A "Moderate" discussion of the avalanche rating scale.

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Originally Posted by spook

i don't know shit about shit but i can't believe that the "human factor" can be so considerable if all these people are knowledgeable and informed and read about all their buddies dying in avalanches that should have been avoided and say "oh vibes, man" let's honor our dead friends by not learning a damn thing and do exactly the same thing.

or maybe another way to say it is if you can't immunize yourself from the "human factor," which seems to be based in human stupidity and ego, you shouldn't be going in groups.

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This post is a great example of the heuristic trap (AKA human factors). You acknowledge that you don't know shit, but then claim that your "belief" trumps many observed and well accepted phenomena of what happens when people get together to ski.

This is similar to what happens to some BC skiers. They may not know shit about what they are skiing, but based on various beliefs (such as previous tracks, they may have heard it was safe, it's a nice sunny day, it looks awesome!) they decide to ski it anyway.

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Originally Posted by LeeLau

It depends on the partners

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2ND reply. even solid same page partner skiing adds that extra lil bit of comfort which can lead to complacency, which can lead to........

rog

how then do you maintain the if i fuck up im going to die mentality when your not out by yourself?? Because clearly that's the level of stress I want people to have when we're in the "zone"

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Originally Posted by simplypow

how then do you maintain the if i fuck up im going to die mentality when your not out by yourself?? Because clearly that's the level of stress I want people to have when we're in the "zone"

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can you re-word that 1st part a bit?

rog

yeah maybe I'm just diving into the conversation haphazardly, but what I thought I saw was a comment about complacency, and how skiing with other people is a guarantee for that happening...

I know that when I am in the cold, and not counting on someone other than me to get up and down and back again, I spend more time analyzing things, and have an easier time bagging a loaded line

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Originally Posted by simplypow

yeah maybe I'm just diving into the conversation haphazardly, but what I thought I saw was a comment about complacency, and how skiing with other people is a guarantee for that happening...

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I said "can", not guarantee. how many incidences, deadly and close calls, involve multiple people vs going solo? many less when going solo I'm sure.

rog

no question about it. And to take that mentality and apply it to a group situation? Not possible is the point. You come exceedingly close however if you identify a decision maker up front, and then shut up for the rest of the day. Less talk-more time spent skiing

^^^^^^^^^^^agreed.

rog

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Originally Posted by hortence

This post is a great example of the heuristic trap (AKA human factors). You acknowledge that you don't know shit, but then claim that your "belief" trumps many observed and well accepted phenomena of what happens when people get together to ski.

This is similar to what happens to some BC skiers. They may not know shit about what they are skiing, but based on various beliefs (such as previous tracks, they may have heard it was safe, it's a nice sunny day, it looks awesome!) they decide to ski it anyway.

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If you want to see green lights instead of red flags you are probably going to see green lights. This is where scientific critical thinking needs to come into play. Three key things that contribute to critical thinking are curiosity, skepticism, and humility. In this process you evaluate evidence, assess conclusions, and examine our assumptions. The last one is the big one. Humility and an awareness of our own vulnerability to error with an openness to new perspectives and surprises. Basically always be aware of wanting to see green lights and then take a step back because big egos can lead us to cling to our pre-conceptions and that can be very bad with snow science and back country powder skiing.

It's my 2nd day in Psych 101 so I'm a fucking expert now ;), and yes that was slightly adapted to fit this discussion but straight out of the text book but I figure this is sort of like studying.

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Originally Posted by RaisingArizona

If you want to see green lights instead of red flags you are probably going to see green lights. This is where scientific critical thinking needs to come into play. Three key things that contribute to critical thinking are curiosity, skepticism, and humility. In this process you evaluate evidence, assess conclusions, and examine our assumptions. The last one is the big one. Humility and an awareness of our own vulnerability to error with an openness to new perspectives and surprises. Basically always be aware of wanting to see green lights and then take a step back because big egos can lead us to cling to our pre-conceptions and that can be very bad with snow science and back country powder skiing.

It's my 2nd day in Psych 101 so I'm a fucking expert now ;), and yes that was slightly adapted to fit this discussion but straight out of the text book but I figure this is sort of like studying.

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scientia paribus animatum...any scholars out there, because as far as I'm concerned it means better to be alive and lacking than otherwise fulfilled...

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Originally Posted by hortence

This post is a great example of the heuristic trap (AKA human factors). You acknowledge that you don't know shit, but then claim that your "belief" trumps many observed and well accepted phenomena of what happens when people get together to ski.

This is similar to what happens to some BC skiers. They may not know shit about what they are skiing, but based on various beliefs (such as previous tracks, they may have heard it was safe, it's a nice sunny day, it looks awesome!) they decide to ski it anyway.

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my disbelief is really amazement, because i do read the stats and such. at the same time human factors can't really be more than excuses at the moment they occur -- at minimum a lack of somebody speaking up, assuming the danger is obvious, which it seems to be in a lot of these cases. to a lay person, classifying something like that -- moments when people do not act responsibly against their own knowledge and safety and then apparently cause the rest of a group to do the same -- as the human factor sounds a little whitewashed of responsibility.

fucking up is fucking up.

so, if I lay out two scenarios with nearly identical outcomes, is distinguishing responsible vs. irresponsible possible...Comparison is 2007 hotdog bowl accident on Cameron Pass to Sinaktu from last year. To the casual dick tracey it's all just another golden shower... See links below for CAIC reports

http://avalanche.state.co.us/caic/ac...ident=20071202

http://avalanche.state.co.us/caic/ac...=505&accfm=inv

i haven't had time to look at those yet, but i was speaking about the "human factor" in particular. i don't see why there's a problem saying the human factor is someone fucking up. sure, i'm a casual dick tracey with a growing interest. but i haven't read too many reports in here where everybody was like "oh nobody could have seen that coming." in fact, it seems most of the time to be the exact opposite, that the errors are glaring. obviously, i'm oversimplifying but in the end somebody's dead, others are sad and regretful, and often lingering is the sense of if only, which is not usually finished by something drastic and miraculous, but something simple, like, if i'd only said something or if we'd only not willfully ignored this or that.

i don't even hear "yes, we knew the risk and took it."

Spook, when you first start out this game you are humble and scared. A hundred days in the backcountry without an incident can make you way more comfortable than you ought to be ... And more susceptible to getting tricked. It is good to remember what it feels like to be scared. Making a series of mistakes that takes your group into the danger zone is obvious when you have the bird's eye view - but guess what, our AIARE curriculum does not train for the firsthand view of what it is like in a group situation. In other words, it's easy to see the traps in the maze from above, but our current training standards don't show you what they look like from within the walls of human belief and heuristics. Does that make sense?

I will ask you to read my comments in the East Vail Tony Seibert thread in Slide Zone if you care for more. I am not excusing our group's mistakes, only providing context that studying them alone will not inoculate you. It takes situational practice (of communication and protocols) to avoids the traps - something that very few people do. If you still don't believe it, I would suggest looking at situations where your own assessment of the world around you is framed by your mental state and not by the quantifiable evidence. A person can look at the same exact situation in different mental states and draw different conclusions.

I can understand if you disagree, but I ask that you use a respectful tone because learning things the hard way is an incredibly humbling experience. Every single industry professional that I have talked to in the aftermath of our incident has told me, "I understand because I have been there. So take that for what it's worth ...

there was no disrespect intended. as far as i knew this was a generic avalanche thread.

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Originally Posted by SchralphMacchio

Spook, when you first start out this game you are humble and scared. A hundred days in the backcountry without an incident can make you way more comfortable than you ought to be ... And more susceptible to getting tricked. It is good to remember what it feels like to be scared. Making a series of mistakes that takes your group into the danger zone is obvious when you have the bird's eye view - but guess what, our AIARE curriculum does not train for the firsthand view of what it is like in a group situation. In other words, it's easy to see the traps in the maze from above, but our current training standards don't show you what they look like from within the walls of human belief and heuristics. Does that make sense?

I will ask you to read my comments in the East Vail Tony Seibert thread in Slide Zone if you care for more. I am not excusing our group's mistakes, only providing context that studying them alone will not inoculate you. It takes situational practice (of communication and protocols) to avoids the traps - something that very few people do. If you still don't believe it, I would suggest looking at situations where your own assessment of the world around you is framed by your mental state and not by the quantifiable evidence. A person can look at the same exact situation in different mental states and draw different conclusions.

I can understand if you disagree, but I ask that you use a respectful tone because learning things the hard way is an incredibly humbling experience. Every single industry professional that I have talked to in the aftermath of our incident has told me, "I understand because I have been there. So take that for what it's worth ...

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Like the complete absence of two way comm devices in pretty much any of the incident reports. And you mentioned it above so keenly...Even casual observations such as what color someone sees are documented to be relative to an observers perspective. I'm referencing a study that parallels stroop effect, that examines how the color blue is seen by people from different tribes in neighboring regions. I will try to find it if anyone is interested. But back to the topic at hand, and there is a degree of distinction here, when I'm an observer in an inherently dicey situation, and I put the headset or radio on, my world changes. This is not metaphorical. There is massive potential to alter one's perspective in the direction of safe and timely observations, and unfortunately the go big technology seems to be showing the opposite. So back to Temper. Rite and ritual the right way.

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Originally Posted by spook

my disbelief is really amazement, because i do read the stats and such. at the same time human factors can't really be more than excuses at the moment they occur -- at minimum a lack of somebody speaking up, assuming the danger is obvious, which it seems to be in a lot of these cases. to a lay person, classifying something like that -- moments when people do not act responsibly against their own knowledge and safety and then apparently cause the rest of a group to do the same -- as the human factor sounds a little whitewashed of responsibility.

fucking up is fucking up.

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Hindsight Bias, "The I knew it all along phenomenon", The tendency to believe that after learning an outcome, that one would have foreseen it.

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Originally Posted by SchralphMacchio

- but guess what, our AIARE curriculum does not train for the firsthand view of what it is like in a group situation. In other words, it's easy to see the traps in the maze from above, but our current training standards don't show you what they look like from within the walls of human belief and heuristics. Does that make sense?

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So, with the unfortunate firsthand experience that you have recently gone through, would you change the AIARE curriculum, and if so, how? Is it something that we, as skiing and outdoor enthusiasts and you as trained professionals, even learn to avoid in a group? SHOULD the curriculum discuss and teach how to avoid those traps? Not knocking you or the curriculum, just wondering if you would change it now with your current level of hindsight.

^^^

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change the AIARE curriculum

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I just finished AIARE Level One and have been thinking about it. The main thing is too much classroom time, not enough time talking specifics in the backcountry. I would suggest something along the lines of:

Day One: 8-1 Do a tour, with two beacon rescue scenarios. Have the instructor lead the group through the decision making process. In the afternoon, discuss the process that was modeled that morning, discuss the issues that were observed.

Day 2 -3 is more of the same.

I guess the hard part is balancing the need for theory discussion (how various slabs form, different types of hoar, and all) with the practicalities of today's snowpack and decision making. Plus maybe there is a minimum number of classroom hours required. (If so, maybe that should be revisited).

Another option might be to have an actual three day hut tour, with several hours each day in the hut discussing theory and generalities but with the bulk of time spent applying that to the day's touring.

Maybe offer a course entirely on snow, after a student has tested out of the material contained in books such as Staying Alive In Avalanche Terrain.

I'm sure that here are practical considerations that would make these approaches difficult, but I feel that the most valuable aspects of the class occurred when out on the snow, looking at terrain.

Maybe these are more pedagogical changes than curriculum changes. I thought the material covered was fine, though naturally I'm not an expert.

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Originally Posted by RaisingArizona

Hindsight Bias, "The I knew it all along phenomenon", The tendency to believe that after learning an outcome, that one would have foreseen it.

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if i'm not mistaken, several of the people involved at tunnel creek -- the snowboarders -- expressed concern at least to each other about what was going to happen and took another route. i'm talking about something that should be obvious. like i said, a lot of these reports involve clear breakdowns of basic protocols.

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Originally Posted by spook

i haven't had time to look at those yet, but i was speaking about the "human factor" in particular. i don't see why there's a problem saying the human factor is someone fucking up. sure, i'm a casual dick tracey with a growing interest. but i haven't read too many reports in here where everybody was like "oh nobody could have seen that coming." in fact, it seems most of the time to be the exact opposite, that the errors are glaring. obviously, i'm oversimplifying but in the end somebody's dead, others are sad and regretful, and often lingering is the sense of if only, which is not usually finished by something drastic and miraculous, but something simple, like, if i'd only said something or if we'd only not willfully ignored this or that.

i don't even hear "yes, we knew the risk and took it."

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"Human factors" is shorthand in risk management, or whatever you want to call it, for mistakes that humans tend to make because of the way we make decisions, or see or fail to see things. It's one thing to say that people shouldn't screw up. It's another more subtle thing to recognize that there are certain ways in which people tend to (for example) get channeled in their decision making such that by the time they think they are making a final decision, that decision has already been influenced badly by previous decisions that they weren't even aware they were making at the time. The "heuristic traps" paper by McCammon is technical but worth reading if you haven't: http://www.avalanche.org/moonstone/D...%20reprint.pdf

I am no avalanche/snow expert but pay attention to this as well because I'm interested in failure analysis. The way that human factors and group dynamics play in has some parallels, for example, in air crew decision making, where there was a problem with crew being unwilling to challenge the captain's authority, and there is something called "crew resource management" which tries to make an explicit framework for group decisions: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_resource_management The parallel of these case studies to groups in BC situations like Tunnel Creek should be pretty clear. Similar things (usually without fatal consequence thankfully, but expensive) can happen in large science/engineering projects which is where my professional interest is.

Edit: posted at the same time as spook's last. IMO the aircrew examples are very instructive on human factors, because you can't blame air crashes on being blinded by powder fever. None of those people wanted to crash airplanes, yet they made bad decisions despite extensive training.

BUMP

Attachment 355656

This year there seems to be some examples per the OP's concern.

Perhaps the Avalanche Danger Scale should be changed to read:

Extreme --> Extreme and Ongoing
High --> Certain
Considerable --> Very Likely
Moderate --> Likely
Low --> Sometimes

I just don't see the relationship between Moderate and 'heightened avalanche conditions'. Perhaps also, the Low description should not have "Generally safe avalanche conditions" in the description and should also be changed to use a question mark '?' instead of a checkmark -- a question mark being more in line with the 'watch' part of the advisory.

Or a backcountry skier could realized the limitation of any hazard rating system, understand that this is serious business, real the full report and discussion daily and practice consistent conservative decision making.

Whenever there is a run of fatalities, the conversation is alway lean towards "What needs to change so this doesn't happen". We look for a magic solution. There is nothing wrong with this line of thinking. That said, my biggest take awesome is I have to be awesome everyday. I can't fuck up. That's the sport.

IMO the CAIC had been using considerable too extensively in recent years and have numbed many to its meaning. Perhaps splitting hairs but they used to have the old moderate with pockets of considerable, which IMO is more what they mostly meant, but the pockets was dropped. So when folks go out and mostly see moderate like conditions under a considerable rating they learn to discount considerable.

Under the current color scheme I’d rate it high at the moment in the northern mtns when they have considerable.

But yeah as foggy says, ultimately its up to us to keep the tips up so to speak regardless of the rating.


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Originally Posted by Kinnikinnick

IMO the CAIC had been using considerable too extensively in recent years and have numbed many to its meaning. Perhaps splitting hairs but they used to have the old moderate with pockets of considerable, which IMO is more what they mostly meant, but the pockets was dropped. So when folks go out and mostly see moderate like conditions under a considerable rating they learn to discount considerable.

Under the current color scheme I’d rate it high at the moment in the northern mtns when they have considerable.

But yeah as foggy says, ultimately its up to us to keep the tips up so to speak regardless of the rating.


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With the potential for large numbers of clueless newcomers in the backcountry, it becomes difficult to express hazards which involve spatial variability in a single rating, because said newcomers can’t make the necessary distinctions. As their goal becomes limiting fatalities rather than just conveying information, reports trend towards propaganda, and therefore lose credibility and are somewhat disregarded by experienced skiers, exacerbating the potential for overconfidence in one’s judgement, which becomes yet another heuristic trap to be wary of. I read avalanche ratings Iike I read multiple weather reports, knowing that what really matters is what I find at a particular place and time.

OK, so let's post the COMPLETE danger rating scale that includes likelihood, size, and distribution descriptors, because these are important when forecasters are selecting their rating.

Attachment 355665

I think the idea that forecasters (CAIC in particular, I'm not really familiar enough with any other forecast center to judge) intentionally "pad" their danger ratings to make it scarier for newcomers or whatever is mostly a myth. Avalanche forecasting, like travel in the backcountry, is fraught with uncertainty and subject to human error. There's also the limitations posed by forecasting for very large geographic areas and creating a forecast that adequately covers many different microclimates.

There are two misconceptions about avalanche danger ratings that I see a lot:
1) that it is a binary description, when it is actually a scale. You could be at the low end of Considerable or the high end of Moderate
2) that it is a linear scale when actually it is an exponential scale. See here: https://cbavalanchecenter.org/what-i...erable-danger/

They did away with "pockets of" because it wasn't really necessary. Considerable states the following:
Travel advice: Careful Snowpack evaluation, cautious route-finding and conservative decision making essential.
Likelihood of Avalanches: natural avalanches possible, human triggered avalanches likely.
Avalanche size and distribution: small avalanches in many areas, large avalanches in specific areas, or very large avalanches in isolated areas.

When you REALLY dig into the specifics of the danger scale, the ratings we see make more sense. "Moderate with pockets of Considerable" is not needed because Considerable covers that condition adequately with "large avalanches in specific areas." One has to recognize that not ALL of the descriptors for a particular danger rating must be present, and if on the edge between two danger ratings, the forecaster is generally going to go with the rating that conveys the travel advice they feel is appropriate for the day.

Are there days that the forecaster gets it wrong, or that conditions in the specifc area I'm traveling don't match the danger rating? Of course! But when you really dig into the danger scale and what the ratings mean, I think they get it right a lot more often than not.

The idea that a single rating is all you need for an area that is hundreds of square miles, and that if they just improved that rating system we'd be safer, is absurd. The rating is useful, sure, but "fixing" the rating system -- whatever that means -- won't make a damn bit of difference at keeping people safer.

All excellent points.

For every avalanche advisory from every center: It is a forecast, not an aftercast, no matter what words are used it is still up to the user to make appropriate decisions and to obtain the required education and experience to make those decisions. Or there is always Golf or Bowling or maybe water color painting.

I'm sure research has been done on how to best reach multiple audiences with an avy forecast. Every aspect of the reports we read are intentional.

That said, I like this:

Attachment 355688

from this:



But I don't expect forecasts to be written for me. They are also written for pros and jongs.

That's a cool way of looking at it ISBD. Thanks for the link.

Someone else shared the vid recently. Don't remember who.

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Interesting hearing all these opinions. Its going to take me awhile to digest them all.

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Originally Posted by Hacksaw

Interesting hearing all these opinions. Its going to take me awhile to digest them all.

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This conversation is pretty cool. I know you are nerding out on the deets, but

For the noobs, I would like to emphasize this, "what really matters is what I find at a particular place and time." and add in that it is SO IMPORTANT to be intimate with your own location. What is your backyard? Own it! Know exactly what the pack looks like and how it will ski over course of the season.

Por ejemplo, here's my little go-to spot on the solo with the dog on keep-it-safe deeper midwinter days, I still get in some silky steep/deep turns:
Attachment 355725

Maybe it's ghey, but I enjoy farming my own turns (with doggo) on that hill. I don't even have to start the truck, just walk over there from my house.

I rarely look at the rating or rose. I read the discussion and relevant observations and use that in conjunction with my own observations for a given area and season.


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"I wasn't going to let Johnny ski the backcountry with friends but he said the avalanche rating was only 'moderate' so I made sandwiches and let him go."
- Quoted from a mother at a MomSkis support group meeting.

With both older and younger people hitting up the backcountry, it is inevitable that the rating systems will be reworked. Is there a better way to define risk and probability and danger than the system in use? I don't know.

I think the industry should continually refine the alerts and systems. This is still early backcountry access compared to what will be in 10 to 15 years. Think 1000% growth in backcountry use and a much broader age range of participants. Think paid access and other administrative bureaucracies that will regulate access.

The market for equipment, the participant profile, legal issues, and the way people communicate in 10 years will have as much to do with it as anything. Symbols and words will be used that have not been invented yet.

Lastly, a built history of ratings, expeditions and outcomes will determine the level of awareness and amount of time and money spent on improving the warning and ratings systems.

I'll say it again, there is nothing wrong with the danger scale. There is no magic bullet to make the backcountry safer. Ski touring in an activity for rational people that can demonstrate consistently conservative decision making.

I'm not sure where you live but here in Colorado we have one of the best avalanche centers anywhere. The forecast and discussion have been highlighting the DPS problem all season. The risks have been communicated, YouTubes have been made, its all over the news, people have been dying and yet yesterday people were doing incredible dumb shit.

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Originally Posted by Foggy_Goggles

I'll say it again, there is nothing wrong with the danger scale. There is no magic bullet to make the backcountry safer. Ski touring in an activity for rational people that can demonstrate consistently conservative decision making.

I'm not sure where you live but here in Colorado we have one of the best avalanche centers anywhere. The forecast and discussion have been highlighting the DPS problem all season. The risks have been communicated, YouTubes have been made, its all over the news, people have been dying and yet yesterday people were doing incredible dumb shit.

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Agreed. Not trying to make a case for the whole experts vs. newbs thing, but the fatality yesterday in PC was a 31y/o "local" without a beacon. How anyone can not know about the danger in the BC right now is beyond me. The danger level was conservative on that slope yesterday. There are signs at the gate saying you can die. Ignorant people gonna be ignorant.

The common thread is shitty decision making. Not old not young. Not experienced or inexperienced.

Where you want to call it Avalanche Education or not is open to debate. That said, this is the problem. I am frustrated because I don't understand and I don't think most educators do either. Perhaps some type of sit down/ case study with the close call participants might be helpful. This is why the rage call needs to be tempered. Only these people know where there brain was at and why. I think we need to tap into that to attempt to understand the disconnect.

at a certain point shouldnt you strive every day to be your own forecaster
and use more than a 1 word adjective to describe the dangers the mountains and mother nature in a high risk activity?