Good stuff here. First thanks for the kind words. I think you make a couple points here that are worth addressing.
1) I don't necessarily think these guys were "reckless assholes." In fact I'm quite sure they thought they were making a completely reasonable decision. What I object to is the characterization that this type of avalanche was not covered in the forecast (it was, on the forecast discussion tab the possibility for persistent slab avalanches in thinner snowpack areas was clearly discussed) and the idea that this was a fluke accident that they could not have predicted. That's just false. Summit went into good detail on that. I agree that not every backcountry traveler has the skill set to recognize that specific risk but that is not the same as unrecognizable. I don't know the level of actual experience and education that this group had but generally any person that has sufficient education and experience to safely plan a tour in aggressive terrain like this should have been able to recognize potential hazard. I absolutely agree that quickly/blindly characterizing people who are involved in avalanche accidents as reckless or stupid is counterproductive and inhibits your ability to learn from the accident.
2) My main issue with this accident is not that they chose this type of terrain, on this day, it is that they chose this type of terrain on this day above public infrastructure. In fact, I skied a west facing avalanche path further west in the zone about a week prior to this incident. The risk was not zero and we specifically identified, discussed, and avoided thin snowpack areas on the edges of previously windloaded areas on our tour. So when I say the hazard they faced was identifiable, I'm speaking from a place of experience... because we did exactly that. The terrain we chose was overall a bit less likely to slide (thicker, more uniform coverage) and less consequential (less rock/cliff hazard) than the terrain that this group chose but overall it was still big terrain and non-zero risk. The biggest difference, however, is our line did not threaten public infrastructure in any way, which is crucially important because...
3) As a backcountry community I strongly believe that it is imperative to travel with an exceptionally low risk tolerance when recreating in places that threaten infrastructure. The reason why is access. If backcountry skiers put snow on roads, we will lose access. It's that simple. And I do NOT want that to be the precedent. For example, take Berthoud Pass. If closure was the default for management of avalanche terrain above roads, that would mean Stanley, 80s, 90s, and Floral Park at a minimum would all become permanent closures. It wouldn't take much to extend that to a number of steep roadcuts, lower 110s, First Creek, and a bunch of other spots. Now that's getting difficult to enforce so you just stop plowing the parking lot. See where this goes? And that's my issue with this accident. Not that they chose to travel in this type of terrain on this day. It's that they chose to do it above a roadway.
4) Skiing the Sisters/using highway mitigation as justification. Yep I know the people you refer to. One I consider a good friend and not an asshole, but he is reckless, and I've told him that. The others I haven't heard them use CDOT bombing as justification but if they do, they are wrong, full stop. I increasingly stress that highway mitigation work is not equivalent to mitigation work for skiing in my awareness classes because I've noticed this is a disturbing trend.
5) I've avoided commenting on the legal case directly because I'm no dentist and we don't have the full story anyway. My layperson opinion is that he's probably getting the book thrown at him because this went down during the stay at home order. There might be more to it that we don't know as well. I don't feel like I have enough info or legal knowledge to really comment on whether the criminal charges are justified.