The Human Factor

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Originally Posted by Mofro261

What I see setting up in all of these articles is a binary argument where the only "good call" is the decision not to ski in avalanche terrain since any amount of risk we accept and get away with becomes "getting lucky". No amount of rehashing of accidents like these will have a dramatic effect on behaviors or outcomes because the element of risk is what makes us feel the activities are worthwhile. Do you know anyone that only skis in non-avalanche terrain.

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No one is saying that the only good call is the decision not to ski in avalanche terrain.

I feel like it's worthwhile sorting out the difference between good decision making and gambling, and I feel like it's important to try and know the difference.

There's nothing morally wrong with taking a gamble, but wouldn't you at least like to be able to say to yourself, honestly, "well, I don't have enough information, so this is a gamble." At least then you can try to implement extra precautions to make sure that an accident doesn't become a total disaster. Or maybe you want to take the gamble, but recognize that you're tired and that maybe today isn't a good day for a gamble. But if you're saying "oh yeah, we've done our due diligence" when in reality you are just throwing the dice, wouldn't you want to know? Isn't that difference important to you? It's important to me.

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Originally Posted by CookieMonster

No one is saying that the only good call is the decision not to ski in avalanche terrain.

I feel like it's worthwhile sorting out the difference between good decision making and gambling, and I feel like it's important to try and know the difference.

There's nothing morally wrong with taking a gamble, but wouldn't you at least like to be able to say to yourself, honestly, "well, I don't have enough information, so this is a gamble." At least then you can try to implement extra precautions to make sure that an accident doesn't become a total disaster. Or maybe you want to take the gamble, but recognize that you're tired and that maybe today isn't a good day for a gamble. But if you're saying "oh yeah, we've done our due diligence" when in reality you are just throwing the dice, wouldn't you want to know? Isn't that difference important to you? It's important to me.

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realize that people like mofro are the cultural problem. smart, well educated, lots of experience, still come up with stupid rationalizations to themselves for doing dumbshit while looking down their noses at others not like them who do "dumb shit". It's an addiction issue.

I think perhaps you overestimate the ability of most people - even "smart" ones - to put things together in an area outside of their comfort zone, which acting as a guide is for most. Try to find one area of life (outside of perhaps their professional sphere) where an upper middle class person is supposed to independently make decisions without outside advice/handholding?

I think we all agree 5 - 10 turn spacing is not enough. how many people are going to get smoked and not even know it. I'm really big on safety spots and stress to people that wot you think is safe ... aint!!! this is the number 1 thing I have picked up from reading avy incedents and talking to people who have been thru it.
having some one drop in above me scares the shit out of me. we once had the 3rd guy down the chute get taken for a ride. good thing the other 2 were down and safe.
wots the farkin rush ... ... paying customers with expectations ...

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Originally Posted by Hugh Conway

realize that people like mofro are the cultural problem. smart, well educated, lots of experience, still come up with stupid rationalizations to themselves for doing dumbshit while looking down their noses at others not like them who do "dumb shit". It's an addiction issue.

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Even if this is true, I'm interested in whether or not people who self-describe as "competent" actually are competent. Because, and we can use the Wallowas incident as a basis, clearly there are some disconnects in this regard.

Anyway, to do this, we first have to determine what constitutes competence in this domain, and I think this is an important conversation.

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Originally Posted by Hugh Conway

realize that people like mofro are the cultural problem. smart, well educated, lots of experience, still come up with stupid rationalizations to themselves for doing dumbshit while looking down their noses at others not like them who do "dumb shit". It's an addiction issue.
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Hugh, this is really close to true - well educated, several decades of backcountry experience, very fit and strong skiing abilities from a life long pursuit of the my addictions. And yes I am highly addicted to doing dumb shit- I often tour solo, I venture out in what others might consider questionable conditions, I (gasp) rarely wear a helmet, i'll often lap partners in the course of a tour. But I mostly proceed in the mountains in a manner that will have little impact on others, ie part of my rationalization for doing dumb shit is trying to do it in a semi-responsible manner that doesn't endanger others. I don't look down my nose at others for doing dumb shit or being inherently different, I look down my nose at others who act like or are dumb shits and fail to grasp what should be common sense. Like you, I'm quite at peace with being the asshole I am and also content with the talents I've been given and those I have earned.

Cookie, I've never been partial to gambling, but gave up exposing myself to what I considered excessive risk pretty close to the time I had kids to come home to. Call it calculated risk but it is all subjective, my "good call" may be your "gamble" and we may both be right or wrong.

Competency is a tricky one to nail down. In the last several years I have known highly competent and very accomplished mountaineers/skiers who have fallen through cornices. Competent skiers who have suffocated in tree wells. Competent skiers who have died in avalanches. We could debate in each instance whether or not that person was truly competent or not really that competent but I fail to see a level of competency that makes any of us infallible. So we pour over the data to look for the clues, the signs missed, that when faced with the same circumstances, that we be able to make the right decision. While a helpful exercise to move past a tragedy, in reality we will never be exposed to those exact same circumstances (be it the slope, snow pack history, current conditions etc), and the cycle continues.

Part 3. More of the same IMO. This is probably good for younger folks and newbies who have no or less awareness and really can't/don't appreciate the risks. Maybe this will also encourage objective discussion of accidents without being judgmental or defensive by observers and those involved.

I don't necessarily think this is a good piece of journalism but it is a good discussion that we've had here before. The Pucker Face thread here was more valuable than this piece for me.

Regurgitating the same discussions of the same problems we've been talking about for well over a decade, very pretty though.

Yup. The only thing keeping people from dying in avy terrain is other people dying in avy terrain. People die, people wake up.

Shame folk with the media presence, like Powder and (ahem) TGR, can't be as proactive about moving the conversation forward as they are about hocking smut stoke.

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Originally Posted by covert

Shame folk with the media presence, like Powder and (ahem) TGR, can't be as proactive about moving the conversation forward as they are about hocking smut stoke.

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Starting to see a bit more safety conversation amidst the ski porn -- there's the occasional 1/2second clip of a snow pit or beacon practice or pros mentioning the snowpack. But agree there definitely needs to be more. I don't think it's in conflict to their movies' objectives -- doesn't the known risk make it all the more extreme? -- and even a small dialogue could have such an impact on awareness.

Meh. This should have been one piece and cutting it into small pieces has just made the content look thin.

So far I've been very impressed by this series. The focus on Human Factors is welcome and encouraging. Props to Powder and BD for supporting this sort of journalism.

I was unimpressed by some low journalistic standards of the first portion. Errors in fact checking (guide's name and age are incorrect, for example) and not having interviewed any of the people present?!? Might not yet be the appropriate time to tell the story, when you don't have the whole story.

Granted, I agree that stories like this are crucial in retooling how we look at avalanches and risk management, and look forward to the rest of the series (and the discussion it will continue to generate).

In terms of human factors and people being under their own control, peer pressure and informal culture are in fact huge. Is an assistant guide getting one of his first assignments going to contradict his colleague and, e.g., insist on safe travel protocol or suggest that rolling the dice above an obvious terrain trap is not a good choice? Most people in that situation will go along. Unless the culture requires otherwise or express rules require otherwise. If the standard had been "gang skiing gets you fired," then it would be clear that it's ok to step up. I believe most people if they're honest with themselves display less free agency in these scenarios than they'd like.

In terms of competence, there tends to be a normal human reaction after an accident to profess the expertise of the people involved. Often, oddly, also talking about how good they were athletically, as if being graceful or skilled matters in this context assuming a fall wasn't the trigger. Sheep Creek saw much the same reaction. In terms of training and education for the future, in analyzing an incident I do think it's relevant to ask, was this a normal thing, or a sudden departure from normal conservative judgment? Leaving the choice of a terrain trap on a considerable day with an upside down snowpack and pillows of windslab out of it, when did the gang skiing start to happen and how was it justified?

I liked the first few installments, the one just released tonight was a let-down. It's essentially saying, Even relatively educated and experienced bc users do stupid stuff. Well, ok?

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Originally Posted by SkyIsland

I liked the first few installments, the one just released tonight was a let-down. It's essentially saying, Even relatively educated and experienced bc users do stupid stuff. Well, ok?

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Excluding the first segment, all the segments have been saying the same thing.

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Originally Posted by AaronWright

I don't get why people think it's a mystery that these accidents continue to happen, people make bad decisions for reasons unknown and it's not unique to ski touring. Hell people make bad decisions that get them killed driving to and from work everyday. I don't think we will ever know exactly why people make these decisions but it's not a surprise when they do. I can't believe the stupid shit people do(myself included) that gets them into the ER or OR where I work.

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estimates put the number around 400,00 preventable medical deaths occour every year from bad decisions and care
if there was some kind of profit to be made preventing these deaths the "experts" would be all over this but avvy hype is highly profitable

Agreed. Maybe different iterations of stupid stuff in each, but no framing of how to avoid the stupid stuff in a reliable fashion. The gang skiing or the quick lap without gear both are glaring but it takes a culture that forces people to not allow glaring things to slip in.

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Originally Posted by AaronWright

Is that because the journalism standards for Powder are so high?

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It's a fair question. Casual standards for casual readers? What of those in the audience who expect more? Those who do, they'll feel and think critically of pieces which fall short. Part of whether you believe someone's written output is how well the writer complies with what the reader expects, compositionally and rhetorically and fact- or perspective-rigor wise. Editorial slippage resulting in bad comma placement, mis-spellings, etc. is pretty juvenile.

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Originally Posted by skifishbum

estimates put the number around 400,00 preventable medical deaths occour every year from bad decisions and care
if there was some kind of profit to be made preventing these deaths the "experts" would be all over this but avvy hype is highly profitable

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Are you trying to say there is more money to be made by trying to understand bad decisions made by bc users than bad decisions made by medical professionals? There are many financial incentives in place to try and prevent bad decisions and mistakes in healthcare but we are human and we will always find a way to fuck up anything.

The most noteworthy thing I took out of the latest instalment is that Amie Engerbretson survived two avalanches last winter. Which means she fucked up twice. Does anyone know anything about the second avalanche? I'm much more interested in what mistakes were made that second time, given that she already got lucky once.

Edit: So I did some Googling on my lunch break and found a blog about her second incident:

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Two days later, my winter took a big turn. I was up shooting still photos inbounds at Crystal Mountain on one of the deepest powder days of my life, when I hit an air in a treed area of open terrain. Upon my landing, a narrow pocket of snow released and immediately pulled me under and drug me down the slope. I was flipped face down in the snow, head down slope, snow completely filling my mouth, unable to fight against the force, and filled with the dreadful thought, “No. Not again.” Eventually I was able to deploy my airbag and was spit out to the side. The pocket was narrow, with about a one-foot crown, I was carried about 400 feet down slope and eventually found my other ski another 700 feet down in the debris. Once the notion was clear that I wasn’t buried or wrapped around a tree, a sharp pain in my right knee made itself very apparent.

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To me, that sounds like bad luck. You generally expect to be safe inbounds and I give credit for skiing with an airbag and deploying it properly.

^^^ Her career = "instapro" without much personal BC exploration/experiential learning prior to being placed into uncontrolled avy terrain where she was making the calls herself. At least, that's what it has seemed like to this casual observer who doesn't know her personally. May be wrong. But that's just what it seems like.

Edit: Just caught up. I like the approach described in Chapter 3 about how certain guide ops designate slopes as green, yellow, or red. Something I may try to incorporate into my practice on at least some level.

Being 20 something with balls and some athletic talent doesn't make anyone an expert bc skier.

Not recognizing a horrible terrain trap like Grizzly Gulch makes me question all the folks saying "Adam Clark is always so cautious and conservative". It's more likely that he's just been getting lucky like the rest of us.

Most of what I see is hubris when it comes to people talking about themselves and others in regards to competence in the back country.

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Originally Posted by AaronWright

Not recognizing a horrible terrain trap like Grizzly Gulch makes me question all the folks saying "Adam Clark is always so cautious and conservative".

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Perhaps he is... until Human Factors take over common sense. It happens to all of us. Which is the point of this series.

But generally - and away from the people in this series - I do see plenty of examples of this, including myself in the past: "Most of what I see is hubris when it comes to people talking about themselves and others in regards to competence in the back country."

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Originally Posted by AlexC

You generally expect to be safe inbounds

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Who does? Especially at crystal or other "big-ish" resorts. No knock on their patrol implied or meant, but it's big enough and on a "super deep" day there's far too much terrain that could cause you problems "in bounds" and things change far too fast in the day. If you've got the gear... why turn off the brain?

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Originally Posted by AlexC

The most noteworthy thing I took out of the latest instalment is that Amie Engerbretson survived two avalanches last winter. Which means she fucked up twice..

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"Looks like this season is your season" A quote to me after my second time caught, by a woman who got caught more than once the previous season. Thinking back through the years, it does seem that one of the crew does to seem to take more rides than the rest, and it does change. I don't think luck has much to do with it. Den

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Originally Posted by neck beard

Perhaps he is... until Human Factors take over common sense. It happens to all of us. Which is the point of this series.

But generally - and away from the people in this series - I do see plenty of examples of this, including myself in the past: "Most of what I see is hubris when it comes to people talking about themselves and others in regards to competence in the back country."

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What I think is that he had an agenda other than keeping the athletes safe. His job is to get great ski pictures. I'm not saying he disregards their safety but that his goal gets in the way of good decision making.

And yes it happens to all of us, I've been caught in a slide(inbounds) and taken a long, violent uncontrolled slide both times alone. Both were the result of habituation and I should have known better.

Yes it's all hubris, there are no experts. We can only try and make good decisions. Now when I travel in the bc my focus is staying out of slides and not skiing the rad lines and I can still have fun. That's not to say I don't expose myself at times but if I do I really try and make sure the consequences aren't as dire.

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Originally Posted by AaronWright

What I think is that he had an agenda other than keeping the athletes safe. His job is to get great ski pictures. I'm not saying he disregards their safety but that his goal gets in the way of good decision making.

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That last sentence is spot-on with the "Commitment" C in McCammon's FACETS acronym. Which made me think to look at it again and in that incident one could argue that every single one of the FACETS factors was present.

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Originally Posted by AlexC

Edit: So I did some Googling on my lunch break and found a blog about her second incident:
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Blah blah blah blah blah me me me me me.

That grizzly gulch line was blatant stupidity. Skiing down on top of those guys on the up, carving a huge turn in the sun on a convex rollover into a terrain trap. But hey, got the shot! Add that to the "resume".

If you know the area and have entered or exited thru there, it'd be pretty easy for many folks to underestimate that little pitch with a cat road, a powerline, and multiple homes as a backdrop. Add fresh pow with the bluebirdie singing and you got complacent town USA.

Just sayin.

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Originally Posted by thewon

If you know the area and have entered or exited thru there, it'd be pretty easy for many folks to underestimate that little pitch with a cat road, a powerline, and multiple homes as a backdrop. Add fresh pow with the bluebirdie singing and you got complacent town USA.

Just sayin.

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Add to that they're trying to get "the shot" and she comes to a stop right in the middle of that slope, it's not even really skiing it's a turn. I'm sure she's a better skier than me, but that doesn't mean she's competent.

It always gives me a bad feeling when people stop mid slope even when the condition seem or are fine.

Yup. It's not even a "shot" that gets skied cept for a photo op or maybe for building a kicker on. Someone coming in from the cat road wouldn't even see if there was any recent activity on that road embankment of a slope. You'd hafta be up on the emma skiing refrozen coral or glue depending on the time of day when teh sun shines, and even then you'd prolly just schuss right by it.

I know eighth graders with more avalanche awareness then that chick

I hadn't seen the pictures of that from the top looking down until now. Holy shit.

This whole incident was well thrashed in either ski/snowboard or here in SZ when it happened last year.

McCammon's six factors are not unique to avalanches. People make the same mistakes in all parts of their lives.

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Originally Posted by telebobski

People make the same mistakes in all parts of their lives.

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I may have said this on page 1 or 2, that's why things will never change and accidents are normal for any complex system. People need to accept that humans are fallible.

As you know, there are fields which are "life and death" that have come up with strategies for coping with human fallibility. Apparently this isn't one. Shit, apparently it took 5-10 years for mainstream finance risk pap to make it to Avys. poor data seets + zero desire for real analysis = not much change and the same shit over and over again. (not counting the continuing influx of nouveau BC skiers. Who are nouveau in their view, not their appearance.

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Originally Posted by Hugh Conway

As you know, there are fields which are "life and death" that have come up with strategies for coping with human fallibility. Apparently this isn't one. Shit, apparently it took 5-10 years for mainstream finance risk pap to make it to Avys. poor data seets + zero desire for real analysis = not much change and the same shit over and over again. (not counting the continuing influx of nouveau BC skiers. Who are nouveau in their view, not their appearance.

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I deal with strategies that try and cope with these "life and death" decisions everyday at work, the OR, yet people still make mistakes and bad decisions.
Accidents are normal.

I think the decision-making tools are there. And the data may not be great, but is there to a surprisingly large extent. The culture is there only on a group by group basis. Using examples from other fields, getting doctors to reliably wash their hands is surprisingly hard to achieve at the level of actual behavior, but ultimately doable. If you use some of the available decision-making tools, the WAH and Grizzly Gulch incidents would have been headed off at the get-go, for instance. Not using them is a choice, and needs to be recognized as a choice. Just like soloing or doing R/X routes in climbing, if everyone's explicit about those choices, and decides to accept a high level of risk, there's not even anything wrong with that, assuming peer pressure and an inability to process what a bad outcome looks like isn't at work (big assumption).

There is, for snow safety, also an odd culture of almost political correctness that I don't see in climbing. For instance, most trad climbers have had the experience of a runout feeling reasonable until all of a sudden it wasn't. So, "gut" or what feels ok at the moment isn't a great gauge. For snow safety, you can hear repeated talk of "listen to your gut," when gut feelings and listening to them lead to things like the Grizzly Gulch incident very easily. The photographer, on the basis of his limited data set, knew in his gut that it was reasonable to get a few quick photos there. So, consciously or not, failed to utilize established analytical tools that would have said this was high-risk even with gear.

Another link to Powder made me think of this thread and the article. What happened here? Just watch part 5 and the piece never really seemed to go anywhere. Last post was over a month ago and no one posted after part 4.