place, above and beyond the content embedded within them.Quote:
Originally Posted by Hugh Conway
waiting at least 72 hours for intermountain or continental zones is essential:)
rog
Interesting article and risk reduction framework. What's your system?Quote:
Originally Posted by Hugh Conway
Since the accident I've tried to use AIARE Blue Book communication checklist at trailhead, and then ALPTRUTH on slope, but not to 100% compliance, as it's varied by partner and general conditions. The one thing I've done 100% of time since the accident is to review the avalanche problem as a group at the trailhead and at key points along the approach.
I thought SM's post on 1/6 addressed the ego/pride/group dynamic pretty well (at least from one perspective). On a face like that it's easy to think about dangers that are more obvious and get distracted from slides--and legitimately. After all, if someone skis a line and dies in a fall no one asks if he was distracted by the avalanche report.
How to address that in a checklist seems like a good question. FWIW I'm in the camp that thinks 14 points that are handled linearly so nothing is skipped is simpler than a 3×3 plus checking all the caveats and an equation at the end. Particularly given the limitations listed in Hugh's second link ('disadvantages of knowledge-based decision making' on page 3/4). Not to say the linear checklist can actually be kept to 14 points while being as thorough, so it's not an easy comparison. But I like the pre-flight checklist model and I'm still refining mine. Concise is a challenge, but using it at the trailhead and key points is my objective, too.
Also consider buying the Avaluator from the CAC. The latest slope evaluation card (plastic, roughly the size of a credit card) has a terrain character checklist and an avalanche conditions checklist. The results from both checklists are then combined. It is designed for use in an area with a well developed avalanche bulletin.Quote:
Originally Posted by SchralphMacchio
OM developed a checklist of takeaways from this accident. Munter developed a method to reduce accidents (in a specific region). There are other methods out there; other research, I don't know whats the art now, the links are old. The point was not to get into camps of one vs. the other like every other thread . The point was to look at frameworks and research already in existence. Because people have spent time doing this already.Quote:
Originally Posted by jono
baby bear - haven't had a chance to think through your comments until now. I'm trying to listen and process your statements.
Quote:
Originally Posted by baby bear
Pucker is a line to brag about, sure. But not everyone wanted to ski Pucker, and not everyone needed to "check it off." Sure, everyone was interested in the idea of scoring that line in powder - but I can literally tell you that the majority of the group (4/6) did not have a driving thirst to score that specific line at that specific time.Quote:
Originally Posted by baby bear
I hear what you are trying to say, big-picture wise and mostly agree with the general direction of your points. But I am a lot more into nuance than you are, because I don't think that group dynamics is a fancy euphemism that boils down into ego.
This was the very first time that this group of 6 has ever set out to function as a team, whether skiing or fishing or whatever. When I say, "group dynamics," here is a more tangibly stated set of observations:
-I wanted to ski with Mike, and I am not really someone to disrupt a totally new group
-Mike wanted to ski with his friends and make sure everyone had fun, and he had also never skied Pucker
-Some of the group was deferring decision and discussion to others who had more snow evaluation experience
-Some of the group was deferring decision and discussion to others who regularly skied this area (not the same as above)
-The underlying idea that the risk is "Moderate" on Moderate days, superceded the idea that slabs up to 4' deep were possible in specific areas
-Ineffective communication failed to halt/address many mental shortcuts and failed to force a review of the situation / plan
-Ineffective communication led to dismissal or not exploring of alternative views, from both those who had them and those who ignored them
-Alternative views were let go of by those who had them, not because of fear of speaking up, but because everyone had an interest in supporting the group
I would call this a high level of dysfunction in communication and teamwork, and a desire to support the group even though no one is completely sure where it is headed, but not "ego." Ego may have allowed an innocently stated, yet subversively alluring, suggestion ("let's have a look at Pucker") to hijack the direction, but I really don't see that as the underlying weakness here.
In many studies I've read, groups are supposed to come to more accurate decision-making than the majority of individuals can. (A group exercise in our Utah Avalanche Center Freeride Clinic that Oceanman and I took after the accident also demonstrated this.) The crux of that is that the group must be capable of both independent reasoning and effective communication.
When those things aren't available within the group ...
Groupthink:
Quote:
Groupthink is a psychological phenomenon that occurs within a group of people, in which the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision-making outcome. Group members try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision without critical evaluation of alternative viewpoints, by actively suppressing dissenting viewpoints, and by isolating themselves from outside influences ...
Irving Janis devised eight symptoms indicative of groupthink.
Type I: Overestimations of the group — its power and morality
1.Illusions of invulnerability creating excessive optimism and encouraging risk taking.
2.Unquestioned belief in the morality of the group, causing members to ignore the consequences of their actions.
Type II: Closed-mindedness
1.Rationalizing warnings that might challenge the group's assumptions.
2.Stereotyping those who are opposed to the group as weak, evil, biased, spiteful, impotent, or stupid.
Type III: Pressures toward uniformity
1.Self-censorship of ideas that deviate from the apparent group consensus.
2.Illusions of unanimity among group members, silence is viewed as agreement.
3.Direct pressure to conform placed on any member who questions the group, couched in terms of "disloyalty"
4.Mindguards— self-appointed members who shield the group from dissenting information.
One of the party members said it really well after the accident: "We all trusted each other, even though we have never really done anything to earn that trust."
If I modify your text to take out the word "ego" then I totally agree with this statement.Quote:
Originally Posted by baby bear
The challenge is that it's a lot easier to see when things are getting out of whack from the couch than when you're in it - Attachment 154039
Which is the whole point of my campaign for practice and standardization of observable characteristics of mental shortcuts / group dysfunction.
I hear what you are saying about KISS, just consider that part of my audience for that article was addressed to the educational leadership. That's why I talk about exercises for facilitated & structured communication. I do believe that practice can make communication feel more easy, and development of standard communication exercises is a way to give people that practice.
So like I said, big picture, I'm with you. I just don't like the semantics and implications of ego, because I see that strong group communication and observing when shortcuts are being taken are more important to focus on.
(edit)
And, also requoting this for anyone coming back into this thread
Quote:
Originally Posted by SchralphMacchio
But see, that's the whole point.Quote:
Originally Posted by Oceanman
Someone more or less in that age group is dead.
I made similar mistakes when I was in that age group, but others I knew well made worse mistakes and they're dead, too. My own take on this article is that the author admits mistakes were made, but assigns most of the blame to forces beyond anyone's control or some nebulous groupthink that couldn't be overcome.
My own opinion is that if ONE person in that group had had the balls to stand up and say "This doesn't feel right to me. I'm going somewhere else.", the rest of the story might have been very different.
The balance has definitely tipped over the years. Lines are being ridden in conditions today that I and my contemporaries would never have considered two or three decades ago. Bags and lungs and even beacons have changed the dynamic. For the most part, people are getting away with descents that I would have thought insane a while back, and most of the time there are no negative consequences.
To me, this Pucker incident was so obviously off-the-charts sketchy that I can't even believe someone could have stood at the top of Pucker on that day in those conditions and considered riding that line. That said, I've been wrong on so many other topics that y'all can just scoff and call me stupid or a wuss.
I just don't see very many "lessons" in this article that haven't been published time after time before. I don't see much here that really illustrates the tragedy of a life lost and many other lives impacted in terrible ways.
Agreed. Different strokes. Not saying one is useless, I'm just saying which one I use and will likely continue to use. I don't mind complex analysis tools in the least but the more of these I read about and the more experiences I have the more items I see myself remembering at the expense of forgetting some other critical point...so for me it's a list. And human factors get a point or three in it.Quote:
Originally Posted by Hugh Conway