I mean, fuck...
Attachment 264833
Printable View
I mean, fuck...
Attachment 264833
Sobering report.
FWIW, here's another image of the Trico/Senator Beck/South Telluride Peak with more contrast showing the slope differences:
Attachment 264835
We used to have similar experiences when I did SAR. You'd plan a search segment and then discover your route wasn't actually passable.
That report was very well done. I certainly have gotten lazy about slope angle recently (in retrospect) and I'll always think twice now.
I know this was a local company giving the classes, but was the instructor also local, or someone new to the area? If he was a long time local, surely he would be familiar with the area, and it wouldn’t matter what the GPS slope readings said. Ack, it is really hard to not second guess this one.
20m contours in Canada on TRIM maps. I emphasize when helping people read maps that many crevasses, cliffs etc are less than 20m.
Also snow, wind drifts etc all change the slope angle dramatically. Something else emphasized in map reading. Obvious point but there is no substitute for on-field measurements.
Also now emphasized is importance of safe zones. An incident with which I was involved shows that the "bow-wave" of a slide can take a skier off his/her feet and into an avalanche even if the skier is standing on flat ground as the bow wave effect can reach into the flats.
Not MMQB'ing the incident but just emphasizing some field lessons learned after reading this rather clinically chilling report. Well done to the report-writers
How about, "field verify all conditions". Even if it was a paper map, you can't rely on it.
Islands of safety
one at a time
conservative decision making
From the Report: There was an instructor in this group whose role was to teach the group how to understand, observe, and analyze the avalanche hazard and navigate through avalanche terrain. This accident is more complex than most because it involved a relatively large group of people, in a very structured environment, executing a detailed trip plan. In addition to the group’s plan, the instructor made a plan for the course based on his knowledge of the area and current conditions. This experience included multiple days in the field earlier that week, working in the area since mid-December, and work in the area each year for the last six. The instructor had additional local information at his disposal including information exchanges with other guides, avalanche safety operations, and recreationalists in the area.
Lesson learned, get one of these stickers for my ski poles.
Attachment 265091
Another useful tool:
https://play.google.com/store/apps/d...optra&hl=en_US
http://hrtapps.com/theodolite/images/moraineX.jpg[/IMG]
And for quick eyeballing (anything over 1/2 pole to one = increasing hazard potential):
https://tgr.scdn2.secure.raxcdn.com/...r-ski-pole.JPG
By matching the vertical lines to contours on 7.5' maps gets you the slope.
In reviewing the report I saw a snow profile done at the location. CT7 @ 35cms jumped out. I'm no avy pro and I do realize that pit data is only part of the equation but holy shit.
Thanks, I must have skipped over that when reading the report. So he was very familiar with the terrain. Seems like he would know all the areas that were potential avalanche zones there by heart, and there would be no need to interpret slopes from a map, or read an inclinometer, or whatever. He’d have to let his class go through that process, of course, but at some point if he saw they were flirting too close to a danger area, surely he would step in and steer a safer course. But he led the way.
Perhaps he wasn’t anticipating that the group would sidestep so much to the right after he left them. Or maybe he really thought there was no danger. Ah, well, even experts make mistakes. I’m sure he feels awful.
CalTopo's first generation of slope angle shading was released in February 2012 - what feels like an unbelievably long 7 years ago. I think it's an incredibly useful tool for planning purposes, but the source data does have its limitations. I've always tried to present those limitations accurately and not over-sell the product, but figuring out how to best present data is a balancing act, particularly when there are other, non-winter uses for the slope angle shading layer. Coloring slopes 27 degrees and above, even though most people would use 30 as a "magic number", was specifically done to help provide a bit of error margin and compensate for the coarse resolution of the underlying DEM data.
Complex terrain is almost always going to appear smoother on a map than it is in reality, which results in understating the slope angle of short rollovers. Even in a best-case scenario where CalTopo's slope layer were a verbatim match to reality, staying off (but not out from under, separate discussion) 30+ degree terrain would still have required hitting a 3-pixel wide, 70' gap between two 30+ degree colorations, which is a very small needle to thread. Of course reality is generally not going to match the map with anything close to that level of precision.
It's a sad event that we only have secondhand info on and I'm not looking to criticize those involved, but I'm also struggling to wrap my head around exactly what happened and what their thought process was - I can't get the "should I be changing something with the slope angle shading layer" thought out of my head. While the CAIC report hones in on slope angle shading, I can't tell if the students simply used it to pre-plan a route, if they were actively using it for micro-navigation on a phone, or if the guide was reliant on it as well. It does make me wonder how commonly the layer is mis-used for micro-routefinding, and whether there are changes that would help address the issue.
Disclaimer: have not read the report in detail, and being Norwegian I have no knowledge of the maps/GPS etc being used here.
However, in my experience there is three things to remember when using GIS in route planning.
1) As stated several times already, microterrain will disapear between contours.
2) Wind transport will affect the visual impression. Steep terrain may be hidden by a even surface, or gentle terrain may still hold snow bulges or cornices.
3) One of the bigger problems when using the NGIs avalanche maps in Norway, by default they will only show starting zones, not runouts.
Google ngi+skredkart
This is especially important at danger 3 or above and/or whenever the forecast warns about the possibilty to trigger avalanches at a distance.
To mitigate 3) the Norwegian army uses maps that differ between terrain that holds potential starting zones, and they terrain that might be affected by the avalanche.
You can construct these yourself, or you can use the 3:1 rule. Your horizontal stand-off should be three times the vertical drop of the potential starting zone. The 3:1 is extremely conservative, ment to handle any and all avalanche conditions.
Google norwegian+army+avalanche+maps, for several papers and the Norwegian army safe travel / avalanche literature.
Also a good read regarding winter navigation, crossing ice etc.
There is a english version
Oh my god, but people love to make everything so complicated. Skiing has gotten gay, thanks iamgay.
wtf? this is your 1st post in months, in the Slide Zone on a thread about an incident where someone died?
First off, thanks for CalTopo. It has been an indispensable tool in my tour planning for the past few years. That being said, I learned a lot from this report and many of the things discussed are things I am guilty of. I have spent a lot of time scouring maps looking for high alpine lines in Colorado that are gray or have small amounts of yellow/orange on CalTopo. I have definitely gotten into the field on lines I discovered in this manner and felt like I may be flirting with some danger and that some of these lines have steeper sections than what I thought I would find. I realized while reading this report that perhaps I myself was putting too much reliance on the slope shading feature and that while I could still use it to plan routes, I needed to do a better job of evaluating slope angle in the field. As for changes to CalTopo? I can't think of any. I think it was one of the small mistakes this group made in a collection of mistakes. I'm just glad to have the extremely well written report from CAIC to learn from.
Taking a class to stay alive in the backcountry and then dying while taking a class in the backcountry. Tragic irony, RIP.
He had two daughters like me. I can guess he was trying to be a responsible father by learning as much as he could so he could always be there for them.
The Ashcroft avy report is out... some similar sadness in terms of the fathers involved and the circumstances of that fatality.
SAS just linked this on their FB page.....
https://www.powder.com/stories/your-...6cX7ILkOusM.01
The guide that led them to that terrain was supposedly an 'avi pro.' The fact is conditions above tree line were suspect, so go below tree line.
There’s been a lot of recent discussion in this sub forum about why you might want not to be a judgemental, finger-pointing douche. Consider checking out some of the other threads, like this:
https://www.tetongravity.com/forums/...15#post5595415
And read the quote from Bruce Tremper in this post:
https://www.tetongravity.com/forums/...99#post5602299
I honestly dont understand the need for people o come here and be smug and self righteous, I dont know why but it bugs the shit out of me. I suppose since in my 28 years of touring, i have made pretty much every mistake that has been made in this sub forum. I have also learned a ton by hearing and reading about other peoples accidents and near accidents. I still pick up stuff by listening.
I appreciated in here where someone said they always designate one person to be the naysayer on the tour, I really like that and we have incorporated into the standard protocol. Something I would have never learned if people didn't just come here to proclaim how much smarter they are and how dumb other people are. We all know a mistake was made, so why come to just state the obvious?
Instructor that day, not a guide.
Be aware that kailas is a known waste of space. If he died in a treewell. Slowly. Nobody should shed a tear
he's impressively consistent.
This story:
https://www.outsideonline.com/outdoo...h-snow-safety/
... was published over a week ago, but apparently became available from beyond the paywall only more recently.
A few somewhat random disjointed comments, although I’ll leave out the elephant in the room of the ass’t instructor’s terrain selection, since the article has a decent amount of material on that, and I’m struggling to come up with any defense, so sure much else can be said on that based upon the info in the article?
- I like how the color commentary -- in addition to quite literally the colors of the eyes and hair of various people -- includes that a local student is a telemarker living in a converted schoolbus. (Could that be any more stereotypical?)
- This passage strikes me as trying to make some sort of odd point, since if the group’s leader is familiar with the terrain, why do the students also have to be familiar with it? “They were determined to minimize exposure to avalanche terrain, which generally means slopes steeper than 30 degrees, but only Lovell and one of the students had ever been to the basin.”
- Having taken various avalanche training courses as a student (both rec and pro), and having taught at courses both small and large, I am very confused at the notion of a dedicated “safety officer” for the avy course. Now sure, if, say, my skimo races were larger events, I could certainly understand a dedicated Safety Officer. But for any avy safety course, every instructor is essentially an empowered safety officer. (For that matter, individual students should consider themselves all safety officers too.) So what are the duties supposed to be for a course’s single designated safety officer? (Apologies in advance to the leaders for my various AIARE IRC sessions if I wasn’t paying attention to this!) The identified safety officer makes only a cameo appearance in the article, and doesn’t seem to have any role (or any authority) other than reading out loud some excerpts from the CAIC bulletin, [edit] plus a somewhat indirect reference to his apparent role in soliciting tour plans from the instructors.
- The article emphasizes that the safety officer reads only certain portions of the CAIC bulletin to the students. But even if the safety officer had read the bulletin in its entirety, that still strikes me as inadequate. This isn’t, say, the weather forecast for a skimo race (continuing the prior theme), where it’s an ancillary issue. Instead, the local/regional avy bulletin is supposed to be a focus of any avy safety course [edit: I had the level mixed up]: each student should read the bulletin in its entirety, then the group should spend lots of time discussing it, formulating the tour plan around it, etc. Certainly the article might be leaving out elements of what occurred for the course, but if the students never even had the day’s entire bulletin read to them…?
- Nobody in the group seems to have a PLB or any other type of emergency satellite messenger device?
- The plan to carry a radio for communication with the other group and/or the hut doesn’t seem to help that much at first since neither the other group nor the hut has a PLB or any other type of emergency satellite messenger device?
- The BCA lawsuit receives only little mention, which is just as well, given that it sure sounds like a desperate move.
- I find this passage both misleading and unfair: “AIARE has more than 500 freelance instructors operating in 14 states, as well as 30 trainers who qualify instructors, yet the organization struggles to keep pace.” AIARE provides training courses and guidelines for instructors to become “qualified” by AIARE. Such instructors work for independent course providers (or are self-employed). To describe them (us, me…) as “freelance instructors” implies we are working for AIARE as independent contractors, which is definitely not the situation. I also feel that AIARE has if anything been doing a *better* job with instructor continuing education since I first became a qualified instructor in 2006, despite the massive increase in our ranks since then.
- I realize that many guiding companies hire all sorts of freelance guides, and I certainly receive many emails about AIARE course providers looking for instructors to fill gaps. But SAS comes across here more like an instructor venue rather than a cohesive integrated course provider: “At SAS, in response to the increased number of courses, Gober and Barney say they tried to establish clear qualifications for visiting instructors and to hold annual training sessions on how SAS classes should be taught. “We were getting instructors that Doug and Mike and I had never heard of, and we have a couple years in the avalanche world,” Gober says. “It was like, Wait a minute, who are these people coming in? How do we know that they’re teaching courses at the level we want to be teaching?””
- Whoah, now this had to be the ultimate emotionally loaded training course experience: “Two months after the avalanche, in March, four students returned to Silverton to finish the course, including three from Lovell’s group.”
- This TGR thread previously featured some interesting discussion about the relationship of SAS with the other entities – complicated! The article has plenty on that (might help to have an org chart to keep track!), and check this out: “Soon afterward, in early August 2019, Holland sent Barney and Krause an email dissolving the board. He told them he had hired a lawyer and met with the sheriff and claimed that they were not compliant with the bylaws and thus had never been a legitimate board to begin with. Krause, in a reply, questioned the school’s financial practices and whether anything illegal was going on.”
- “On the afternoon of March 6, 2005, Amos Whiting, 28, was the lead instructor of a Level 2 course with Aspen Expeditions.” I remember reading about this at the time, wondering how that possibly could have occurred. Then my AIARE ITC led off with it. The takeaway was improper student vetting: the student from New Mexico could make his telemark turns in only direction. How this wasn’t noticed until the final day was unclear. But the final descent on the final day was down a broad “ridgeline” (which sounded to me more like a “ramp”) splitting two steeper bowls. Stay on the yellow brick road, and you’re fine, so a perfect lesson in terrain selection. But since he couldn’t turn in both directions, he strayed into one of the steeper bowls, where he triggered the slide.
- This sounds emotionally brutal: “It had been an especially tragic winter locally; George had already helped recover five bodies from avalanches.”
Correct, in that capacity for that day.
But he now has his IFMGA "pin":
https://amga.com/hire-a-guide/?page=...d=11014&gid=32
... and (at least according to the Outside article) he already had his Alpine & Rock guide cert from AMGA at the time of the course.
Agreed -- in general. A L2 is not just supposed to be the avy equivalent of gator watching, which is often what happens with L1 courses, especially out East in the Presidentials, where our terrain is so binary.
Good quote here from the Outside article:
"When the class split into groups for Saturday’s field session, Reed and Marshall joined Lovell’s party because they wanted experience planning and executing a more complex ski tour. “We didn’t want to skin a half-mile in and sit there and dig a snow pit the entire time,” Reed says."
But this excerpt is very interesting in that regard:
*****
On the morning of January 4, when the class met in Silverton to sign liability waivers, there was discussion about conditions and where the groups would venture in the field. In a statement three days after the accident, obtained via a public-records request, Jasper Thompson wrote: “I asked instructors what terrain they intended to use. Sandy [Kobrock] stated ‘we are not going to travel in avalanche terrain’ in the presence of Zack [sic]. I agreed with the decision and added my concern that under these conditions it is best to not travel in, under or on slopes directly attached to avalanche terrain. The instructors acknowledged.”
In internal logs on January 4 and 5, both Kobrock and Lovell noted heavy recent wind loading on terrain above tree line that faced the same direction as the bowl that slid. Lovell stressed the need for “caution ATL [above tree line] on steep slopes with skiable HS [hard slab],” the same ingredients present in the slide. Under the heading “Closed Terrain,” Kobrock wrote: “[Above] 30 degrees.” Lovell, however, acknowledged that if they ended up skiing the bowl, they would have to descend a “small pocket of 30-35 [degree]” terrain that was “adjacent to larger terrain.”
Of course, none of this meant that they knew an avalanche would occur, but it shows that Lovell left the door open to ski avalanche terrain, something Kobrock had explicitly ruled out. On January 4, according to Jasper Thompson’s written statement, Lovell talked to Jim Donovan—who is also the county emergency manager and captain of its search and rescue team—about where he might take his group. But it’s unclear if Donovan weighed in on Lovell’s final plan. (Both men declined to be interviewed or participate in fact-checking for this article.) Later that morning, Thompson wrote, “I expressed my concern to Sandy that Zack seemed inclined to travel in more complex and bigger terrain due to his growing experience as an AMGA rock, alpine, and ski guide. Sandy was thankful for this information and [said she] would follow up [with] a discussion with Zack.”
My read (could be a leap) is it's not an assertion that everybody needs to be familiar with the terrain, but a way of illustrating that while the group made a tour plan with intent to avoid avalanche terrain (using Caltopo), only Lovell and one other student had been on it, and therefore were the only ones who might've had prior knowledge of slopes included in the plan that were actually steeper than 30deg.
Again, maybe a leap based on my prior knowledge of the incident.
The event is massively sad and unfortunate. Legal proceedings and finger pointing isn't going to change that.
I encourage anyone that take a field avalanche course to be aware of the possibility that the Expert Halo includes your instructor. It is all of our responsibility to keep our entire group safe. Ultimately, whatever situation we are in is a function of our own free will. Please keep that in mind everytime you jump out of your truck and turn on your beacon.
The partners I trust and respect the most are the ones that look me in the eye and say, "Fuck that Foggy! I not comfortable with that plan. I'm turning around and going home the safe way".