Sorry for the loss. I really wish these things would stop happening so often.
Maybe the discussion of the moderate rating should have it's own thread or be in the CAIC site thread. I'm pretty sure these guys didn't make their decisions based solely on the rating that day.
^I don't think anyone is saying that. Speaking only for myself, I was just seeking better understanding of the danger scale, which others have provided.
No disrespect intended to Georgio, or those who knew him.
Never got to ride with George, but his contributions to berthoud and Colorado splitboarders was always appreciated, as well as his stoke.
As far as the avy discussion I've subscribed to the philosophy I learned in my avy 1 course. "There are two types of avy terrain...100% safe and unsure".
^^^^^^^^terrain is only avy terrain if there's new snow/slab, a sliding surface, steep enough angle, and a trigger. Take any one of those 4 items away and yer not in avy terrain.
Those 4 things are on my mind when in the mountains in winter. If there happens to be an itch that i must scratch i look at the terrain and ask myself, " do you feel lucky, punk?"
Rog
Lots of truth in all of this. Well said buddy.Quote:
Originally Posted by pbourdon
http://avalanche.state.co.us/caic/ac...inv&acc_id=514
[QUOTE
Avalanche Details
Location: Parkview Mountain, west of Willow Creek Pass
State: Colorado
Date: 2013/12/31
Time: 1:21 PM
Summary Description: One backcountry traveler buried and killed
Primary Activity: Backcountry Tourer
Primary Travel Mode: Snowboard
Location Setting: Backcountry
Number
Caught: 1
Partially Buried, Non-Critical: 0
Partially Buried, Critical: 0
Fully Buried: 1
Injured: 0
Killed: 1
Avalanche
Type: HS
Trigger: AR - Snowboarder
Trigger (subcode): u - An unintentional release
Size - Relative to Path: R2
Size - Destructive Force: D2.5
Sliding Surface: O - Within Old Snow
Site
Slope Aspect: NE
Site Elevation: 11000 ft
Slope Angle: 37 °
Slope Characteristic: Convex Slope
Avalanche Comments
The avalanche was a hard slab, triggered by a members at the bottom of the slope. The avalanche was small size relative to the avalanche path, large enough to bury, injure, or kill a person, and potentially large enough to damage a car. It broke into old snow layers and in one small section it broke to the ground (HS-AR-R2/D2.5-O/G). The crown face ranged from less than 1 foot to 4 feet, with an average crown height of 1.5 feet. The slide was 150 feet wide, and ran 500 vertical feet, and broke small tree branches up to 2 inches in diameter.
Weather Summary
A small storm brought a several inches of new snow (0.2 to 0.3 inches of water) to the Willow Creek Pass area in the from December 27 to December 31st. Strong westerly winds drifted snow onto easterly aspects, including the start zone of this avalanche path. The day of the accident was overcast, windy, with small amounts of blowing snow.
Snowpack Summary
A shallow snowpack in November and December of 2013 and cool temperatures formed a pronounced weak layers across much of the Front Range and Steamboat Zones, including the Willow Creek Pass area. The average snowpack depth was 130cm, with approximately 15 cm of soft storm snow that had fallen and been drifted onto the slope in the several days prior to the accident. There was a pronounced facet/crust combo approximately 60cm below the surface. The bottom 40cm of the snowpack consisted of large (4mm) and weak depth hoar grains. Stiff (pencil hard on the hand-hardness scale) slabs sat atop each of these weak layers.
Events Leading to the Avalanche
A group of 3 spilt-boarders headed towards Parkview Mountain from Willow Creek Pass, leaving the car around 0930. They read the avalanche forecast that morning, and decided to head towards the obvious northeast facing avalanche path off a sub-peak of Parkview Mountain. The were aware of the Persistent Slab problems in the area. Thus, they intended to avoid the avalanche path itself and ascend and descend through treed terrain on either side of the path.
The approached the area, and ascended through heavily treed terrain to the south of the avalanche path. The group dug one snow profile very near treeline on their ascent, and observed the persistent weak layers mentioned in the forecast, though snowpack tests did not produce notable results.
They transitioned from uphill to downhill mode at approximately 1240, discussed their descent route, and descended a few meters to just above and to the far skier's right of the avalanche path, where they dug one more snow profile similar to their first. They began their descent at approximately 1300. The avalanche path below and slightly to the skier's left of their transition area rolled over steeply about 10m below the group. They elected to traverse above the path one at a time, and then regroup on the far skier's left side of the path where they could descend through more gentle and heavily treed terrain. All three group members successfully completed the traverse and they regrouped on the skier's left side of the path.
Skier 1 descended approximately 10m through the trees to gain a vantage point where he could keep on eye on Skiers 2 and 3 as they descended past him. Skier 2 then began his descent, but after passing Skier 1, turned skier's right and further into the avalanche path than planned. Skier 2 triggered the slab from low in the start zone, and the entire slab broke above him.
Accident Summary
The avalanche ran through lots of small timber, which broke up the avalanche flow and created a big powder cloud that obscured visibility. The victim traveled approximately 15 to 30 m in the flow. He was fully buried 60 to 90 cm deep, and came to rest on his side. His body was bent around a small tree so that both his head and feet were down hill of his waist. He had a climbing helmet attached to his pack but was not wearing it at the time of the accident.
Rescue Summary
Skier 1 immediately began a signal search, while Skier 3 called 911 at 1321. Skier 1 had eyes on Skier 2 until he was lost in a powder cloud, but he was able to find a beacon signal with a minute. He follow the signal to near the burial location, at which point Skier 3 was nearby ready with a probe. The lowest signal strength reading on the searching beacon was 0.7. They hit the victim with the first probe attempt only a few minutes after the avalanche.
They immediately began extricating the victim and had an exposed airway within 10 minutes. The victim's airway was free of snow, but there was no breath nor pulse. Skier 3 placed a second 911 call at this point at 1337. Skier 1 and 3 began CPR, and continued for 20 minutes but to no avail. They left the scene at 1420 to meet search and rescue back at the highway.
][/QUOTE]
Reading that is scary. The group seemed on point with their protocols, and this just goes to show that making educated calls with good group dynamics can still lead to tragedy.
As our confidence increases we ultimately push a little harder, I'll bet that is what drew him a little further out into the path.
Even with educated predictions, snowpack dynamics are unpredictabe.